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FOREWORD 
The Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group (MNSG) is an international body of veteran 
policymakers and prominent analysts working to craft innovative but practical measures to address 
threats posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. A 
summary of the Strategy Group’s efforts and copies of associated publications are available online at 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/mnsg/index.htm. 
Since its inception in July 1999, the MNSG has been preoccupied by the spread and potential use 
of mass-destruction weapons, whether by such states as Iraq or transnational terrorist organizations 
like al-Qa’ida. In December 2001, the MNSG met in Monterey, California, to reflect upon the impact 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and their U.S. and international repercus-
sions, and to strategize about how the United States and international community can avert terrorism 
and reduce NBC threats to U.S. and international security. This publication includes papers prepared 
for the meeting, a thematic review of the group’s deliberations, as well as a list of Strategy Group 
members and other specialists who participated in the session. 
This publication and other activities of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group have 
been made possible in part through the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, 
The Ford Foundation, Dr. Jeff and Mrs. Jill Harris, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foun-
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CISAC  Center for International Security and 
Cooperation 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
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CW chemical weapons 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid 
DOD U.S. Department of Defense 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DOS U.S. Department of State 
ESD  Environmental Sensing Device 
FY fiscal year 
G-8 Group of Eight 
HEU highly enriched uranium 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM  intercontinental ballistic missile 
IL-4 interleukin-4 
INF  Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
IRGC Islamic Republic Guards Corps 
ISI Inter Services Intelligence 
MPC&A  materials protection, control, & 
accounting 
MNSG  Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy 
Group 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 
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NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team 
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NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons 
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P-5 Permanent Five (members of U.N. Secu-
rity Council) 
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R&D research and development 
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START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
U.N. United Nations 
UNSC U.N. Security Council 
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WMD weapons of mass destruction 
WSSX Warhead Safety and Security Exchange 
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NATIONAL SECURITY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND THE 
WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
Mike Shuster 
National Public Radio 
 
The attack on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, is a wa-
tershed date in the history of the United States 
after the Cold War. Since 1989, policymakers, 
analysts, and historians have been unable to 
name the period of history the United States 
entered after 1989. The best that they could 
muster was “the post-Cold War period.” That 
short-lived era in U.S. history is now over. 
What we will name this period and how we will 
characterize it are not yet clear. But it will be a 
very different period for the United States and 
its role in the world.  
Where before the United States displayed 
uncertainty and confusion about its global 
power and place, now U.S. policy in interna-
tional affairs has a clear purpose and goal. U.S. 
policymakers, in both political parties, under-
stand the international stakes for the United 
States better than they did in the previous pe-
riod, and they have already demonstrated the 
ability to make better decisions. 
The United States experienced an attack on 
its citizens and its territory like no other since 
the early Nineteenth Century. Even the attack 
on Pearl Harbor in 1941 did not threaten the 
territorial United States in such a deliberate and 
murderous way. The goal now is the defense of 
the American homeland, the prevention of fu-
ture attacks, and the use of diplomatic and mili-
tary means to make sure that the American 
people are as safe as possible. 
This is bringing fundamental changes in na-
tional security policy and nonproliferation pol-
icy. U.S. national security policy will be 
motivated principally by homeland defense. 
Defense policy and budgets, intelligence agen-
cies and budgets, and nonproliferation policy 
will all be driven by a single principle: protect-
ing the United States from attack, especially 
from attack with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). This has already begun to change the 
shape of the U.S. government’s national secu-
rity apparatus, and it will bring about the re-
alignment of political forces in the United 
States. Some of the outcomes are already within 
view. Some will be paradoxical. 
DETERRENCE, PREVENTION, 
AND DEFENSE 
The tools in the war against terrorism, as 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry 
has pointed out, are deterrence, prevention, and 
defense.1 These are all necessary components of 
a national security policy. Any administration 
that does not understand the necessary role of 
each may fail in its effort to protect the United 
States in the future from devastating attack. 
Deterrence works against nation-states and 
national governments, which must take into 
account the will and welfare of their people. 
Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, even 
as the United States pursues deep cuts in offen-
sive nuclear deployments, will remain a compo-
nent of U.S. national security policy for the 
foreseeable future. But greater realism about the 
lower levels of deployments necessary, their 
alert status, and their targets, is welcome. The 
overwhelming conventional power of the U.S. 
military also comprises an essential element of 
American deterrence. 
But deterrence by itself will not be suffi-
cient to confront all threats. Before September 
11, this was a heated topic of debate among 
specialists in nuclear weapons policy. Now we 
have an answer: the United States is facing an 
enemy bent on and capable of inflicting mass 
casualties on the territory of the United States, 
against whom deterrence will not work. As long 
as those who plan the attacks on the United 
States are willing to commit suicide, and as long 
                                                 
1 William J. Perry, “Preparing for the Next At-
tack,” Foreign Affairs, 80 (November/December 
2001), pp. 31-45. 
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as they are ordered into action by stateless peo-
ple who have no loyalty to populations or peo-
ples, and who seek refuge in failed states whose 
populations have no influence over their lead-
ers, then deterrence will not be reliable in all 
cases. 
“Nuclear or biological weapons in the 
hands of terrorists or rogue states,” Perry wrote 
recently, “constitute the greatest single danger 
to American security—indeed to world secu-
rity—and a threat that is becoming increasingly 
less remote.”2 
The Bush administration came into office 
with a skeptical view of the value of interna-
tional agreements in containing the spread of 
WMD. In fact, in its early months, it seemed as 
if the administration had concluded that prolif-
eration was a fact of international life and the 
policy of nonproliferation would not remain a 
priority in national security policy. Counterpro-
liferation was becoming the watchword; non-
proliferation was, for some in the 
administration, barely relevant. 
But in the aftermath of September 11, it is 
more important than ever to use the tools of 
nonproliferation, developed over decades, to 
protect the United States. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion (CTR), and weapons inspections in Iraq 
“are necessary components of Bush’s war on 
terrorism,” wrote Lawrence Korb and Alex 
Tiersky. “The Bush administration must now 
demonstrate that it is ready to stand with the 
world, even if it means accepting some limited 
constraints on America’s freedom to do as it 
pleases.”3 
This may largely be true, but in the new 
context of the war on terrorism, it may be that 
the United States will use these instruments of 
nonproliferation to build coalitions even as it 
augments its action by unilateral steps, often 
                                                 
2 Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” p. 32. 
3 Lawrence J. Korb and Alex Tiersky, “The End 
of Unilateralism? Arms Control After Septem-
ber 11,” Arms Control Today (October 2001), 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/k
orboct01.asp>. 
military, when it pleases. In its focus on home-
land defense, the current administration can use 
the nonproliferation regime as one of the tools 
in its arsenal. But under current circumstances it 
can justify use of a bigger stick to pressure er-
rant nations into cooperation. There will be less 
restraint on military action to impose nonprolif-
eration goals, and more international consensus, 
inside the U.N. Security Council and beyond it, 
for action in cases where WMD proliferation 
threatens peace and security. 
An additional necessary component is a re-
energized cooperative threat reduction effort 
with Russia. In this area, too, the Bush admini-
stration began with a skeptical view and an in-
clination to cut budgets. But insecure stockpiles 
of nuclear materials and weapons in Russia—a 
problem that will only be made worse by fur-
ther deep cuts in offensive deployments—is the 
single most-accessible source of nuclear assets 
for terrorists. In contrast to the Bush admini-
stration’s initial approach to cooperative threat 
reduction, the United States will have to spend 
more money and speed up its effort to secure 
all of Russia’s nuclear materials as quickly as 
possible. 
Deterrence and prevention in current cir-
cumstances are powerful safeguards of national 
security. But they will not protect the United 
States against all possible attacks using WMD. 
Homeland defense will take a position in 
American national security policy unequaled 
since the middle of the Twentieth Century. And 
there will have to be a role for what Perry calls 
“the insurance policy” of missile defense. 
But covert delivery is still the most likely 
method of attack by terrorists using nuclear or 
other weapons of mass destruction. The United 
States will have to fund and mount a very effec-
tive homeland defense, focusing on WMD de-
livery by boat or truck or other secret means. It 
will have to develop technology that can find 
hidden nuclear and other WMD, and it will 
have to put that technology into the hands of a 
wide variety of law enforcement agencies. This 
will be an enormous and expensive undertaking. 
As for missile defense, September 11 ap-
pears to have changed no one’s mind. Those 
who opposed missile defense before continue 
to oppose it now, arguing that as they had fore-
seen, mass-casualty attacks against the United 
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States would come in an unexpected package, 
not from attack by intercontinental ballistic 
missile. Those who favored missile defense be-
fore continue to favor it now. They argue that if 
those who ordered the September 11 attacks 
could acquire nuclear weapons and a missile 
that could reach the United States, then they 
would use them without hesitation.  
While there seems little doubt that the ter-
rorists would use such weapons if they could 
get them, it is difficult to imagine a precise sce-
nario right now where the United States would 
not be able to preempt an attack of this sort. 
Even if pro-bin Laden forces were to seize 
power in Pakistan, for example, and seize its 
nuclear weapons and missiles, and even if those 
missiles had the range to reach the United 
States (which they do not), the United States 
would be in a clear position to attack missile 
and nuclear sites in Pakistan before a launch 
could occur. 
But as an insurance policy against future 
threats, the careful and measured pursuit of 
missile defense should be a component of the 
national security policy of the United States. 
Paradoxically, the attacks of September 11 may 
have forced the Bush administration to slow its 
approach to developing anti-missile technology, 
as it seeks the acquiescence and cooperation of 
Moscow. For the first time, the United States 
has the opportunity to fund development and 
testing of a wide range of technologies while 
not succumbing to the political pressure that 
has created the “rush to failure” in the past. But 
this cautionary note from Perry is a good one: 
“If the single-minded pursuit of [missile de-
fense] conflicts with programs designed to curb 
proliferation and strengthen deterrence, it could 




The September 11 attacks have turned the 
Bush administration’s approach to foreign pol-
icy on its head. President Bush and most of his 
senior policy advisers arrived in office with a 
strong desire to lead the United States on its 
                                                 
4 Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” p. 33. 
own path in the world. From global warming to 
International Monetary Fund bailouts, small 
arms sales to nuclear arms control, this admini-
stration demonstrated little concern for the 
wider world’s views in its first eight months in 
office. 
September 11 drove home the realization 
among senior policymakers in the Bush admini-
stration that the United States really does need 
the help of the rest of the world. Nowhere has 
that message been more important than in U.S. 
relations with Russia. The September 11 attacks 
turned years of cool relations between the 
United States and Russia into a veritable cozy, 
fireside gathering. In fact, these events may 
bring the two nations together with a purpose 
unlike any of those imagined by even the most 
optimistic observers at the end of the Cold War 
in the early 1990s. The ABM Treaty may even-
tually disappear, and it may turn out to be far 
easier in the current context to fashion a coop-
erative strategic framework to replace it.5 
Even the missile threat itself may change. 
President Bush and his advisers have usually 
listed North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the rogue 
states with ambitions to acquire ICBMs. But the 
war in Afghanistan is swiftly transforming U.S.-
Iranian relations. More slowly perhaps, North 
Korea is reevaluating its interest in developing 
and exporting longer-range missiles. It is not 
possible to predict which nations might be con-
sidered a threat by the time the United States is 
actually ready to deploy missile defenses. 
What will be the effect of these develop-
ments on China? It could very well perceive 
itself on the outside of this newfound coziness 
between Washington and Moscow, especially if 
Russia lets the ABM Treaty go. Only six 
months ago, Russia and China were fashioning 
a new closer relationship, which some observers 
worried might eventually evolve into a military 
alliance to challenge America’s place as the sole 
superpower. Then, Moscow and Beijing reaf-
firmed the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of 
international security. After September 11, 
President Putin and President Bush engaged in 
                                                 
5 After this paper was written, on December 13, 
2001, the Bush administration announced U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. 
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de facto negotiations to adjust the ABM Treaty. 
They proved unsuccessful, but Putin’s reaction 
to the U.S. decision to leave the ABM Treaty 
was muted, as Putin seems unwilling to under-
mine by his actions Russia’s closer relationship 
to the United States. We may see China move 
quickly in the aftermath of this warming be-
tween Washington and Moscow to seek friend-
lier relations as well with the United States 
Here at home, the political consequences 
are also profound. The traditional Democ-
ratic/Republican divide on these issues is break-
ing down. Democrats are more willing to 
advocate military action; Republicans will be 
more willing to combine military action with 
diplomacy on the nonproliferation front. 
“The old split between hawks and doves is 
no longer relevant,” David Brooks wrote this 
fall. With a bow to Machiavelli, Brooks pro-
poses a new divide on national security policy 
between lions and foxes. “Lions believe in the 
aggressive use of power. For them the main 
danger is appeasement. They worry that we will 
be half-hearted and never really tackle our 
problems. Foxes, by contrast, believe you have 
to move cleverly and subtly. They worry that 
America will act unilaterally and tear its coali-
tion and trample upon our own freedom.”6 
PARADOXICAL OUTCOMES 
The consequences of this tectonic shift in 
international relations are not easy to predict. 
Current friends could end up becoming adver-
saries. Just think of the geopolitical goals of 
Usama bin Laden. Were he or those who come 
after him to have their way over the next five 
years, the threat could come from Saudi Arabia 
with money to acquire the missiles and nuclear 
weapons. Iran might turn into the friendly 
power the United States relies on in the Persian 
Gulf. 
And it could be that nonproliferation 
agreements get in the way of safeguarding nu-
clear weapons. The NPT could stand in the way 
of more aggressive action on the part of the 
United States to prevent terrorists from acquir-
ing nuclear weapons or components. Again, 
                                                 
6 David Brooks, “The Age of Conflict,” Weekly 
Standard, (November 5, 2001), p. 19. 
take the example of Pakistan. If radical Islamists 
in Pakistan’s military overthrow the government 
of General Pervez Musharraf, what happens to 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? How can the 
United States make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear 
assets do not fall into the hands of terrorists? 
Obviously, the answer is clear: Washington 
should do everything it can to help the current 
Pakistani government safeguard its nuclear 
weapons. But that turns out to be more difficult 
than one might imagine. Because Pakistan is a 
non-nuclear state under the provisions of the 
NPT, the treaty prevents the United States 
from providing Pakistan with the most ad-
vanced safeguards for its nuclear weapons. 
However, such safeguards would also make 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons easier to deploy and 
easier to use. Providing such help would in ef-
fect acknowledge Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons 
state. The NPT prohibits all its signatories from 
accepting the nuclear-weapons status of any 
state other than the original five nuclear 
weapon powers. 
In any case, even if the Bush administration 
were willing to provide it, Pakistani leaders are 
reluctant to accept such help because they fear 
disclosing intimate knowledge of the character-
istics and locations of their weapons. They be-
lieve such information could be used by the 
United States to steal, destroy, or otherwise un-
dermine their nuclear arsenal. 
It may be true that only by accepting Paki-
stan, and by extension India, into the club of 
nuclear nations can the United States work 
most effectively to prevent the spread of nu-
clear weapons into the hands of terrorists. So is 
the NPT really part of the war on terrorism? Or 
will some inside the Bush administration con-
clude that it should be abandoned—not to con-
done proliferation—but in the interests of 
containing proliferation and preventing such 
weapons from ending up in the hands of those 
who are undeterrable?  
CONCLUSION 
Earlier this year, Jan Lodal wrote: “A deci-
sion by the United States to reduce its offensive 
forces below 2,500 and to adopt a non-
threatening approach to strategic defenses 
would be a powerful answer to those who be-
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lieve the United States is committed to hege-
monic military dominance.”7 
Before September 11, it was very difficult 
to imagine that the Bush administration would 
adopt such a posture; but afterwards, that could 
very well be the approach the Bush administra-
tion takes. Its agreement with Russia on deep 
cuts in offensive strategic weapons may place it 
squarely within Lodal’s framework. We shall see 
how the Bush administration moves ahead on 
the details of its missile defense program. 
The attack against the United States made 
possible this shift in policy. What is still unclear 
is whether the United States will remain com-
mitted to this approach and whether the world 
will perceive that the United States is not bent 
on absolute military dominance in global affairs. 
                                                 
7 Jan Lodal, The Price of Dominance: The New 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to 
American Leadership (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, 2001), p. 13. 
On this issue, the September 11 attacks 
may have given a boost to both impulses in 
American national security policy: to more mul-
tilateralism as the evolving relationship with 
Russia demonstrates, and to more unilateralism 
especially through the exercise of U.S. military 
power. The so-far successful (as of mid-
December 2001) war in Afghanistan will 
strengthen this impulse. The threats to expand 
the war on terrorism to other states—Iraq is 
cited most often—have not abated. But the 
Bush administration has already recognized the 
utility of a nonproliferation tool it had earlier 
disdained, the Biological Weapons Convention. 
Such are the unexpected and potentially 
beneficial results for national security and non-
proliferation policies of the war on terrorism.  
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THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Leonard S. Spector 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
An applicant for a license to construct and operate a [nuclear] production or utilization facil-
ity. . . is not required to provide for design features or other measures for the specific pur-
pose of protection against the effects of (a) attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, 
directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government 
or other person. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations establishing requirements for protection of 
nuclear power reactors, 10 CFR Sec. 50.13, originally adopted 26 September 1967. 
The Office [of Homeland Security] shall coordinate efforts to protect the United States and 
its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. In performing this func-
tion, the Office shall work with Federal, State, and local agencies, and private entities, as ap-
propriate, to: (i) strengthen measures for protecting . . . facilities that produce, use, store, or 
dispose of nuclear material. . . within the United States from terrorist attack. 
Executive Order 13228, establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the  
Homeland Security Council, 8 October 2001. 
 
As the transformation of U.S. policy on re-
actor security indicates, the al-Qa’ida terrorist 
attacks of September 11 and their aftermath 
have given new immediacy to the threat of nu-
clear terrorism. This threat includes not only 
terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants, but 
also terrorist use of fission weapons or conven-
tional bombs containing radioactive contami-
nants (radiological dispersion devices). The 
September 2001 events have underscored the 
growing capabilities of terrorist organizations, 
heightened awareness of the shortcomings in 
existing efforts to avert nuclear terrorism, and 
accentuated the need to intensify these efforts 
and explore new strategies to meet the nuclear 
terrorism challenge. 
GROWING COMPETENCE 
Al-Qa’ida’s destructive attacks in New York 
and Washington demonstrated for a second 
time the sophistication and malevolence of the 
most advanced modern terrorist groups. The 
first demonstration came in March 1995, when 
Aum Shinrikyu released sarin gas in the Tokyo 
subway. 
No terrorist organization, including Aum 
and al-Qa’ida, is known to have assembled a 
technically qualified team that could build a 
nuclear weapon if it had the requisite fissile ma-
terial in hand. Moreover, the actual terrorist 
deeds of these organizations were far from the 
pinnacle of technical complexity. Nonetheless, 
Aum Shinrikyu, and, particularly, al-Qa’ida—
with its free hand in Afghanistan, links to Paki-
stani nuclear scientists, and potential links to 
Iraqi nuclear specialists—probably could have 
built a fission-weapon production team over 
time.1 
                                                 
1 A number of episodes make clear that terrorist 
organizations are interested in acquiring the 
potential for nuclear mayhem. Aum Shinrikyu, 
for example, is reported to have mined and ex-
tracted uranium and to have attempted unsuc-
cessfully to enrich it. Usama bin Laden has 
declared that he possesses nuclear weapons of 
some type, and testimony of other al-Qa’ida 
members has described his attempts, apparently 
unsuccessful, to buy fissile material. In addition, 
Russian military officials have stated recently 
that terrorist organizations have scouted Rus-
sian nuclear sites. In November 1995, Chechen 
rebels seeking to embarrass authorities in Mos-
cow publicized the fact that they had placed 
cesium-137, a radiological material used for 
many industrial and medical purposes, in a 
heavily used Moscow park. Unfortunately, only 
Leonard S. Spector 
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Other existing terrorist organizations may 
not be able to match the overall technical com-
petence, international reach, and wealth of Aum 
Shinrikyu and al-Qa’ida, but this constellation 
of capabilities has been demonstrated twice, in 
very different settings, and may well be seen 
again. 
Thus, even as the United States attempts to 
limit nuclear “brain drain” from the former So-
viet Union and to strengthen international con-
trols over nuclear technology flows, one of the 
most important tools for restricting terrorists’ 
development of a fission-weapon production 
team is likely to be the broader U.S. war on ter-
rorism, aimed at disrupting major terrorist or-
ganizations across-the-board, a war conducted 
outside of the sphere of traditional nuclear 
regulations and regimes. 
PROTECTING FISSILE MATERIAL 
More traditional initiatives directly aimed at 
improving the security of fissile materials are 
also essential to counter nuclear terrorism. To-
day these initiatives are focused most inten-
sively on materials in the U.S. nuclear weapons 
complex and on those in the former Soviet Un-
ion. Only the latter—which remain far more 
vulnerable—will be addressed here. 
The U.S. Department of Energy Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) 
Program has completed security upgrades on 
fissile material in the former Soviet states other 
than Russia. In Russia, the MPC&A Program is 
not scheduled to complete the first echelon of 
improved security (“rapid upgrades”) on all 603 
tons of fissile material currently in Russia’s in-
ventory until 2007, although it is possible that at 
least rudimentary security improvements could 
be completed over the next nine months.2 
                                                                      
modest technical capabilities would be needed 
to mount an attack against a civilian nuclear 
facility or to incorporate a radioactive source 
into a conventional bomb. 
2 U.S Department of Energy (DOE), Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program, 
Strategic Plan—2001 (Washington, DC: DOE, 
July 2001); Rose Gottemoeller, “Testimony be-
fore the Subcommittee on International Secu-
rity, Proliferation, and Federal Services, 
Efforts to protect fissile material in Russia 
could be significantly strengthened. The most 
important step would be to accelerate the 
MPC&A Program; the Bush administration 
initially opposed new funding to speed this 
work, but is now seeking significantly increased 
resources for it. Second, since weapons-quality 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) could be far 
more easily used for a terrorist nuclear device 
than plutonium, U.S. programs to protect and 
eliminate fissile material in the NIS should be 
adjusted to concentrate first on securing and 
eliminating such HEU.3 Finally, diplomatic and 
economic resources should be concentrated on 
the U.S. fissile material programs in the NIS 
(see summary chart below) that will produce 
benefits most rapidly. 
Even if all of these initiatives are adopted, 
however, large quantities of Russian fissile ma-
terial will remain vulnerable for the next five 
years. During this “window of vulnerability,” 
overall counterterrorism efforts to block the 
formation and activities of large-scale interna-
                                                                      
Committee on Governmental Affairs,” U.S. 
Senate, November 7, 2001. 
3 Small, but proliferation-significant quantities 
of fresh HEU research reactor fuel also can be 
found at facilities in a number of other former 
Soviet states and Eastern Europe. Locations of 
greatest concern are the Vinca reactor in Serbia; 
the Sosny reactor in Belarus; and the Kharkiv 
reactor in Ukraine. U.S. programs have im-
proved security at all sites holding such material 
in the former Soviet states and security in sev-
eral, but not all, East European states meets 
international standards. However, the best ap-
proach overall would be to convert the reactors 
in question to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
fuel, and to transfer fresh and spent fuel to 
Russia for down-blending to non-weapons us-
able low-enriched material. Also, Thomas Neff, 
the intellectual father of the current U.S. pro-
gram to blend down and purchase Russian 
HEU, estimates that the added cost of an accel-
erated program to blend down HEU at a rate of 
50 tons per year, rather than at the current rate 
of 30 tons per year, would be only about $150 
million annually, much of which would be re-
couped when the additional blended material 
were sold commercially.  
The New Landscape of Nuclear Terrorism 
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tional terrorist organizations—that is, to con-
strain the “demand” side of the problem—will 
thus be a particularly important component of 
U.S. efforts address this aspect of the nuclear 
terror threat. 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Protecting nuclear power plants against at-
tacks by terrorist groups will also require a mul-
tidimensional approach to nuclear terrorism, in 
which non-nuclear security measures are em-
ployed as one of the major bulwarks against this 
danger. 
U.S. nuclear power reactors on flight paths 
to major airports have containments (reinforced 
concrete structures surrounding the reactor ves-
sel) able to withstand some commercial jet 
crashes, although not necessarily the deliberate 
crash by a fully fueled jumbo jet. Containments 
at other reactors are less robust. Spent fuel 
pools at all reactors have little protection 
against airplane crashes, and, in many cases, 
attacks on these pools could cause meltdowns 
with extremely serious consequences. Plane 
crashes could also destroy vital reactor safety 
systems that are not protected by containment 
structures. 
It is impractical, however, to make the 103 
U.S. nuclear power reactors invulnerable to this 
danger by reinforcing containment domes or 
building comparable structures around spent 
fuel pools and critical plant equipment. Rather, 
the civilian airliner threat will have to be ad-
dressed outside the nuclear regulatory frame-
work. The only effective approach is 
eliminating the danger of hijacking, establishing 
no-fly zones near nuclear facilities, and, at least 
for the immediate future, providing military 
protection through air patrols and other anti-
aircraft measures. None of these responsibilities 
resides with nuclear regulatory authorities or 
private electrical utilities that operate nuclear 
plants. 
More broadly, as indicated at the outset of 
this paper, U.S. nuclear power plant security 
regulations assume that plant operators are not 
responsible for protecting against threats posed 
by an “enemy of the United States.” With the 
United States now at war against al-Qa’ida, it is 
clear that modern terrorist organizations can 
attain the status of “enemy.” It is also clear that 
the design basis threat for developing protective 
measures at nuclear facilities needs to be up-
graded to take into account the possibility of a 
military-style attack involving 10 to 20 highly 
trained, heavily armed men working in multiple 
teams. Meeting this threat is not a job for the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nu-
clear plant operators, but one for the National 
Guard or other military or police organizations 
(with appropriate coordination and training 
with nuclear authorities). 
The United States has recognized the need 
for such a multidimensional response to major 
terrorist threats through the creation of the Of-
fice of Homeland Security in October 2001. 
The fundamental mission of this office is to 
coordinate a wide range of state and federal 
capabilities to detect terrorist threats, protect 
against terrorist attacks, respond to such attacks 
when they occur, and aid in recovery efforts. As 
noted above, the mandate of this office specifi-
cally includes addressing terrorist threats to nu-
clear facilities and materials in the United States. 
Many questions remain about the future ef-
fectiveness of this new organization. What is 
more important, however, is that this office has 
been established and that, in a dramatic shift in 
national policy, the United States is now look-
ing comprehensively at mechanisms for meet-
ing the nuclear terrorism challenge. Similar 
capabilities will be needed in other states with 
major nuclear facilities, especially Western de-
mocracies, which are the most likely targets of 
terrorism. 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 
ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION  
As the United States moves to confront 
nuclear terrorism across a broad front, the in-
ternational community is lagging behind. Inter-
national efforts to improve physical security 
standards over nuclear materials and facilities, 
for example, are stalled. The Physical Protection 
Guidelines of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) are voluntary and, because they 
must address such a wide variety of situations 
across the IAEA’s member countries, they are 
Leonard S. Spector 
 9
so general as to give little practical guidance.4 
Little progress is being made toward making 
these guidelines binding or toward extending 
the 1980 International Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which 
now covers materials in international transit, to 
also cover materials held within a state. 
The international community has also been 
unable to establish effective programs for con-
trolling radioactive sources, which are used in 
radiotherapy and industrial radiography equip-
ment. Controlling such sources is essential to 
reduce the danger of terrorist use of radiation-
dispersal devices. According to IAEA Director 
of Radiation and Waste Safety Abel Gonzalez,  
Security of radioactive materials has 
traditionally been relatively light. There 
are few security precautions on radio-
therapy equipment and a large source 
could be removed quite easily, espe-
cially if those involved have no regard 
for their own health. Moreover, in 
many countries, the regulatory over-
sight of radiation sources is weak. As a 
result, an undetermined number of ra-
dioactive sources have become or-
phaned of regulatory control and their 
location is unknown.5  
Equally telling, the IAEA’s 1999 action plan for 
addressing this risk treats the matter as purely a 
health and safety issue, not a potential terror-
ist/military threat.6 
The foregoing suggests that to advance the 
physical protection of nuclear assets interna-
tionally, and, especially in advanced Western 
states, it may be time to look beyond the IAEA, 
at least on an interim basis. Given the solidarity 
                                                 
4 “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
and Nuclear Facilities,” International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 
(Corr.), (Vienna: IAEA, May 1999). 
5 “Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terror-
ism Threat,” IAEA Press Release, November 1, 
2001. 
6 “Measures to Strengthen International Coop-
eration in Nuclear Radiation and Waste Safety,” 
GOV/1999/46-GC (43)/10, (Vienna: IAEA, 
August 17, 1999. 
of U.S. military allies—the NATO countries, 
Japan, and South Korea—in the current war on 
terrorism and given the increasing recognition 
that nuclear terrorism is, in its most dangerous 
forms, a military threat to the United States and 
its security partners, it might be useful to en-
gage these countries, as allies, in a systematic 
effort to improve security over nuclear materi-
als, including radioactive sources, and facilities 
within their respective borders. 
Under this approach, senior national secu-
rity officials in Washington—from the National 
Security Council, the State Department’s Office 
of Counterterrorism, and/or the Department of 
Defense—would work with their counterparts 
in allied capitals to launch, as a matter of alli-
ance policy, parallel national initiatives to im-
prove the security of nuclear materials and 
facilities. Existing alliance coordinating bodies, 
such as the NATO Senior Political-Military 
Group on Proliferation, could also be employed 
for this effort. The content of new physical se-
curity rules could be based upon IAEA stan-
dards—appropriately strengthened and fleshed 
out—which would be implemented through 
normal civilian channels and augmented 
through coordination with other national capa-
bilities (i.e., civil air authorities, National Guard 
equivalents, etc.). The motive for action would 
be to enhance the defenses of U.S. alliance 
partners against a new, jointly recognized threat. 
Such an approach would have several ad-
vantages. It would:  
• bypass the stalemate created by consensus 
decision-making at the IAEA;  
• generate new bureaucratic pressure within 
allied states for improving protection 
against nuclear terrorism;  
• foster the incorporation of military assets in 
certain aspects of the counter-nuclear-
terrorism effort (including specially trained 
response forces, air patrols, and the like); 
• dilute the influence of nuclear facility op-
erators seeking to minimize security ex-
penses; and  
• prod national regulators to control radioac-
tive sources more effectively. 
NATO members, Japan, and South Korea 
account for nearly 70 percent of all nuclear 
power plants worldwide and the bulk of other 
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nuclear fuel cycle facilities. If these states 
adopted more robust nuclear security practices 
as part of the alliance response to terrorism, 
neighboring non-allied states, such as Switzer-
land, Sweden, and perhaps Russia, would be 
hard-pressed not to follow suit. As the principal 
nuclear supplier countries, moreover, the alli-
ance governments could also take steps to en-
sure that customer states improve their 
regulation of radioactive sources produced in 
research reactors supported by these suppliers. 
This approach, to be sure, would be a sig-
nificant departure from past policies, but it is in 
keeping with emerging trends within NATO 
and within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Ko-
rean security relationships, where coordinated 
counterproliferation and counterterrorism ef-
forts have received increased attention since the 
mid-1990s. 
CONCLUSIONS 
If the capabilities of modern terrorist or-
ganizations continue to grow, the threat of nu-
clear terrorism will surely worsen in coming 
years. Meeting this multifaceted challenge will 
require a more comprehensive and diversified 
response than imagined only months ago, one 
that goes well beyond a focus on the protection 
of nuclear assets per se. With the wide-ranging 
war on terrorism and the establishment of the 
Office of Homeland Security, the United States 
is setting the right course. It must now find the 
political will and financial resources to sustain 
these efforts and to lead other vulnerable na-
tions to adopt similar strategies.
Leonard S. Spector 
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U.S. NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 
Program Goals Accomplishments Challenges/Recommendations 
Program (Agency) Goals Accomplishments Challenges/Recommendations 








of START I Treaty by 
underwriting the elimina-
tion of Soviet-era nuclear 
systems and providing 
related technical support 
All n-weapons removed from 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine; 
>6000 n-weapons deactivated; 
> 400 ICBMs destroyed; 83 long-
range bombers destroyed; 
367 ICBM silos destroyed; 184 
ballistic missile submarines de-
stroyed; 184 submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles destroyed 
 
Program running smoothly; management of 
spent fuel from dismantled submarines and re-
lated transparency issues may pose obstacles 
 
No arrangements to account for or eliminate 
tactical nuclear weapons or to confirm imple-
mentation of 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear 





Assist Russia destroy CW 
stocks in compliance with 
Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC) 
Some progress towards construc-
tion of key CW destruction facility 
in Shchuch’ye 
Much delay because of disputes over choice of 
CW destruction technology, Russian financial 
contributions, and environmental issues; Russia 
now seeking extension of CWC deadlines; pro-
gram regained momentum during 2001  
 
Fissile Material Security 
Material Protection, 
Control, and Account-
ing (MPC&A) Program 
(DOE) 
Assist Russia improve 
security for 603 tons of n-
weapons material at 53 
sites and for 1000s of na-
val n-weapons  
All n-weapons material secured in 
non-Russian NIS states; rapid 
security upgrades completed on 
190 tons of material (including 
comprehensive upgrades on 90 
tons of material); 1000s of n-
weapons secured 
 
Rapid upgrades on all 603 tons not to be com-
pleted until 2007; comprehensive upgrades not to 
be completed until 2011; access limited at many 
sensitive Russian sites; program not fully inte-
grated with other U.S. fissile material protec-
tion/elimination programs  
Mayak Fissile Material 
Storage Facility (DOD) 
 
Construct secure facility 
for 50 tons of Russian 
weapons plutonium 
 
Facility nearing completion. Load-
ing to begin in 2002 
Transparency arrangements, essential before 
loading can begin, remain under negotiation 
Second Line of De-
fense (DOE, DOD) 
Reduce risk of nuclear 
smuggling by improving 
border security 
Nearly a dozen border points 
secured in Russia; tens of border 
points secured in other NIS states 
 
Russia program slowed by inadequate funding; 




Secure 3 tons of high-
quality Pu in spent fuel 
MPC&A upgrades complete; fuel 
canned with “hot” fuel 
Discussions continuing on site for long-term 
storage of spent fuel 













Purchase 500 tons of 
weapons grade uranium 
over 20 years for $12bn, 
blended-down to non-
weapons usable nuclear 
power plant fuel 
 
 
To date, 113 tons of HEU 
blended down to fuel-grade and 
purchased by USEC for sale to 
nuclear power plant operators. 
Elimination of HEU will take 20 years; purchase 
price disputes and questions over long-term prof-
itability of USEC creating uncertainties 
 Goals Accomplishments Challenges/Recommendations 
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Program (Agency) Goals Accomplishments Challenges/Recommendations 
Plutonium (Pu) 
Disposition (DOE) 
Eliminate 34 tons of Rus-
sian weapons Pu by irradi-
ating material as mixed 
oxide fuel in Russian nu-
clear power plants  
 
Agreement establishing U.S.-
Russian program signed; extensive 
cost estimates complete; $200M 
appropriated toward future work  
Parallel program launched to 
eliminate 34 tons of U.S. Pu 
 
After lengthy review, Bush administration an-
nounced support for program in late 2001; pro-
gram requires significant financial participation 
by other G-8 members; delay caused by Bush 
review has led to loss of momentum, especially in 
obtaining G-8 support 
Pu Production Reactor 
Shut-Down Agreement 
(DOE) 
End annual production of 
1.8 tons (total) of weapons 
plutonium at three remain-
ing Russian production 
reactors, while providing 
alternatives 
 
Agreements signed, cost esti-
mates, planning complete to re-
place reactors with refurbished or 
new fossil fuel plants 
Extensive delays because of failure of initial ef-
fort to convert cores of reactors as means for 
ending Pu production; new U.S.-Russia agree-
ment on fossil option offers path forward; pro-
gram transferred to DOE from DOD in FY 




Effort during Clinton 
Administration to per-
suade Russia to halt sepa-
ration of 1.5 t/yr of 
plutonium from civilian 
nuclear power plant fuel 
 
Clinton Administration proposed 
construction of spent fuel storage 
facility for civilian spent fuel.  
Program stalled over linkages to Russian nuclear 
exports to Iran; studies continuing. No new 
funds in FY 2002; Bush administration reviewing 
program; support uncertain 
Employing WMD Experts 
Initiatives for Prolifera-
tion Prevention (DOE) 
 
Employ NIS WMD scien-
tists in high-tech projects 
leading to self-sustaining 
businesses with U.S. indus-
trial partners 
  
More than 10,000 NIS scientists 
employed over 5 years; invest-
ment by U.S. business greater 
than U.S. government outlays; 
new privately financed $52M 
venture capital fund 
Commercialization of projects in Russia inher-
ently difficult; years required to develop current, 
successful approach; program now has significant 
momentum and strong interest of U.S. private 
industry, as well as Bush administration and 
Congressional support 
 
Nuclear Cities  
Initiative (DOE) 
Accelerate the planned 
down-sizing of Russia’s 
nuclear weapon complex, 
concentrating on three n-
cities and two n-weapon 
assembly plants 
Open computing centers estab-
lished in two cities; int’l develop-
ment centers established in two 
cities; 10+ commercial projects 
initiated; footprint of Avangard 
plant reduced to create low-
security zone for commercial 
projects; EBRD small loan pro-
gram established 
 
Congressional and Bush administration skepti-
cism created funding uncertainty for FY2002, but 
final FY2002 appropriation will permit program 
to accelerate; initial Russian hesitancy to partici-
pate now overcome 
Intl. Science and 
Technology Center 
(Moscow); Science and 
Technology Center—
Ukraine (Kiev) (DOS) 
 
Provide high-tech em-
ployment opportunities for 
former Soviet WMD scien-
tists 
30,000 scientists assisted through 
hundreds of R&D projects 
Program operating smoothly; recent increases in 
funding 
Employ biological 
weapon (BW)  
scientists; convert BW 




Reduce threat of leakage of 
BW expertise by employ-
ing Soviet BW scientists in 
non-weapons work; recon-
figure BW facilities to non-
weapons work 
For facilities not under Russian 
military control, much progress. 
Many scientists engaged in U.S.- 
or multilaterally sponsored pro-
jects; key facilities in Russia, Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan now 
focused solely on non-military 
activities 
Concerns remain regarding offensive military 
activity at BW facilities that remain under control 
of Russian military; added transparency urgently 
needed 
 
Action needed to ensure security and/or elimina-
tion of working stocks of BW agents 
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ARMS CONTROL FOR ANTHRAX: 
A SAFETY-AND-SECURITY APPROACH TO STRENGTHENING THE BWC 
Michael Barletta & Amy Sands 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
The fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United 
States demonstrate both the urgent need to bol-
ster efforts to address the biological weapon 
(BW) threat, and the inadequacy of the Bush 
administration’s scant and essentially toothless 
proposals to meet that threat. However, the 
bioterror attacks also suggest that the 
administration was right to criticize central 
elements of the proposed compliance protocol 
to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
as fundamentally flawed.  
This paper outlines the nature and dimen-
sions of the “new” BW threat, and urges nego-
tiation of an additional convention grounded in 
materials and technologies safety and security 
(MTSS) principles, rather than pursuing expen-
sive and futile attempts at verification through 
facility inspections as in the proposed BWC 
protocol. It recommends that for both political 
and substantive reasons the administration 
should adopt a “fast-track” approach with the 
U.S. Senate to increase prospects of successfully 
negotiating a new Biosecurity Convention that 
can help avert bioterrorist threats. 
THE “NEW” BW THREAT 
While underscoring the bioweapon threat, 
the anthrax attacks also lend credence to the 
administration’s objection to the proposed 
BWC protocol—though not for the reason an-
ticipated by U.S. officials. Their central BW 
proliferation concern was that given the diffi-
culty of verifying the location, current use, and 
future application of dual-use biotechnologies 
and materials, a determined proliferant state 
could use deception and denial techniques to 
maintain an offensive bioweapon capability 
with little risk of being caught, even by on-site 
teams of expert inspectors. UNSCOM’s frus-
trating experience in Iraq illustrates the validity 
of this concern, but the demonstrated BW 
threat extends far beyond the list of suspected 
proliferant states. 
What the criminal and epidemiological in-
vestigations into the fall 2001 anthrax attacks in 
the United States have revealed is of more omi-
nous proportions. We now recognize that a 
very small group—perhaps even a lone individ-
ual—can acquire a deadly strain of Bacillis an-
thracis, culture a significant quantity of spores, 
and process them to readily aerosolize. The 
terrorist(s) then employed a cheap and ubiqui-
tous delivery system—the U.S. mail—to mur-
der five people, sicken thirteen more, force tens 
of thousands to take powerful antibiotics, dis-
rupt basic functions of the U.S. government, 
provoke anxiety across the nation and around 
the world, and impose billions of dollars in eco-
nomic costs—without being apprehended, 
much less deterred or prevented. At this point, 
it appears that only our assailant’s intentions 
stand between the targeted assault that we have 
suffered so far, and mass-casualty anthrax at-
tacks. 
Even more alarming, despite weeks of in-
tensive investigation, U.S. officials still do not 
know which research or commercial laborato-
ries or other facilities in the United States retain 
virulent strains, or who has access to them or to 
the inexpensive, dual-use, laboratory-scale 
equipment necessary to produce gram quanti-
ties of aerosolizing anthrax spores. At present, 
the United States cannot with confidence verify 
BW capabilities within its own territory, let alone 
inside other countries, and we have no reason 
to believe that even picture-perfect implementa-
tion of the draft BWC protocol could have 
averted these attacks. Whether or not the recent 
bioterror attack proves to be entirely “made in 
America,” it is now evident that the U.S. gov-
ernment cannot protect its citizens from poten-
tial BW threats originating from within the 
continental United States. It will not be able to 
do so until government agencies successfully 
develop and implement comprehensive biode-
fense measures, which will take years even in 
the best-case scenario. 
A Safety-and-Security Approach to Strengthening the BWC 
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Worse still, current casualties and disrup-
tion do no more than hint at the lethality and 
social destructiveness of potential BW threats. 
Set against the backdrop of suicidal terrorists 
plotting and training for years in order to mas-
sacre thousands of people on September 11—
possibly as part of an effort to decapitate the 
U.S. government—we must take seriously the 
threat of deliberate dissemination of smallpox, 
plague, or other contagious diseases. In an age 
of intercontinental air travel, no nation could 
hope to remain an island in the event of a 
smallpox outbreak or other epidemic. More-
over, the widespread training of bioscientists 
and diffusion of dual-use laboratory and pro-
duction equipment, coupled with ongoing ad-
vances in biotechnology, raise the prospect that 
one day non-state actors might be able to bio-
engineer contagious diseases for virulence, sta-
bility during dissemination, and antibiotic 
resistance. 
STRENGTHENING COUNTER- 
MEASURES AGAINST BW THREATS 
Yet just as the bioweapons threat has be-
come almost universally palpable, global efforts 
to control them have come to a standstill. In 
July 2001, the Bush administration announced 
its rejection of the proposed BWC protocol, 
scuttling years of international effort to develop 
confidence-building and compliance measures 
to bolster the BWC. Supporters and critics dis-
agree on the merits of that decision, but there is 
little reason to expect that this administration 
will reconsider. Even if it were to do so, the 
pharmaceutical industry remains opposed and 
the U.S. Senate as presently constituted likely 
would refuse to ratify the proposed protocol. 
Given this political reality, and in light of 
our emerging understanding of the proportions 
of the BW threat, the United States should pro-
pose a set of new initiatives that build on those 
announced in Geneva on November 19, 2001. 
These efforts should include activities that will 
make immediate progress in addressing the BW 
threat, such as launching a global campaign to 
demonstrate that the international community 
rejects the use of biological weapons as a crimi-
nal, evil act that will not be tolerated. Equally 
important is the need to set in motion longer-
term activities, such as negotiations on a new 
convention based on fundamentally different 
and more effective principles than the proposed 
BWC protocol, to ensure development of a 
robust national and international infrastructure 
to address BW threats. 
However, the international norm articu-
lated in the BWC is essential; it remains central 
to any international measures designed to com-
bat BW terrorism or proliferation. In this re-
gard, President Bush was right to declare on 
November 1, 2001, that the United States is and 
will remain committed to the BWC. Indeed, the 
norm against BW must be reinforced. The key 
to success in both the short and long term is 
through a high-profile international endeavor 
led by the United States. 
Thus far, however, the administration has 
not done nearly enough. Certainly, some of the 
specific suggestions that the administration has 
outlined do have merit (e.g., national legislation 
to criminalize the use or possession of BW) but 
others appear vague and ineffectual (e.g., volun-
tary investigation of suspicious outbreaks) or in 
the realm of merely good intentions (e.g., devis-
ing a code of bioethics for scientists), and the 
sum package constitutes a meager effort, one 
that is dwarfed by the manifest threat. While it 
is useful that the United States finally has pro-
vided some alternatives to the proposed proto-
col, we are far from an adequate program of 
action. We therefore urge the administration to 
undertake an integrated set of measures to re-
duce bioterrorist threats to the United States 
and the world. 
Short-Term Initiatives: Unilateral Steps to 
Provide a Role Model for Global Action 
First and foremost, the United States 
should immediately assume a leadership role, 
promoting a realistic and meaningful agenda 
that requires both national and international 
activities. A basic prerequisite for success is that 
President Bush and his most senior advisors 
make this issue a top priority inside and outside 
of the United States. 
Second, the president should order a sys-
tematic evaluation of all U.S. laws relating to 
biological agents and toxins to ensure they are 
sufficiently comprehensive and stringent, and 
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adequately resourced for their effective imple-
mentation. 
Third, the U.S. government should quickly 
determine to rebuild the nation’s public health 
sector, and allocate the necessary resources to 
develop a surge capacity in the medical com-
munity capable of providing adequate response 
in the event of a large-scale BW attack, and to 
ensure that in such an event appropriate com-
munication links and networks are functioning 
as soon as possible in all regions of the country 
and at all levels of government. 
Fourth, as he has already proposed, the 
president should press all countries to pass laws 
criminalizing possession or use of biological 
weapons or toxins with malicious intent. 
Longer-Term Initiatives: Developing an 
Effective International Agenda  
First, the United States should immediately 
assume a leadership role for the long term, 
pushing forward a realistic and meaningful 
agenda requiring multilateral cooperation and 
negotiations. 
Second, the executive branch should work 
quickly to develop with Congress and with the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries to 
develop national laws to tighten U.S. regula-
tions controlling trade, transport, accountability, 
and security of sensitive biological agents. 
These laws should then be enacted as soon as 
possible and without partisanship, to provide a 
basis for a “fast-track” approach to interna-
tional negotiations (outlined below).  
Third, the United States should take the 
lead in promoting a new Biosecurity Conven-
tion to develop and implement progressively 
higher standards for accountable, safe, and se-
cure use, transport, and commerce of danger-
ous pathogens. By focusing on materials and 
technologies safety and security (MTSS) princi-
ples, this treaty would be separate from but in 
support of the BWC. In some respects, the 
1994 Nuclear Safety Convention can serve as a 
useful model, but the Biosecurity Convention 
should be broader in scope, and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) provides useful 
guidance for including real “teeth” to encourage 
membership and help enforce compliance. Ne-
gotiations on the Biosecurity Convention 
should be held under U.N. auspices, and for 
obvious symbolic reasons held in New York 
City.1 All states parties to the BWC and any 
other interested U.N. members should be in-
vited to participate in the negotiations. 
The proposed Biosecurity Convention 
would complement the normative foundations 
of the BWC with concrete agreed-to regulations 
and activities relating to the control, account-
ability, safety, and security of dangerous patho-
gens and toxins as well as certain sensitive dual-
use technologies. It would involve four ele-
ments: a legal commitment by contracting par-
ties; agreed principles for developing higher 
standards in regulation and licensing; mecha-
nisms for oversight and progressive refinement; 
and compliance measures.2 Specifically, this 
convention would entail: 
• commitment to and procedures for the de-
velopment of increasingly higher interna-
tional standards for accounting for and 
                                                 
1 Arguably, for legal and procedural reasons it 
would be better to negotiate an alternative 
BWC protocol, rather than an entirely new, 
“freestanding” multilateral instrument. But for 
political reasons, this would be a bitter pill to 
swallow for all countries but the United States 
that contributed to negotiation of the draft pro-
tocol. For its part, the U.S. administration 
would want to avoid reintroduction of elements 
of the first proposal, a likely outcome if Ad 
Hoc Group efforts that produced the protocol 
were to continue in Geneva. 
2 Paralleling the Nuclear Safety Convention, for 
several reasons the new Biosecurity Convention 
would not aim to include language that would 
exhaustively detail all standards for safety and 
security. First, standards developed now may 
rapidly become obsolete with technological 
change. Second, biotech industry leaders in the 
United States and Europe can learn from other 
states’ best practices and procedures, notably 
from those used in the Soviet BW program. 
Third, it simply will be easier to reach early 
agreement on broad principles, and then use 
subsequent procedures to push for their pro-
gressive implementation, than it would be to 
craft and win accession to a comprehensively 
detailed treaty. 
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ensuring the safety and security of danger-
ous pathogens held within national 
boundaries, and when transported within 
or exported across national borders; 
• identifying the locations of disease cultures 
of concern and developing national and 
global registers of this information; 
• establishing a requirement for end-use veri-
fication of BW-related technology transfers 
by exporting countries; 
• requiring passage of national legislation to 
establish national licensing, export controls 
over dangerous pathogens and toxins and 
sensitive dual-use equipment, and regula-
tory bodies to implement this system;  
• making every effort to persuade all states 
that it is in their national interest to attain 
greater safety and security regarding bioma-
terials, but also requiring signatory states to 
be in compliance with standards developed 
under the convention within five years of 
entry-into-force (EIF) of the convention; 
and 
• terminating all biological commerce and 
scientific exchanges with any state remain-
ing a non-signatory five years after EIF, or 
with any signatory state not in compliance. 
Fourth, the United Nations should sponsor 
a joint effort between the members of the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the BWC, 
and the Biosecurity Convention, to develop a 
new International Secretariat with the following 
responsibilities:  
• monitoring efforts of member states to 
comply with international biosafety and 
biosecurity standards by reviewing informa-
tion provided in obligatory, timely report-
ing from members about development and 
implementation of their national regulatory 
systems; 
• providing an ongoing forum for discus-
sions related to dangerous pathogens, 
emerging diseases, biosecurity threats, and 
biotechnology issues; 
• staffing biennial conferences of signatories 
for peer review of reports on national regu-
lation and licensing systems, which would 
provide opportunities for evaluating new 
developments in biotechnology and related 
areas, as well as a venue for seeking clarifi-
cation on national declarations; 
• developing a mechanism to more effec-
tively monitor global disease in as close to 
real time as possible, with this information 
to be used by each group to address con-
cerns relevant to their specific undertaking; 
and 
• training and maintaining lists of experts to 
comprise international teams for prompt 
investigation of suspicious outbreaks, al-
leged BW attacks, or unaccounted-for dan-
gerous pathogens. 
Finally, the international community must 
effectively address noncompliance issues by 
states party to the BWC, but should do so 
through different mechanisms than those em-
ployed to reduce bioterrorist threats. 
• First, the United States should employ low-
profile bilateral discussions to address 
BWC compliance questions relating to 
Russia and China, not to embarrass either 
country with regard to past activities, but to 
reassure the international community that 
those activities are in fact only matters of 
historical concern. 
• Second, the international community can-
not allow Iraq’s flagrant violation of its 
commitment under the BWC to stand. Ac-
cordingly, the United States should collabo-
rate with the other permanent members of 
the U.N. Security Council to bring com-
bined pressure to bear on Iraq to accept 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
inspections and ongoing monitoring of 
dual-use facilities to verify its disarmament 
of biological weapons and other prohibited 
armaments. 
In sum, in responding to the anthrax at-
tacks thus far, U.S. officials should engage in a 
thoroughgoing national MTSS effort in any 
case. By engaging the international community 
through negotiations on and adherence to a 
new Biosecurity Convention, the United States 
can play a leading role in defining international 
standards for MTSS in the biotechnology sec-
tor, learn from any useful measures that have 
been developed abroad, including in the former 
Soviet BW program, and forge an effective in-
Michael Barletta & Amy Sands 
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ternational response to the BW proliferation 
threat. 
FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATIONS 
Given the years of diplomatic labor in-
vested in the proposed BWC protocol, and in a 
context of widespread international perceptions 
of arrogant U.S. unilateralism, the Bush admini-
stration cannot realistically expect to initiate 
serious negotiations on a new Biosecurity Con-
vention by merely declaring its intention to do 
so. To restore U.S. credibility—and just as im-
portantly, to spur other governments to imme-
diately begin reconsidering their own positions 
on strengthening the BWC—the administration 
should signal a determined, even singular com-
mitment to negotiating a better accord to 
strengthen the BWC. In light of September 11 
and subsequent events, Bush administration 
officials can plausibly argue that their aim is not 
to “cherry-pick” from the draft protocol ac-
cording to earlier U.S. preferences, but rather to 
work for a more effective accord to cope with 
the new realities. A compelling way to demon-
strate such dedication would be to begin with 
the ultimate arbiter of U.S. participation in any 
international treaty: the U.S. Senate. 
President Bush should press the Senate to 
grant “fast track” authority to negotiate a new 
Biosecurity Convention. In conferring such 
authority, the Senate would commit to commit-
tee review and a floor vote on the new conven-
tion without attaching amendments or 
reservations of any kind, either in committee or 
on the floor, with consideration and debate lim-
ited to a set time-period (e.g., 45 days).3 To re-
                                                 
3 The term “fast-track” typically refers to a pro-
cedural mechanism developed under President 
Nixon and used most often by his Republican 
successors for promoting trade liberalization. 
However, the U.S. Congress has adopted 
streamlined procedures to ensure timely, disci-
plined consideration of national security and 
defense legislation, including the 1973 War 
Powers Act and the 1990 Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Act. In employing such meas-
ures, the legislature delegates some prerogatives 
to the executive but retains ultimate veto 
power. Although doing so encroaches on the 
ability of individual members to shape legisla-
spect the constitutionally mandated “advise and 
consent” role of the Senate in treaty ratification, 
a favorable vote on a new Biosecurity Conven-
tion would still require a two-thirds majority to 
win approval.  
To build support for a revised accord, 
however, the president would instruct execu-
tive-branch negotiators to consult closely with 
leaders of both parties in the Senate and in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. 
Specifically, in requesting fast-track authority, 
the administration would outline the objectives 
and criteria that it would employ in a new 
round of negotiations. It might also detail spe-
cific obligations to inform and consult with the 
Senate (e.g., quarterly reporting on the status of 
negotiations with regard to U.S. goals and crite-
ria). International attention to this public proc-
ess would have the added benefit of helping to 
reshape international expectations about what 
can and should be done to meet the BW threat, 
and the urgent need for all parties to set aside 
standard governmental procedures to address 
this urgent threat to U.S. and international secu-
rity. 
Barring filibusters and requiring a simple 
up/down floor vote would prevent a rogue 
senator from hobbling U.S. foreign policy, an 
all-too-frequent occurrence in recent years. It 
would also prevent a repeat of the CWC ratifi-
cation debacle, in which senators attached res-
ervations that both changed the meaning of 
                                                                      
tion, it leverages the weight of the Congress 
overall in bargaining with the President, while 
simultaneously boosting U.S. authority in for-
eign negotiations. In addition to serving the 
national interest, expedited procedures shield 
legislators from special-interest pressures. On 
such procedures in the U.S. Congress, see: 
Lenore Sek, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track 
Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and 
Developments in the 107th Congress, Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief IB10084, 
(Washington, DC: CRS, October 12, 2001), 
<http://www.fpc.gov/CRS_REPS/ 
crs_trad.pdf>; Stanley Bach, “Fast-Track” or 
Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements, and 
Implications, CRS Report 98-888, (Washington, 
DC: CRS, January 18, 2001), <http://www. 
house.gov/htbin/crsprodget?/rl/98-888>. 
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U.S. commitment to the treaty and carved out 
ready-made loopholes for proliferant states to 
exploit. Limiting debate would thus help ensure 
a better substantive outcome for any agreement 
concluded. 
Fast-track negotiating authority would im-
pinge on the majority prerogative to control 
committee and floor deliberations, now exer-
cised by the Democrats. However, they would 
gain greater influence in shaping the objectives 
and criteria to be employed by the Republican 
president in negotiations. In any case, given the 
level of public alarm, party leaders would find it 
difficult to resist an urgent presidential request 
for authority to negotiate a stronger treaty, es-
pecially as Democratic constituencies favor 
arms control regardless of which party holds 
the presidency. A fast-track commitment would 
exemplify the kind of problem-solving biparti-
sanship that the American people have long 
craved, as well as providing reassurance that the 
U.S. government is doing all that it can to pro-
tect the populace at a dangerous moment in our 
nation’s history.  
Fostering U.S. and international security by 
winning agreement to strengthen the BWC is an 
issue that demands presidential leadership. 
Gaining approval now for expedited considera-
tion by the Senate would remove incentives for 
individual members or either party to “out-bid” 
the president by demanding stronger measures 
after the conclusion of international negotia-
tions. In the early 1970s, President Richard 
Nixon earned respect for decisively terminating 
the U.S. bioweapon program and signing the 
BWC. In the mid-1980s, President Ronald 
Reagan won acclaim for negotiating a much 
stronger accord on U.S. and Soviet intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces (INF) than most ob-
servers initially believed possible. By the year 
2004, President George W. Bush could rea-
sonably expect to claim credit for leading the 
world in strengthening the ban against germ 
weapons, to the benefit of the nation and the 
world. 
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The almost exclusive attention given to the 
threat of conventional and non-conventional 
terrorism since September 11 could lead some, 
especially in the public, to think that traditional 
proliferation concerns have somehow become 
less germane to U.S. and international security. 
This of course is not so. Moreover, as a decade 
of U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction 
activities attests, concern for the subnational 
terrorist nuclear threat is not new. However, the 
rising salience of this threat certainly compli-
cates, even while it makes ever more important, 
the longstanding goal of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) of avert-
ing state proliferation. 
But now we must address more directly the 
possibility that a subnational group funded, har-
bored, or assisted by a state may acquire access 
to nuclear explosives. Such a group might use 
nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes in pursuit 
of its own agenda, or on behalf of a host state 
unwilling to act directly in fear of retaliation. 
Iraq, which came perilously close to acquiring 
nuclear weapons capability a decade ago, and 
where U.N. inspectors have been unable for 
years to verify that WMD reconstitution efforts 
are not underway, is a potential case in point. 
President Bush’s definition of the war on terror-
ism as including nations that develop weapons of 
mass destruction to terrorize other nations im-
plies such hypothesized linkages and concerns. 
This situation presents challenges, but also 
opportunities that could result in strengthening 
of the nonproliferation regime in a number of 
ways. For example, response and enforcement 
mechanisms have been uncertain and problem-
atic in the past (e.g., the U.N. Security Council or 
coalitions of likeminded states operating pursu-
ant to Security Council mandates). Bringing 
them more effectively to bear on recalcitrant 
proliferants could strengthen the regime. This 
could, alternatively, weaken the regime if it leads 
to discounting multilateral approaches in exclu-
sive favor of unilateral or alliance-of-
convenience means of pursuing security, strate-
gies that often work in the short term but do 
little to contribute to international security, sta-
bility, and predictability in the longer term. Ei-
ther way, the nonproliferation agenda reflected 
in the NPT review conferences, and involving, as 
it does, realization of the treaty in all of its as-
pects, will persist and continue to be central to 
international security as we go forward.1 NPT 
review and preparatory conferences are an al-
most annual affair, and they will continue to be 
dominated by their traditional agendas even as 
they accommodate new challenges and exigen-
cies. The menace of nuclear terrorism will not 
displace nuclear nonproliferation on the interna-
tional security agenda—it will only add more 
problems, but also, perhaps, more urgency to 
dealing with all of the threats on that agenda. 
State proliferation and subnational nuclear 
terrorist threats are different levels of the same 
problem. Preventing access to the means of im-
posing nuclear threats, and removing incentives 
to acquire nuclear capabilities, are respectively 
the supply- and demand-side approaches to deal-
ing with proliferation. Some nonproliferation 
supply-side measures bear directly on the nuclear 
terrorism challenge, and the latter is a potentially 
powerful stimulus for the international commu-
nity to take steps that can address both threats. 
More specifically, the September 11 tragedy, and 
the attention it has drawn to the prospect that 
terrorists might acquire access to WMD or mate-
rials to produce WMD, may motivate states to 
act more quickly and with greater determination 
to shore up key elements of the nonproliferation 
regime. 
                                                 
1 This agenda includes nonproliferation; system-
atic and progressive reductions by NWS of their 
weapons pursuant to their unequivocal undertak-
ing to accomplish total elimination; bringing the 
CTBT into force; negotiating a fissile material 
cutoff convention; and pursuing effective safe-
guards while facilitating peaceful nuclear coop-
eration. 
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As is discussed below, three types of meas-
ures would put roadblocks in the way of terrorist 
access while simultaneously furthering traditional 
nonproliferation goals. There are “upside oppor-
tunities” for progress on safeguards, physical 
protection, and export controls, a range of useful 
efforts in which even the non-NPT states with 
nuclear weapons can participate. But there are 
also “downside risks” that the coalition strategy 
for anti-terrorism could negatively affect the 
nonproliferation regime. 
UPSIDE OPPORTUNITIES 
Safeguards: Safeguarding nuclear material 
serves nonproliferation and helps counter nu-
clear terrorism. In concluding a comprehensive 
(full-scope) safeguards agreement with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), states 
undertake to establish a state system of account-
ing and control (SSAC) which provides the basis 
both for reporting to the IAEA, and for inde-
pendent IAEA verification. It also gives states a 
detailed picture of nuclear materials under their 
jurisdiction, which in turn provides a basis for 
establishing comprehensive and effective means 
for controlling materials and preventing unau-
thorized and unaccountable access. If fully im-
plemented by all states, comprehensive 
safeguards agreements would thus serve both 
verification and material control objectives.  
One problem is that 50 states party to the 
NPT have yet to enter into treaty-obligated safe-
guards agreements with the IAEA. These states 
have little nuclear material (and in some cases 
none at all), which helps explain the low comple-
tion rate. But as the North Korean case reminds 
us, delay can eventually carry heavy conse-
quences. Moreover, states lacking basic means to 
remain alert to possible transfer of nuclear mate-
rial across their borders or through their territory 
via illicit trafficking, provide gaps in the system 
of global oversight of nuclear activities. Closing 
such gaps to avoid unpleasant nuclear surprises 
should be a straightforward proposition. The 
same is true for implementing the 1997 Addi-
tional Protocol to safeguards agreements, which 
provides the IAEA with tools to verify not only 
declared nuclear material, but also to confirm the 
absence of undeclared material or activity. Al-
though more than three years have passed since 
the IAEA Board of Governors approved the 
model protocol, it has entered into force for just 
22 states, and these include only a few states with 
significant nuclear activity. The prospect of 
subnational/terrorist access to nuclear material 
should provide some impetus to speeding up the 
process. The five nuclear-weapon states 
(NWS)—and in particular the United States as a 
strong advocate for strengthening the safeguards 
system—would help if they quickly completed 
the necessary steps. This could remove lingering 
concerns among the non-nuclear-weapon states 
(NNWS) of further discrimination between the 
NWS and NNWS parties to the NPT, and also 
reinforce the universal, global essence of the re-
gime. 
Physical Protection: While the purpose of 
international safeguards is to verify nonprolifera-
tion commitments by states, and although states 
are responsible for the security of nuclear mate-
rial, effective physical protection has always been 
seen as inherently crucial to nonproliferation. 
However, the 1987 Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, the only signifi-
cant international instrument dealing with physi-
cal protection, addresses only international 
transport of nuclear material, not domestic ship-
ping, storage, or use. Moreover, only 69 states 
currently are party to this convention, which is 
now under review to broaden its reach more 
comprehensively into domestic practice, law, and 
regulation. Once again, heightened awareness of 
nuclear terrorist threats can stimulate not only 
conclusion of a more robust and far-reaching 
convention on physical protection, but also 
much wider state participation. The goal should 
be to achieve universal participation. Physical 
protection goes beyond preventing unauthorized 
access to nuclear material, and includes control-
ling radiological sources, and protecting nuclear 
facilities against sabotage or attack similar to that 
carried out against the World Trade Center. 
Since September 11, many now see nuclear ter-
rorism as a global threat along the same lines as 
nuclear proliferation by states, and this under-
standing can spur convergence in strategies, ap-
proaches, and instruments for contending with 
these risks. 
Export Controls: Export policies, including 
agreement among key members of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), have been an effective 
component of the nonproliferation regime. In 
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recent years, however, strains have emerged 
within the group over whether to maintain a rig-
orous policy of not concluding new cooperation 
agreements with states that do not accept full-
scope safeguards. Loosening restraints on nu-
clear transactions—especially under current cir-
cumstances—could undermine the effectiveness 
of an important arm of the nonproliferation re-
gime. Arguably, NSG practice should be moving 
in the opposite direction, toward converting in-
formal understandings among key suppliers into 
formal, legally binding obligations. NSG mem-
bers could take this even a step further to in-
crease export transparency more generally, by 
reporting to the IAEA not only their exports of 
items on the safeguards trigger list, but also their 
decisions to deny export licenses for trigger-list 
and dual-use list items. Such transparency, un-
dertaken by supplier states as though it were a 
legally binding obligation, even if not one based 
on a legally binding instrument, would help illu-
minate who is seeking what, and potentially iden-
tify companies that might be serving as fronts 
for al-Qa’ida or other non-state entities. Here 
again, there are concrete actions that can be 
taken to support both nonproliferation objec-
tives and to foreclose opportunities for subna-
tional/terrorist access to nuclear assets. 
Non-NPT States: Whether non-NPT 
states with nuclear weapons (i.e., India, Pakistan, 
Israel) have provided assistance elsewhere in the 
past, this is an opportune time to draw them 
more closely into supporting nonproliferation 
regime measures, including safeguards, export 
controls, and physical protection. While at pre-
sent acceptance by these states of full-scope safe-
guards is not feasible, one or more of them 
could submit additional unsafeguarded facilities 
that are not part of their nuclear weapons pro-
grams to IAEA safeguards, as the NWS have 
done in varying degrees.  
These three states could also commit even 
more directly to not assist any other state or en-
tity in nuclear matters, except under safeguards 
and with adequate national physical protection 
arrangements. France’s nonproliferation policy 
prior to joining the NPT offers a precedent. As 
well, insofar as these states have not become 
party to the Convention on Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material or embraced the non-
binding guidelines on physical protection out-
lined in INFCIRC/225, they should be called 
upon to do so. Gaining their active support for 
and involvement in tightening controls over nu-
clear and radiological materials—which could be 
used against them as against others—should not 
be discounted. Of course, we should recognize 
the limited scope that such involvement would 
entail, and that these states may make counter-
requests for cooperation, support, or assistance 
that could compromise our nonproliferation 
policies, principles, and obligations. 
DOWNSIDE RISKS 
This last observation leads to consideration 
of four downside risks to the nonproliferation 
regime that may result from the coalition strategy 
to countering terrorism. Three risks in particular 
deserve attention. First are the potential costs of 
partnering with some states with which the 
United States has differences on nonprolifera-
tion issues. A second has to do with South Asia, 
where two coalition partners are also non-NPT 
nuclear weapon states, which were until recently 
the focus of sanctions for having conducted nu-
clear weapon tests. A third relates to the impact 
on peaceful nuclear cooperation that may result 
from measures to combat nuclear terrorism. Fi-
nally, there is the broad question of how the cur-
rent U.S. approach to national security may 
impact the nonproliferation regime and its insti-
tutions. 
Regime Norms at Risk: First, to counter 
terrorism effectively, the United States has built 
coalitions and partnerships with states that were 
and remain of concern in U.S. nonproliferation 
policy. Russia is a case in point. U.S. relations 
with Russia have been strained over export pol-
icy practices, including Russian nuclear coopera-
tion with Iran (which the United States believes 
is pursuing nuclear weapon development), and 
with India (despite the policy agreed by Russia as 
an NSG member not to engage in significant 
nuclear cooperation with any state that like India 
has not accepted full-scope safeguards). Al-
though the United States continues to press Rus-
sia to terminate cooperation with Iran and to 
limit its participation in the Indian peaceful nu-
clear program, the exigencies of promoting and 
consolidating anti-terrorism alliances may rele-
gate such issues on the traditional nonprolifera-
tion agenda to a lower priority. 
Implications of the War against Terrorism for the NPT Regime 
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Nonproliferation has long been touted as a 
priority objective for the United States, but it has 
always had to compete with other national secu-
rity, political, diplomatic, and economic objec-
tives. Unfortunately, it is easier to find cases 
where the latter have trumped nonproliferation 
than to encounter the reverse. The urgency of 
effectively meeting the terrorism threat may put 
other policies on hold or diminish the diplomatic 
and political effort behind them, and the partner-
ing strategy against terror raises the bar that 
nonproliferation policies have to clear in order to 
be a U.S. priority. 
If partners in the war on terrorism already 
have differences with the United States over the 
facts in a particular case (e.g., whether Iran is or 
is not pursuing a weapons program under cover 
of peaceful nuclear activities) or the regime con-
sequences of relaxed behavior on certain base-
line principles (e.g., requiring safeguards on 
specific nuclear transfers to India for peaceful 
purposes, but not requiring that India acquiesce 
in full-scope safeguards), then hard choices may 
have to be made. Thus short-term economic or 
political interests may override long-term regime 
consolidation. 
If economic or political opportunism are 
seen to take precedence over nonproliferation 
norms, principles, and rules of regimes that pur-
portedly sustain national and international secu-
rity and stability, then some states may be 
emboldened to push the envelope in pursuit of 
their own particular agendas. If such states suc-
cessfully press for relaxation of regime rules or 
of full compliance with their undertakings, con-
fidence in the regimes will weaken and interna-
tional politics could backslide toward earlier 
national security practices of self-reliance and 
alliances, in which nuclear weapons may end up 
taking a larger rather than a diminished role in 
world affairs. 
The South Asia Challenge: Second, South 
Asia provides a key instance of the above prob-
lem. Both India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear 
weapon states and both are important to suc-
cessful prosecution of the war against terrorism. 
This is so not only because of their geopolitical 
position, but also because of uncertainty (espe-
cially in the case of Pakistan) about the safety 
and security of their nuclear weapons in terms of 
unauthorized or accidental use or accessibility to 
theft or seizure by terrorist groups, as well as 
concern about how responsibly these states will 
act with regard to outside nuclear cooperation or 
transactions and whether they will hew to, or 
derogate from, nonproliferation regime rules. 
The irony here, of course, is that both states 
were subject to significant and far-reaching sanc-
tions in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests. 
Moreover, Pakistan was subject to even earlier 
sanctions based on U.S. law mandating that mili-
tary and economic assistance was contingent on 
presidential certification that Islamabad did not 
possess nuclear weapons—a conclusion that 
President Bush could not reach as far back as 
1991. 
The urgent need to ensure that these states’ 
nuclear weapons not fall into the hands of ter-
rorists, and that India and Pakistan support the 
campaign against terrorism, led to removal of 
these sanctions and restoration of economic, 
financial, and military cooperation. The question 
is not whether the lifting of sanctions can be 
justified by the urgency of addressing the risk 
that terrorists might gain access to nuclear weap-
ons or weapons-relevant materials, but rather 
whether there may be resulting costs to the re-
gime, and if so, how these costs can be averted 
or minimized. The issue is complicated by the 
recognized need to take steps to ensure the 
safety and security of nuclear weapons in South 
Asia, arms whose acquisition the international 
community has protested and censured. The 
question is whether taking such steps will be 
perceived as conferring special stature on India 
and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states, leading to 
preferred political status and recognition or spe-
cial technological and economic consideration. 
Such outcomes could signal ambivalence about 
the priority of nonproliferation, and raise ques-
tions about the major powers’ dependability in 
maintaining and implementing the NPT. The 
challenge for the United States and other nuclear 
weapon states is to deal with the problem with-
out frustrating important non-nuclear-weapon 
state (NNWS) parties to the NPT, and without 
undermining or impairing their confidence that 
the treaty’s objectives of nonproliferation and 
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons will be 
sustained. 
Peaceful Cooperation under Stress: A 
third downside risk has to do with how terrorist 
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access to nuclear materials, equipment, or tech-
nology—not to speak of nuclear weapons—
might affect international nuclear cooperation. 
For many NNWS, a central feature of the NPT 
is the assurance it provides for the “fullest possi-
ble access” to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Use of this term in Article IV of the NPT has 
been long interpreted by most parties to mean 
cooperation and access to the maximum extent 
consistent with the nonproliferation purpose of 
the treaty. This view has led key nuclear supplier 
states to agree upon (and in light of changing 
circumstances, to update and tighten) conditions 
under which nuclear cooperation and transfer 
would take place (such conditions including 
safeguards, adequate physical protection, peace-
ful use undertakings, etc.). 
The constraints and limitations imposed 
with respect to certain technologies (e.g., en-
richment and reprocessing) have occasioned 
controversy, and the increasing importance of 
dual-use technologies has been a source of de-
bate and tension. Some developing countries 
have interpreted the limitations and constraints 
as a form of “technological imperialism,” which 
denies them the opportunity to move more 
quickly and completely into the modern techno-
logical age. 
The risk here is that in light of heightened 
concern about terrorist access to nuclear weap-
ons or explosive-relevant nuclear materials, 
equipment, and technology, the nuclear supplier 
states may call for even tighter constraints, 
greater limitations, and more demanding condi-
tions. This could deepen the sense of frustration 
felt by developing countries, intensify their de-
mands for economic and technological equity, 
and potentially deflect the attention necessary for 
consensus on and support for nonproliferation 
measures that can frustrate terrorist efforts to 
acquire nuclear capabilities. How key nuclear 
suppliers manage this challenge will bear sub-
stantially on whether the inevitably more restric-
tive approach to technology transfer and 
international cooperation is seen as technological 
imperialism, or instead as a measure motivated 
by the common interest of nonproliferation. 
Multilateralism on the Defensive: Finally, 
lurking in the background of these specific con-
cerns is the matter of current U.S. attitudes to-
ward multilateral institutions and arrangements 
in general. Coalition-building to deal with terror-
ism can be seen as turning back in the direction 
of multilateral approaches to security and stabil-
ity, or as “multilateralism a la carte”—an ad hoc 
rather than an institutionalized process. The lat-
ter seems to be a much more apt description 
than the former.  
However, the more the United States by-
passes or minimizes the relevance of multilateral 
institutions, processes, and regimes, the less con-
fidence that other states will have in the credibil-
ity and reliability of those arrangements. This 
decline in confidence would lead to a general 
weakening of the formalized, legally anchored 
foundation that multilateral institutions have 
provided in support of efforts to achieve a more 
predictable, stable, and secure world order. In 
the short term such a development may suit the 
purposes of the global leader, but in the longer 
run, power shifts and so does the capacity to 
influence and control change in international 
affairs. Consolidating multilateral structures and 
regimes and influencing the values, norms, and 
principles they reflect while the United States is 
in a strong position to do so may be the better 
path to building and preserving a preferred 
world order. This consideration deserves close 
attention when calibrating policy choices for 
dealing with current security threats of terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction. 
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REGULATING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF 
POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
Jonathan B. Tucker 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
 
In recent years, dramatic advances in the 
fields of molecular biology and biotechnology 
have yielded numerous benefits for humanity, 
including improved health and nutrition. Yet 
these scientific breakthroughs also have a dark 
side: the potential to yield more deadly instru-
ments of biological warfare and terrorism. The 
creation of an advanced pathogen, either acci-
dentally or deliberately, could pose a major 
threat to the well-being and even the survival of 
the human species.1 
Harnessing the powerful knowledge emerg-
ing from the new genetic technologies in a 
manner that benefits humankind—while pre-
venting its misuse—will require a set of mutu-
ally reinforcing policies and institutions at the 
domestic and international levels. With respect 
to the scientific community, specialists in the 
biological, biomedical, veterinary, and plant 
sciences must become more aware of the po-
tential dangers resulting from advances in ge-
nomics and genetic engineering techniques. 
They must also take the difficult but vital step 
of regulating research with direct offensive ap-
plications in biological warfare. 
NEW RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
In January 2001, an inadvertent discovery 
highlighted the potential risks associated with 
the new genetic technologies. Australian scien-
tists developing a contraceptive vaccine for 
controlling field mouse populations sought to 
enhance the vaccine’s effectiveness by inserting 
the gene for the immune regulatory protein 
interleukin-4 (IL-4) into mousepox, which was 
                                                 
1 Andrew Pollack, “With Biotechnology, a Po-
tential to Harm,” New York Times, November 
27, 2001; Claire M. Fraser and Malcolm R. 
Dando, “Genomics and Future Biological 
Weapons: The Need for Preventative Action by 
the Biomedical Community,” Nature Genetics 29 
(2001), pp. 253-65. 
being used as the carrier virus. IL-4 is a sub-
stance that is normally produced in mice, but 
insertion of the IL-4 gene into the mousepox 
genome unexpectedly transformed the normally 
benign virus into a virulent strain that shut 
down the mouse immune system and killed all 
the animals in the experiment. In addition to 
rendering mousepox lethal in mice that were 
genetically resistant to the virus, the inserted 
gene made the mousepox vaccine ineffective—
the recombinant virus killed even those mice 
that had previously been vaccinated.2 Although 
the Australian team debated for months over 
the wisdom of publishing their disturbing re-
sults, they finally decided to do so as a means of 
warning the scientific community. 
The mousepox experiment demonstrated 
that the novel gene combinations produced by 
genetic engineering can, on rare occasions, yield 
a more virulent pathogen—a possibility first 
raised in the 1970s by scientists concerned 
about the safety of recombinant-DNA re-
search.3 The Australian finding also highlighted 
the potential of genetic engineering to create 
new and more lethal instruments of biological 
warfare. Indeed, since human beings possess 
the interleukin-4 gene, it is possible that insert-
ing this gene into a poxvirus that infects hu-
mans, such as smallpox or monkeypox, could 
create a highly lethal strain that would be resis-
tant to the existing smallpox vaccine. Inadver-
tent discoveries of this type, as well as 
deliberate efforts to employ the new genetic 
technologies for nefarious purposes, may be-
                                                 
2 R. J. Jackson et al. (2001), “Expression of 
Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectro-
melia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte 
Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance 
to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology, 75 (2001), pp. 
1205-10. 
3 Stewart A. Newman, “Australian Mouse Study 
Confirms CRG Warning,” GeneWatch 14 (2001). 
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come increasingly common as scientific re-
search continues to generate a flood of new 
information about the structure and function of 
microorganisms at the molecular level and the 
host response to infection. 
The potential also exists for the deliberate 
creation of “designer pathogens.” Until at least 
1992, the former Soviet Union and then Russia 
secretly pursued the world’s largest and most 
sophisticated biological warfare program. This 
effort encompassed four military microbiologi-
cal institutes run by the Ministry of Defense 
and a vast complex of ostensibly civilian phar-
maceutical facilities, known as Biopreparat, that 
secretly engaged in offensive biological weap-
ons development and production. Soviet mili-
tary scientists employed genetic engineering 
techniques to develop more lethal strains of 
anthrax bacteria, smallpox virus, and other bio-
logical warfare agents.4 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
OVERSIGHT 
The scientific community will need to deal 
with the problem of hazardous research, ideally 
through self-governance. Although many scien-
tists view any restrictions on scientific inquiry as 
anathema, the alternative could be far worse. If 
a novel pathogen is created in the laboratory, 
the resulting public outrage could compel the 
U.S. Congress to impose draconian restrictions 
on scientific inquiry. In the interest of avoiding 
such an outcome, scientists should act proac-
tively to make their research safer. 
There is, of course, some precedent for this 
type of regulation. In February 1975, some 140 
biologists, lawyers, physicians, and journalists 
met at the Asilomar Conference Center near 
Monterey, California, to discuss the potential 
risks associated with recombinant-DNA tech-
nology, which had only recently been devel-
oped. This conference resulted in a set of 
research guidelines established by the National 
Institutes of Health and implemented by a Re-
                                                 
4 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohaz-
ard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert 
Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told 
From Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: 
Random House, 1999). 
combinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC). 
The Asilomar analogy goes only so far, how-
ever. Whereas the 1975 conference focused on 
the possible unintended consequences of recom-
binant DNA research, the current concern is 
over the potential malicious use of this technol-
ogy for harming or killing people (or for attack-
ing crops and livestock to inflict economic 
damage). 
In order to prevent the deliberate misuse of 
scientific knowledge for nefarious purposes, a 
system for “prudential review” of potentially 
hazardous research is urgently needed. Because 
science is an inherently international activity, a 
regime focusing on the U.S. scientific commu-
nity alone would not be effective. Thus, the 
oversight mechanism would have to be interna-
tional in scope. As a condition of government 
funding, legitimate but high-risk projects would 
be reviewed by a scientific oversight board, 
which would be similar to the RAC but would 
operate at the international level. Certain types 
of research with direct offensive military appli-
cations would be forbidden outright, while oth-
ers would be subject to close monitoring. 
The regulated activities would constitute a 
fairly small subset of the spectrum of scientific 
research in the fields of microbiology, infec-
tious disease, veterinary medicine, and plant 
pathology. Areas of particular concern include 
the cloning and transfer of toxin genes and 
virulence factors, and the development of anti-
biotic- and vaccine-resistant strains of microor-
ganisms and genetically engineered toxins. For 
example, the same technology used to create 
fusion toxins for the purpose of killing cancer 
cells could be redirected to produce novel tox-
ins that target normal cells of almost any tissue.5 
Another area of potential concern involves the 
engineering of viruses to evade or manipulate 
the human immune system. Gene therapists, 
seeking to prevent an immune reaction to the 
viral vectors that are used to introduce thera-
peutic genes, are designing “stealth” viruses that 
can evade the immune system. Yet such tech-
                                                 
5 Raymond Zilinskas, Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, personal communication, 
November 28, 2001. 
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niques might also be misused to convert viruses 
into particularly deadly biowarfare agents.6 
The proposed review and oversight system 
should be designed to be capable of identifying 
hazardous lines of research, without being so 
intrusive as to have a chilling effect on legiti-
mate scientific inquiry or to inspire defiance and 
attempts at circumvention. Because no univer-
sal set of criteria is possible, the judgments of 
the oversight board would have to be scientifi-
cally informed and made in the context of spe-
cific research proposals. Hazardous research 
that is justified for protecting public health or 
defending against biological warfare would be 
restricted to a few high-containment laborato-
ries, as is already the case with research on the 
smallpox virus. All such work would be trans-
parent and the results reported to the interna-
tional oversight board on a regular basis. 
Inadvertent discoveries with dangerous implica-
tions, such as the Australian mousepox discov-
ery, would have to be reported to the oversight 
board and advice sought on whether or not to 
publish. 
To avoid gaping loopholes in the oversight 
mechanism, it could not tolerate any excep-
tions. Because genetic engineering has become 
a burgeoning commercial business, many senior 
academic researchers have extensive ties to the 
private sector that complicate attempts at self-
regulation. For this reason, proprietary indus-
trial information must not be exempt from the 
reporting requirement. The international over-
sight board might also establish anonymous 
web sites and other mechanisms to facilitate 
whistleblowing by scientists who suspect that a 
colleague is engaged in the development of 
pathogens for military purposes or is otherwise 
violating basic norms of scientific integrity and 
responsibility. Although protecting the identity 
of whistleblowers would be essential to prevent 
intimidation or retribution, safeguards would 
also be required to preclude false accusations 
and character assassination. 
                                                 
6 Peter Aldhous, “Biologists Urged to Address 
Risk of Data Aiding Bioweapon Design,” Na-
ture, 414 (November 15, 2001), pp. 237-38. 
CHALLENGES AHEAD 
The process of developing an international 
mechanism to regulate hazardous “dual-use” 
research will be complex and difficult, requiring 
the active participation of a variety of stake-
holders including scientists, lawyers, and politi-
cians from several countries.7 The devil will be 
in the details: it will be extremely difficult to 
achieve consensus within the scientific commu-
nity on any regulatory mechanism. Moreover, 
U.S. policymakers will be extremely reluctant to 
allow an international body to have detailed, 
binding review authority over biodefense activi-
ties. Thus, agreeing to notify the oversight 
board that such activities are being conducted, 
and describing them in general terms, may be 
all that can reasonably be achieved.8 Because 
negotiations extending over several years will be 
required to hammer out a practical system, pre-
paratory work should begin as soon as possible. 
In crafting an international oversight re-
gime for scientific research of potential rele-
vance to biological warfare, a number of 
difficult issues will need to be addressed. First, 
how will dangerous “designer pathogens” be 
identified in advance? What types of inserted 
genes or gene fragments would make a garden-
variety microorganism declarable? 
Second, how can one give the international 
oversight board the authority and power it re-
quires to enforce the rules, while preventing it 
from becoming corrupt and autocratic? Because 
of the potential for abuse, the oversight board 
must be structured with checks and balances so 
that it does not unduly constrain scientific free-
dom or abuse its privileged access to sensitive 
and proprietary information. Obviously, the 
members and staff of the oversight body must 
meet the highest standards of professional eth-
ics. Yet how can one ensure the reliability and 
integrity of the board members? Would they be 
subjected to a periodic vetting or clearance pro-
cedure? 
                                                 
7 John Steinbruner, University of Maryland, 
personal communication, September 10, 2001. 
8 Gerald L. Epstein, Institute for Defense 
Analyses, personal communication, December 
13, 2001. 
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Third, how can one alert the scientific 
community to potential biological warfare 
threats from research activities without creating 
self-fulfilling prophecies? For example, scien-
tists from states with biowarfare programs 
should not be allowed to serve on the interna-
tional oversight board because of the possibility 
that they could be directly involved in clandes-
tine weapons development. Yet making such 
distinctions would be politically difficult for 
national governments and would also require 
the scientific community to adopt a “counterin-
telligence” mentality that is alien to its prevail-
ing culture of openness. 
Fourth, should the publication of certain 
scientific papers be blocked in part or in their 
entirety on the grounds that the information 
they contain is inherently dangerous or could be 
misused? Given that the ethos of the scientific 
community is opposed to censorship of any 
kind, a strong professional consensus would be 
required to support a decision not to publish 
research data because its dissemination could be 
harmful to society. 
In developing a workable oversight mecha-
nism for hazardous scientific research, public 
perceptions will play a key role. Even if the sci-
entific community ultimately decides that con-
trols on research are impractical, ill-advised, or 
do not meet risk-benefit criteria, it will be nec-
essary to explain and justify these arguments to 
a skeptical public in an open and understand-
able manner.
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One of the most commonly used phrases 
since the horrendous September 11 attacks is 
that “the world has changed.” On the one hand 
the phrase is correct, on the other it is a cliché 
that has been used loosely throughout the world 
by columnists, pundits, analysts, and the media. 
Is it really true that September 11 will entail 
far-reaching implications for the Middle East 
region generally? What are the security and po-
litical ramifications of this event, especially with 
respect to the regional security situation? Given 
that I do not define Afghanistan as part of the 
Middle East in the traditional sense, and given 
that there was never any questions of a balance 
of power between the United States and the 
Taliban in the classical military sense, I believe 
that the answer to this question is not as clear 
cut as the cliché would suggest. If security is 
viewed from the prism of state-to-state relations 
among its traditional members, then September 
11 does not usher in a new world in the Middle 
East. 
The attacks on Washington and New York 
did not change the geopolitical considerations 
that guide the security concerns of any of the key 
regional actors, Arabs and non-Arabs alike (Is-
rael, Iran, and probably Turkey). Beyond those 
states that immediately border the Central Asian 
security zone, the war in Afghanistan does not 
fundamentally alter the immediate security situa-
tion faced by Middle East states. The military 
balance of power in the various sub-regions—
the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli arena, North Africa, 
the Horn of Africa—has not been affected. Nor 
has the regional arms proliferation dynamic been 
altered in any significant way. 
Furthermore, the ethnic hot spots that have 
plagued certain states—for example, involving 
the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, and the southern 
insurgency in the Sudan—have been relatively 
unaffected, and seem to be influenced by the 
same autonomous set of factors that have oper-
ated for decades. 
Even with respect to the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, September 11 has not affected the key is-
sues that constitute the defining core of any final 
settlement between Israel and the Palestinians: 
i.e., Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and the settle-
ments, although some may argue that the United 
States has engaged in its recent Middle East 
peace efforts in order to preserve the anti-terror 
coalition. 
I would even go further to say that if secu-
rity is defined as constituting national, religious, 
or ethnic problems in the Middle East, here 
again one finds that the equation did not change 
as a result of September 11. Even if security is to 
be redefined to include the general threat of ter-
rorism, post-September 11 does not necessarily 
reveal a new security landscape for the Middle 
East, in that the terrorism threat has been part of 
the regional security situation for decades. 
On the other hand, post-September 11 is 
not the same as September 10 for the Middle 
East. While the transforming events of Washing-
ton and New York have not yet affected the na-
ture of the regional security landscape, they can 
have a potentially significant impact on the 
agenda that will define how these issues are ad-
dressed. Here one can discern a number of con-
siderations that will factor into the regional 
security and political landscape over time: 
• The September 11 terrorists had the audac-
ity to directly take on the United States and 
the international community in a manner 
comparable to the challenge mounted by 
Saddam Hussein in 1990 with the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait, even if the analogy is not a 
precise one. Terrorists, and/or acts of terror, 
will be held accountable by a much larger 
group of states, from well beyond the re-
gion. 
• The audacity of the September 11 attacks 
has made transparent many of the issues in 
the region and beyond that in the past could 
be left unaddressed. The international com-
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munity itself will be under pressure to react 
and address Middle East issues. 
• The regional actors, including non-Middle 
East peace process players that have an in-
fluence in regional politics, are under unpar-
alleled scrutiny globally and regionally; every 
issue or position will be held to a litmus test, 
both by the international community as well 
as by their domestic constituency. 
Nowhere are these considerations better ex-
emplified than in the complex linkage between 
September 11 and the Arab-Israeli conflict, an 
issue that has been the subject of much contro-
versy. There is no casual linkage between 9/11 
and the crisis that has erupted on the Israeli-
Palestinian arena. However, the breakdown of 
the peace process cannot be divorced from the 
broader war on terrorism. The cumulative frus-
tration due to the stalemate in the peace process 
generates an environment for indiscriminate vio-
lence on the part of both sides. Furthermore, the 
persistent calls for the Middle East to positively 
engage in the emerging global order will not 
resonate with the publics of the region if the 
international community does not respond posi-
tively to address the problems that have plagued 
the Middle East for decades. 
All of these factors will place tremendous 
pressure on global and regional players to ad-
dress a multitude of issues and/or resolve them 
in a much clearer manner and with a higher 
standard, creating a momentum to address out-
standing issues, which otherwise could have 
negative repercussions. 
The answers to many of these questions and 
their implications for security in the Middle East 
can be affected quite significantly by results of 
the U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban and 
Usama bin Laden. If the campaign is to succeed 
in its first phase, the probability that there will be 
wise and constructive action in pursuing the sec-
ond phase dealing with wider consequences of 
terrorism is greater—although one does have to 
caution against excessive zeal or overconfidence. 
There will be a greater possibility that regional 
and non-regional actors will take this opportu-
nity and seize the momentum created by the 
global anti-terrorism campaign to respond to 
serious regional problems. This development will 
provide more political latitude for constructive 
engagement, including on issues related to dis-
armament and arms control. Needless to say, 
Israeli and Palestinian acts of violence since U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Middle East 
speech of November 19, 2001, have once again 
raised serious questions. 
On the other hand, a prolonged, inconclu-
sive first stage will most probably lead to an ex-
tremely agitated international community at the 
helm of the coalition, which will generate a nega-
tive spillover affect in the Middle East with some 
trying to define another “deliverable” for an ex-
pedited stage two, and other countries trying to 
ensure that they do not become deliverables. The 
debate about Iraq is a case in point. 
If the beyond-Afghanistan deliverables of 
stage two are pursued too quickly, the effect of 
such haste on Middle East security will be dis-
ruptive at the very least. If coalition efforts are 
not generally realized in Afghanistan, it could 
trigger a reassessment of security priorities on 
the part of non-Arab U.S. allies in the Middle 
East, with some questioning the efficacy of rely-
ing on American security guarantees for their 
defense. If skepticism were coupled with a paral-
lel effort on the part of the United States to 
widen the war to include Middle Eastern states, 
then it could result in the realignment of security 
postures and strategic alliances by Arab U.S. al-
lies, with serious consequences for regional sta-
bility. Such a dynamic will only generate a 
climate of severe political uncertainty that will 
provide an opportunity for the resurgence of 
terrorist activity, both regionally and globally. 
The security implications of this dynamic 
will be compounded by another potential impact 
of the global war on terrorism that relates more 
broadly to the potentially transforming effect of 
September 11 for U.S. national security policy. 
How the war on terrorism is prosecuted can af-
fect—or in some cases even supplant—other 
issues on the global security agenda. This will be 
especially relevant to the global arms control and 
nonproliferation regime, and its potential impact 
on the Middle East. How the requirements of 
the global anti-terrorism coalition will influence 
U.S. policy in these areas is still to be deter-
mined. However, it seems that the requirements 
of coalition politics have only affected the pace 
of trends and policies that were evident before 
September 11, rather than ushering in a shift in 
administration priorities toward more interna-
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tionalization. For example such requirements 
have only tempered, not altered, U.S. pursuit of a 
global anti-missile shield that would violate the 
tenets of the ABM Treaty. Similarly, the admini-
stration’s stand towards the draft protocol to the 
BWC, even after the latest anthrax attacks, re-
veals a marked distrust in the efficacy of multi-
lateral arms control, in favor of a more unilateral 
approach to dealing with proliferation issues. 
Perhaps more important, we are now witnessing 
acceleration in the trends towards de facto rec-
ognition of the nuclear status of India and Paki-
stan, with the waiver of the sanctions imposed 
after the 1998 nuclear tests, the creeping trend 
towards solutions by which the international 
community can assist in securing their nuclear 
arsenals rather than calling for their dismantle-
ment, and the fact that their accession to the 
NPT has now been effectively dropped from the 
international agenda. 
Such trends will have profound security im-
plications for the Middle East. The proliferation 
dynamic in the Middle East has always been in-
fluenced by a global/regional interface. The 
transformation of the global nonproliferation 
agenda ushered in after the May 1998 nuclear 
tests in South Asia, and accelerated by the geo-
political requirements of anti-terrorism coalition, 
will have a definite spillover in the Middle East, 
beginning with erosion of Israel’s nuclear ambi-
guity posture, thus triggering acceleration of ex-
isting WMD programs, or reactivation of once-
dormant programs on the part of other regional 
states. 
If these developments are further com-
pounded by a shift in the focus of the military 
campaign from Afghanistan to Iraq, then the 
security repercussions could be severe. While it is 
difficult to gauge whether in fact a decision has 
been taken within the administration on this is-
sue, the debate as to the status of Iraq within 
anti-terrorism efforts is indicative. Here we find 
a tendency to confuse the issue of Iraq as a 
WMD problem on the one hand, and as a part of 
the terrorism problem on the other. Those who 
advocate an aggressive posture towards Iraq 
within the global anti-terror effort have tended 
to deliberately merge both issues, while a more 
rational approach would entail the necessity of 
keeping them separate, dealing with each one on 
its own merit and applying one standard to all in 
the Middle East on each issue. 
In these circumstances, what I envisage is a 
Middle East where complex macro-problems 
dissolve into a multitude of more complex mi-
cro-security issues, which will be fundamentally 
more difficult for states to address. This trend 
will be reflected not only in state-to-state security 
concerns, but also in sub-regional ethnic con-
flicts. 
My conclusion therefore is that the security 
equation in the Middle East has not changed due 
to September 11, at least not yet. It will, how-
ever, definitely be affected by how the interna-
tional community chooses to prosecute the war 
against terrorism. 
It is important to emphasize that terrorism 
cannot be allowed to stand. Global and regional 
players have said that before, and they say that 
now. The terrorist actions of September 11 have 
in many respects placed the challenge before us. 
They—the terrorists—were responsible for 
thousands of deaths. We—the international 
community led by the United States—in our re-
sponse as manifest in the focus and credibility of 
the anti-terrorist campaign, will determine the 
security ramifications of this act for the Middle 
East.
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
against civilian and military targets in New York 
and Washington, D.C. came as a shock to most 
of the world, and prompted an outpouring of 
sympathy and grief by both allies and adversar-
ies of the United States. In the Middle East, 
however, from whence all of the perpetrators of 
this heinous attack originated, the reaction was 
qualified. The governments of most Arab states 
in the Middle East allied with or sympathetic to 
the United States expressed official condemna-
tion of the terrorist action itself and sympathy 
for the victims. But with few exceptions, most 
of these sentiments were accompanied with 
statements that the September 11 attacks had 
roots in American policies in the Middle East, 
especially in Washington’s handling of the Pal-
estinian question and sanctions imposed on 
Iraq. On the popular side, many people in the 
Arab streets welcomed the attacks on the 
United States as just retribution, and some even 
openly celebrated this horrendous act of brutal-
ity. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran—viewed by 
many as the United States’ archenemy in the 
Middle East—reacted to September 11 in a very 
different manner, both at the official level and 
especially in the streets, as recounted below. 
Coupled with the fact that al-Qa’ida and its 
Taliban hosts in Afghanistan have been long 
regarded by Tehran as serious threats, Iran’s 
reaction encouraged some observers in both 
Iran and the United States to express optimism 
for U.S-Iranian understanding and even hope 
for some form of diplomatic contact in coordi-
nating efforts to weed out al-Qa’ida from Af-
ghanistan. Since Pakistan was the main 
supporter and in some senses the creator of the 
Taliban, and given Afghanistan’s landlocked 
status, some analysts went as far as predicting a 
coordinated U.S.-Iranian military campaign 
against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. 
In this paper I review official and unofficial 
Iranian reactions to the September 11 attacks, 
and analyze how they changed as the United 
States found an ally in Pakistan’s President 
Pervez Musharraf and began its military cam-
paign in Afghanistan. I then turn to Iran’s 
threat assessment and possible further reliance 
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to 
confront the perceived or real threat emanating 
from a U.S. military presence on Iran’s eastern 
borders. Here I also look at the lessons Tehran 
may have learned about the utility of nuclear 
weapons from observing the Pakistani case. I 
conclude with an epilogue on the future of 
U.S.-Iran relations in light of President George 
W. Bush’s State of the Union address, which 
included Iran with Iraq and North Korea as 
members of an “axis of evil.” 
POPULAR IRANIAN REACTIONS 
The immediate Iranian reactions to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States somewhat mirror Iran’s domestic politi-
cal sentiments toward America. They were 
unlike reactions in most states of the Middle 
East, where the popular response to the events 
of September 11 ranged from open euphoria to 
qualified condemnation of the terrorist acts 
coupled with justification for anger that drove 
the perpetrators to respond to what has been 
described as an unjust U.S. policy in the Middle 
East. In contrast, ordinary citizens of Iran re-
acted to the attacks on the United States with a 
genuine outpouring of sympathy. The habitual 
chants of “Death to America” that accompa-
nied Friday prayer sermons throughout Iran 
were missing in the two weeks immediately af-
ter September 11. Perhaps most striking were 
the spontaneous candlelight vigils organized in 
memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks in 
the United States by the people of Tehran, and 
impromptu observance of a moment of silence 
by 60,000 soccer fans at a Tehran stadium. Such 
public displays of sympathy for a country that is 
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officially regarded as the “Great Satan” must be 
understood as entailing considerable risks for 
the Iranians who participated in them. Echoing 
popular sentiments, the mayors of Tehran and 
Isfahan sent messages of condolence to New 
York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. The spokesman 
of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) Presiding 
Board, Ahma Bourqani, signed a memorial 
book placed at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran 
(which houses the U.S. interest section), con-
demning the terrorist attacks in the United 
States. This was the first publicly recorded con-
tact between an Iranian parliamentarian and the 
U.S. interest section since the 1979 revolution. 
OFFICIAL IRANIAN STATEMENTS 
The official position of the government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the September 
11 events was an unequivocal rejection of ter-
rorism in all of its forms and a show of sympa-
thy toward the United States, which reportedly 
was reciprocated with a message from Washing-
ton to the Iranian leadership.1 However, 
whereas President Muhammad Khatami’s ex-
pression of sympathy had no qualifications, 
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
condemned the terrorist attacks against the 
United States but warned Washington against 
unilateral interference in Afghanistan. Instead, 
he suggested that the United States should util-
ize the United Nations as a tool to end the 
presence of al-Qa’ida terrorist camps and 
Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Khamenei 
hinted that although Iran condemned the at-
tacks, he would also condemn any action that, 
in his view, would be catastrophic to Afghani-
stan. On the surface, this message basically sug-
gested that Iran would oppose any military 
action by the United States in Afghanistan that 
would prolong the suffering of ordinary Af-
ghans. However, Iran was more concerned with 
the prospect of a United States military pres-
ence next door as well as the risk that more 
Afghan refugees would cross into Iran. Already 
home to 1.5 million Afghan refugees, Iran 
closed its borders with Afghanistan in fear of an 
                                                 
1 Alan Sipress and Steven Mufson, “U.S. Ex-
plores Recruiting Iran into New Coalition,” 
Washington Post, September 25, 2001, p. A1. 
influx of more people fleeing anticipated U.S. 
attacks. 
Looking at the internal dynamics of the 
Iranian political landscape, the difference be-
tween the initial reactions of Khatami and 
Khamenei to the events of September 11 ech-
oed the political divide in Iran’s officialdom. 
Khatami represents the “moderate” or prag-
matic camp, and enjoys the overwhelming sup-
port of the Iranian people. Since first being 
elected as president by a clear majority of Irani-
ans in 1997, he has tried to bring Iran out of its 
international pariah status. In the process, 
Khatami has attempted to offer “olive 
branches” to the United States through good 
words and, at times, good deeds. Khamenei, on 
the other hand, represents the conservative 
hardliner camp, commands Iran’s military and 
intelligence agencies, and has the final word in 
the overall foreign policy direction of the Is-
lamic Republic. The camp he represents is first 
and foremost interested in safeguarding the 
Islamic Republican regime, specifically safe-
guarding the special status of the clergy in the 
nascent democratic system in Iran. As such, the 
Ayatollah regards rapprochement with the 
United States as detrimental to the survival of 
Iran’s regime, unless it is accomplished by his 
camp and with assurances that the regime’s sur-
vival is not put in jeopardy.  
Seen from this angle, Khamenei’s initial 
strong condemnation of the terrorist attacks 
against the United States was a signal to Wash-
ington that Iran’s hardliners were ready to do 
business with their archenemy, but only if they 
were the interlocutors—not Khatami’s prag-
matic camp. Again, leaving aside the rhetorical 
and theatrical sides of Iranian politics, the hard-
liners in Tehran will deal with Washington if 
they deem such an act to be in the interest of 
the regime. We should recall that even while 
Ayatollah Khomeini (Khamenei’s predecessor 
and founder of the Islamic Republic) was pub-
licly denouncing the United States, he was si-
multaneously seeking and receiving, through 
intimidation and the use of terror, U.S. military 
equipment while Ronald Reagan, a U.S. conser-
vative, was president of the United States. 
President Khatami, directly or by proxy, 
seemed to have been trying to use the catastro-
phic events of September 11 as an opportunity 
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to court the current U.S. administration to work 
with Tehran directly and officially in tackling 
the problem of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist 
groups being sheltered in Afghanistan. For the 
first time since 1979, Iran and the United States 
shared a common goal: destruction of al-Qa’ida 
and ousting the Taliban from power in Af-
ghanistan. Since Iran is a neighbor of Afghani-
stan, the situation was primed for real 
cooperation between the two adversaries. At 
least this was the feeling among the pragmatic 
camp in Tehran.  
It ought be noted that since 1998, U.S. and 
Iranian diplomats have participated in formal 
discussions on the Afghan question as part of 
the Six-plus-Two group—composed of Af-
ghanistan’s six neighboring states (China, Iran, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan), plus the Russian Federation and the 
United States.2 Voicing the opinion of the 
“moderates,” Vice-Speaker of the Majlis and 
brother of the Iranian President, Muhammad 
Reza Khatami, praised his country’s officials for 
condemning the 9/11 terror attacks, adding that 
the terrorist threat was serious and hinting that 
Iranian officials should talk to Americans using 
the “Dialogue of Civilizations” process for such 
contacts.3 The only condition that he placed on 
                                                 
2 Moreover, the text of the “Tashkent Declara-
tion,” adopted during a meeting of the group in 
Uzbekistan on July 19-20, 1999, reflected gen-
eral agreement between the governments of 
Iran and the United States on such issues of 
common interest such as combating terrorism 
and the narcotics industry. Furthermore, after 
the Tashkent gathering, Washington and Te-
hran stood as the two most vocal opponents of 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
3 President Khatami conceptualized the “Dia-
logue of Civilization” as a way to bring the Is-
lamic and Western cultures closer through 
dialogue rather than confrontation. It was in 
part a response to Samuel Huntington’s con-
cept of a “Clash of Civilizations,” in which 
Huntington viewed Islam and Western culture 
as fundamentally opposed to one another. In 
response to Iranian efforts, in 1998 the United 
Nations proclaimed the year 2001 as “United 
Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations.” 
See U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 
dialogue with the United States was that Iranian 
officials not deal passively with such issues, 
suggesting that any interaction between Wash-
ington and Tehran be reciprocal in nature and 
that Iran be engaged as a partner. 
U.S.-IRANIAN COOPERATION 
IN AFGHANISTAN? 
A Canadian newspaper reported on Sep-
tember 18, 2001, that in a message from the 
“highest levels” of the Iranian government, 
transmitted through the Canadian delegation to 
Washington, Tehran would not oppose any 
targeted military strike against terrorist bases in 
Afghanistan.4 The Iranian Foreign Ministry, 
however, immediately rejected the report. But 
other signs of possible U.S.-Iran rapproche-
ment were evident in the days before the visit 
of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, to 
Tehran on September 25, 2001. There were 
rumors in Tehran that Straw was carrying a 
message from Washington, particularly since 
the historic visit—the first of a British foreign 
secretary to Iran since 1979—took place a day 
after Straw met with U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell. Again, official Iranian media 
sources rejected this report, but U.S. Depart-
ment of State officials were anxious to hear 
what Straw had to say and some U.S. officials 
apparently informed the press that the Bush 
administration was divided on how to approach 
Iran. According to unnamed sources, the State 
Department wanted to “push forward” on ex-
ploring broad Tehran-Washington cooperation 
and had White House backing at the time. 
However, Pentagon hardliners reportedly were 
resisting such an approach due to skepticism 
about Iran’s intentions.5 
Still, Powell hinted in a December inter-
view that some warming of relations between 
                                                                      
A/RES/53/22, November 16, 1998, 
<http://www.un.org/documents/r53-22.pdf>.  
4 Robert Fife, “Iran Uses Ottawa as Conduit to 
Bush,” National Post, September 18, 2001, 
<http://www.nationalpost.com>. 
5 “United States Debates Approach towards 
Iran,” Reuters, Gulf News, September 21, 2001, 
<http://www.gulf-news.com>. 
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Tehran and Washington had taken place after 
September 11. He stated: 
I am open to explore opportunities 
[with Iran]. We have been in discus-
sions with the Iranians on a variety of 
levels and in some new ways since Sep-
tember 11. Jim Dobbins spoke with 
Iranians in Bonn as we put together the 
new interim administration in Afghani-
stan, and I had a brief handshake and 
discussion with the Iranian Prime Min-
ister [Actually, Powell shook hands with 
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Kamal Khar-
razi—Iran has no Prime Minister] in 
the United Nations. So there are a 
number of things going on and we rec-
ognize the nature of that regime and we 
recognize that the Iranian people are 
starting to try to find a new way for-
ward and we are open to exploring op-
portunities without having any Vaseline 
in our eyes with respect to the nature of 
the government or the history of the 
past 22 years.6 
TRIUMPH OF THE HARDLINERS 
While pragmatists in Tehran and in Wash-
ington were entertaining the idea of rap-
prochement and possible cooperation between 
Iran and the United States, hardliners in both 
capitals did not remain on the sidelines. 
Khamenei must have determined that the 
United States did not need Iran’s help in Af-
ghanistan, and therefore was not desperate to 
make a deal with his camp, and that hence any 
cooperation between Tehran and Washington 
would strengthen Khatami’s camp. Even if the 
United States did not seek Iran’s active support 
in the initial phase of the military campaign in 
Afghanistan, the prospects of an extended 
American military presence in Afghanistan and 
possibly in Pakistan and Uzbekistan would 
mean more chances for contact between those 
Iranians who wish to align their country with 
realities on the ground by somehow coming to 
                                                 
6 Colin L. Powell, “Press Briefing on Board 
Plane En Route Moscow,” December 9, 2001, 
U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state. 
gov/secretary/rm/2001/dec/6759.htm>. 
terms with the United States. Such Iranians in-
clude those opposed to the Islamic Republican 
system altogether, as well as pragmatists who 
prefer some ideological and policy shifts while 
retaining the present regime. 
For Khamenei and his supporters, the best 
way to prevent any dealings with America was 
to revert to the policies of the early years of the 
Islamic Republic, through rhetoric and perhaps 
action. The first and most obvious stage to 
push this policy was for the Iranian hardliners 
to become “more Palestinian than the Palestini-
ans.”7 While Iranian officials in all camps have 
consistently supported the Palestinian cause and 
have been critical of Israeli policies vis-à-vis the 
Arabs, the conservatives often use anti-Israeli 
rhetoric as a domestic tool to battle the pragma-
tists. Of course, on the ideological front, sig-
nificant increases in violence in the West Bank 
or Gaza usually prompt increased anti-Israeli 
action regardless of Iranian domestic politics. 
Iranian conservatives also use anti-Israeli state-
ments, especially calls for the destruction of the 
state of Israel, to block any undesired rap-
prochement between the pragmatists and the 
United States. Sometimes the anti-Israeli and 
anti-American statements are buttressed by po-
litical actions and even terrorism. Therefore, it 
is conceivably possible that conservative ele-
ments within the ranks of the Islamic Republic 
Guards Corps (IRGC) may have helped some 
members of al-Qa’ida to slip into Iran. These 
hardcore terrorists might later be unleashed to 
harm Israel or the United States if either coun-
try were to attack Iran, since at present Iran is 
incapable of mounting any direct military chal-
lenge to either country. Rhetoric aside, when 
Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ali Sham-
khani warned that if attacked by Israel, the Ira-
nian response would be “unimaginable to any 
Israeli politician,” he most likely was referring 
                                                 
7 President Khatami’s advisor Muhammad Reza 
Tajik reportedly told a conference in Tehran in 
December 2001 that the reason for Iran’s isola-
tion is that the country’s leadership “is more 
Palestinian than the Palestinians.” See “Official 
Iran Is Not the Only Iran,” Ha’aretz, February 
7, 2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>. 
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to the use of terror rather than direct military 
confrontation.8  
Meanwhile in Washington, President Bush 
seemed to have joined the hardliners in his ad-
ministration. Instead of working to establish 
some sort of an understanding between Iran 
and the United States, he apparently concluded 
that with hardliners in Tehran, the only appro-
priate language is that of force and not of com-
promise. 
While some Bush administration officials 
were heralding talk of U.S.-Iran cooperation, 
others were categorizing Iran as an enemy and 
calling for overthrow of the clerical regime in 
Tehran. When asked if he considered Iran an 
ally in America’s war on terrorism, U.S. Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded, 
“Oh, my goodness, Iran is certainly not an 
ally… [but rather] Iran is a state like Iraq, North 
Korea and Cuba and Syria and Libya that’s on 
the terrorist list.”9 Chairman of the Defense 
Policy Board Richard Perle, formally not a 
member of the Bush administration but gener-
ally regarded as the voice of its hardliners, 
stated in early December that the United States 
should do everything “to encourage the cen-
trifugal forces in Iran that, with any luck, will 
drive that miserable government from office.”10 
Faced with public U.S. statements calling 
for the overthrow of the regime in Iran, even 
moderate elements in the Iranian political spec-
trum began to distance themselves from the 
United States, fearing retribution from hard-
liners who increasingly associated cozying-up to 
America as disloyalty to the Islamic Republican 
system. 
                                                 
8 “Iran Denies Israeli Claims It Has Supplied 
Rockets to Hezbollah,” Ha’aretz, February 6, 
2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>. 
9 “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with CNN 
Novak and Hunt,” U.S. Department of De-
fense, November 30, 2001, <http://www.de-
fenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/t11302001_t113
0cnn.html>. 
10 Amy Waldman, “In Louder Voices, Iranians 
Talk of Dialogue with U.S.,” New York Times, 
December 10, 2001, p. A12. 
SEPTEMBER 11 AND IRAN’S 
PROLIFERATION POLICIES 
Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the 
tragic events of September 11 the focus in 
Washington may have momentarily shifted 
from Iran’s pursuit of WMD to the more im-
mediate business of fighting al-Qa’ida and per-
haps eliciting Iran’s participation in such as 
campaign, subsequent developments have only 
encouraged Tehran’s determination to acquire 
such weapons, especially a nuclear weapon ca-
pability.  
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons prior to 
September 11 can be divided into two phases: 
under Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi before 
the 1979 Revolution, and since the Iran-Iraq 
War began in 1980. Under the Shah, Iran’s 
main external security threat came from the 
Soviet Union; however, the Shah’s flirtation 
with the idea of turning Iran into a nuclear 
power had more to do with his view of regional 
supremacy and control over the Persian Gulf. 
The Shah was also aware of Pakistan’s nuclear 
activities and would not have waited for any 
neighbor to achieve any sort of unchallengeable 
advantage over Iran. In 1979, the Shah’s dreams 
of regional supremacy ended with the triumph 
of the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhullah 
Khomeini’s initial view of nuclear weapons as 
“un-Islamic,” whether genuine or rhetorical, 
changed suddenly when Iraqi troops poured 
into Iran in 1980. For the first time since the 
Second World War, Iran saw itself as vulnerable 
to states other than superpowers. 
This shift in threat perception and other 
events in the 1990s strengthened Iran’s resolve 
to pursue a nuclear capability. From 1980 to 
September 11, 2001, the prime motivation for 
Iran to acquire nuclear weapons was to deter 
Iraq. But Israel, Turkey and Pakistan also posed 
potential threats to Iran’s security, either di-
rectly as in the case of Iraq and Turkey, or indi-
rectly through Islamabad’s support for the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, since 
the Gulf War there exists a notion in the Middle 
East that the United States only respects states 
with nuclear weapons, and that possessing them 
prevents U.S. intervention. Nuclear weapons 
also would allow Iran to compensate for its 
strategic isolation in the face of an increasing 
U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region. In 
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addition, nuclear weapons are viewed in Tehran 
as a substitute for conventional military weak-
ness. Iran’s conventional deficiency leaves it 
feeling vulnerable when compared to the mili-
taries of such countries as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. Beyond threats, nuclear 
weapons have domestic “benefits” for the re-
gime in Iran. Following the examples of India 
and Pakistan, the leadership in Iran can show-
case nuclear technology as a substitute for the 
lack of progress in most economic sectors.  
NEW ROLES FOR  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
Shortly after September 11th, it became 
clear that al-Qa’ida was mainly responsible for 
the terrorist attack on the United States and 
that military action would be taken against that 
organization and its host country, Afghanistan. 
Undoubtedly, policy makers and military plan-
ners in Washington were keenly aware that 
given Afghanistan’s landlocked status and Paki-
stan’s special relations with the Taliban regime, 
Islamabad’s help would be essential for any 
large-scale military operation in Afghanistan. 
However, the way that the United States ap-
proached Pakistan has strengthened the belief 
of leaders in the Middle East that nuclear 
weapons matter a great deal, and that only by 
having them can a state influence U.S. policy.  
Consider the following points: 
• After the most devastating attack on its soil 
since 1941, the United States not only had 
the right, but also had no choice but to re-
spond with force against the terrorists who 
carried out the attacks and against any state 
that harbored them. 
• Al-Qa’ida was based in Afghanistan and 
sheltered by the Taliban regime, which in 
turn enjoyed not only full political and mili-
tary backing from Pakistan, but in some 
senses only came to power at the behest of 
Islamabad. Afghanistan has neither access 
to the sea nor indigenous munitions facto-
ries or oil reserves, and excepting Pakistan 
it was surrounded by hostile neighbors; 
without Islamabad’s direct support, the 
Taliban’s war machine would have crum-
bled within days and with it would have 
ended the presence of al-Qa’ida in Af-
ghanistan. 
• The United States had repeatedly requested 
since 1999, both directly and using interna-
tional forums such as the U.N. Security 
Council, that Pakistan stop supporting the 
Taliban regime, specifically because of the 
presence of Usama bin Laden and his ter-
ror network in Afghanistan.11 
• The current Pakistani regime headed by 
General Pervez Musharraf seized power 
through a military coup d’état, dismantling 
the democratic process, however rudimen-
tary, in Pakistan. 
Under normal circumstances, given all of 
these facts, the United States would have de-
manded that Pakistan cooperate with any 
planned military action in Afghanistan, citing 
Islamabad’s consistent failure or refusal to stop 
aiding the Taliban. In case Pakistan refused to 
cooperate, the U.S. would have carried out its 
plans—obviously not as smoothly without ac-
cess to bases in Pakistan—and would have 
warned Islamabad to keep clear of the zones of 
operation. Or, Washington would have offered 
Islamabad some minor incentives for its coop-
eration. Alternatively, given the fact that some 
of the most hardcore anti-American terrorist 
organizations are based in Pakistan, the United 
States might have punished Pakistan as well as 
Afghanistan.  
However, the circumstances were anything 
but normal. Pakistan demonstrated in 1998 that 
it was a nuclear weapons state. A prime objec-
tive in Washington, prior to execution of mili-
tary plans in Afghanistan, was to ensure that 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal did not fall into the 
hand of elements sympathetic to al-Qa’ida or 
                                                 
11 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 of 
December 2000 specifically required that all 
member states of the United Nations cut off 
arms supplies to the Taliban regime. Former 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South 
Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth in several occa-
sions called on Pakistan to end its support of 
the Taliban. Concurrent resolutions from U.S. 
Congress in October 2000 (House Resolution 
414 and Senate Resolution 150), also called on 
Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. 
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the Taliban. As such, once President Musharraf 
had declared his intention to abandon the Tali-
ban and join America’s war on terrorism, the 
stability of the Pakistani regime became the 
answer to U.S. concern for Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons. As part of the price for General 
Musharraf’s cooperation, sanctions pursuant to 
the 1994 Glenn Amendment, which had been 
imposed on Pakistan since 1998 for conducting 
a nuclear test, were lifted. 
The United States needed to act against al-
Qa’ida quickly and with the least possible ob-
stacles, and for this objective, nuclear nonpro-
liferation has suffered a grave long-term 
setback. But a very wrong message has been 
sent: not only does access to nuclear weapons affect U.S. 
policy vis-à-vis the possessor state, but any regime—
democratic or otherwise—can ensure its survival if it 
possesses nuclear weapons and safeguards them. The 
Iranian leadership, conservative or moderate, 
undoubtedly took notice of General Mushar-
raf’s treatment by the United States, and is 
likely reassessing these “positive” values of ac-
quiring nuclear weapons.  
EPILOGUE ON TWO TRAGEDIES 
In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union 
address to the U.S. Congress, President George 
W. Bush shifted the focus of America’s war on 
terrorism to target regimes that threaten the 
United States with WMD, naming Iran, Iraq 
and North Korea and calling them an “axis of 
evil.” While Iran’s pursuit of WMD is nothing 
new, the United States has not presented any 
evidence that in the past few months Iran made 
any significant advances in its WMD programs. 
Inclusion of Iran as part of the “axis of evil” 
should be understood as a clear triumph of the 
hardliners in both Washington and in Tehran. 
As matters stand, the goal of WMD non-
proliferation—and especially that of dissuading 
or preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons—has suffered a setback. While there 
are voices in Iran blaming the conservatives for 
worsening the animosity with the United States, 
any official cooperation by the pragmatists with 
Washington will be held as tantamount to trea-
son in the eyes of the conservatives. As hinted 
by the remarks of President Bush that “an un-
elected few repress the Iranian people’s hope 
for freedom,” perhaps the strategy of Washing-
ton’s hardliners is to promote a regime change 
in Iran since the democratic elements have not 
been able to rule the country. And it may be 
that political pressure brought on Iran will spur 
a change in behavior in Iran’s clerical regime, 
either in the form of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan or even curtail-
ment of anti-Israeli activities. However, the sad 
note is that no matter what regime comes into 
power in Iran, if it seeks to preserve some level 
of independence in dealing with the United 
States, it will presumably seek the only bargain-
ing tool demonstrated effective vis-à-vis the 
United States—nuclear weapons.  
The September 11 tragedy presented an 
opportunity for beginning a constructive and 
mutually beneficial relationship between the 
United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
after more than twenty years of hostility. Re-
gardless of which side first failed to take advan-
tage of this opportunity, it is also tragic that in 
both countries voices of reason have now been 
overpowered by cries for war reminiscent of 
two decades ago. 
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BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime was like an aging but 
functioning dam in need of patching, refurbish-
ment, and capital investment. The most porten-
tous cracks in the dam were already well known 
to specialists in the field and do not need to be 
described in detail here: 
India and Pakistan. These two states did not 
violate the NPT by testing nuclear weapons in 
1998, but their overt possession of nuclear 
weapons highlights the NPT’s non-universality. 
Several major international security risks emanate 
from these nuclear states, while the strictures of 
the NPT complicate efforts to engage India and 
Pakistan positively in redressing these risks. This 
challenge is discussed more fully below. 
Iraq. Iraq remains noncompliant with U.N. 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that are 
meant to enforce the international WMD non-
proliferation regime. Iraq’s WMD status poses 
material security threats and a challenge to the 
U.N. system and the nonproliferation regime, as 
discussed below. 
Israel. Israel quietly occupies a formal cate-
gory with India and Pakistan as a possessor of 
nuclear weapons that lies outside the boundaries 
of the broader nonproliferation regime. More-
over, Israel’s nuclear weapons simultaneously 
defend against and exacerbate proliferation 
threats from the Arab world and Iran. Iraq and 
Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons 
stem from each other and also, at least politically, 
from Israel. Failure to address Israel’s nuclear 
status, and to deal with the Palestinian challenge, 
may increase Egypt’s interest in acquiring nuclear 
weapons. More broadly, Arab political willing-
ness to support the nonproliferation regime over 
time will depend in part on Israel’s nuclear 
status. 
Iran. Iran seeks at least a nuclear weapon op-
tion. On the supply side, the major challenge is 
to persuade Russia and perhaps China to stop 
assisting Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear option. 
On the demand side, as discussed below, Iran 
must be persuaded that its political and security 
standing will be improved by adhering fully to 
the NPT and foregoing acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, more than by acquiring them. Devel-
opments in Iran will affect the potential nuclear 
calculations of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
Russia. Russia is the greatest potential source 
of nuclear weapons, material, and expertise 
sought by proliferators. This manifold problem 
must be addressed through improved physical 
and security capabilities around Russian facilities 
and, as importantly, through Russian political 
determination to make nonproliferation a top 
state priority. Russia will affect the future of pro-
liferation/nonproliferation most importantly in 
Iran, India, and Iraq. 
China. China poses threats of vertical prolif-
eration—tied to U.S. policies—and of horizontal 
proliferation, particularly to Pakistan and, indi-
rectly, in India, and also perhaps in the Persian 
Gulf. For the nonproliferation regime to be 
strengthened, China must determine that doing 
so is a high national priority. 
North Korea. While the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work continues to offer the prospect that this 
acute proliferation challenge can be redressed, 
much work remains to be done to assure imple-
mentation and/or negotiated improvements of 
the agreement. 
United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, 
and France. The nuclear nonproliferation regime 
depends heavily on heightening the international 
community’s determination to strengthen safe-
guards and regime enforcement. This in turn 
depends in part on the willingness of the recog-
nized nuclear-weapon states to keep their part of 
the bargain and make real progress toward fulfill-
ing their “unequivocal” NPT commitment “to 
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear 
arsenals.” In May 2000, these states agreed to 
important benchmarks of progress toward this 
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end. Unfortunately, since that time the nuclear-
weapon states—and others—have made almost 
no progress on these benchmarks. The nonpro-
liferation regime also depends on engaging the 
three nuclear-weapon states not party to the 
NPT bargain—India, Israel, and Pakistan—in a 
productive manner that encourages them to be 
part of the solution, as is discussed below. 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
Since September 11, the cracks in the nu-
clear nonproliferation regime have widened. The 
conflict between the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and most of the international com-
munity, on one side, and suspected radical 
Islamists on the other has coincided with horri-
ble violence in Israel and the occupied territories. 
There is plenty of blame to assign all around, but 
the net effect is greater antagonism in the Islamic 
world toward Israel and the United States, and 
vice versa. The war now underway in Afghani-
stan creates perceptions of insecurity or uncer-
tainty that may heighten interests in Iran, Iraq, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in acquiring nuclear 
weapons or other WMD. In short, the political 
and security environment stretching from India 
to Israel arguably poses the greatest challenge the 
nonproliferation regime has faced since its incep-
tion.  
In South Asia, post-September 11 events ex-
acerbate risks of proliferation and possible use of 
nuclear weapons in several ways. The prospect 
has grown that nuclear weapons, fissile materials, 
and/or know-how could leak from the Pakistani 
state to extremist groups or other states. The 
most real threat of leakage stems from possible 
insiders within the Pakistani nuclear establish-
ment transferring fissile or non-fissile radioactive 
materials and/or know-how. The next most 
likely threat is the possibility that a regime 
change could occur in Pakistan in which custody 
and control over nuclear “assets” would pass 
from relatively responsible, internationally coop-
erative leaders to a government of extremists 
determined to challenge the international order 
and/or to intensify conflict with India over 
Kashmir. Thirdly, it is possible that Indo-Pak 
violence in Kashmir could escalate and that a 
South Asian missile crisis could ensue. India and 
Pakistan do not have confidence in the “loca-
tion” of each other’s threshold for using nuclear 
weapons. Nor do they have the sorts of intelli-
gence and warning capabilities desirable for 
managing conflict under the shadow of nuclear 
threats. In the absence of agreed confidence-
building measures and clear “rules of the road” 
for managing a nuclear stand-off, the two states 
could back themselves into a nuclear conflict.1  
The post-September 11 nuclear dangers in 
South Asia also extend to the broader nonprolif-
eration regime. As part of an effort to build po-
litical relations with both countries in the fight 
against terrorism, the United States lifted post-
1998 proliferation sanctions on India and Paki-
stan. Japan followed suit. While these policies 
may make strategic and political sense, they also 
raise questions about the long-term enforceabil-
ity of nonproliferation norms. 
Yet, for all of the ominous signs facing the 
nonproliferation regime after September 11, the 
fluidity of international security relationships also 
creates opportunities to repair the cracks in the 
regime. The first challenge is to recognize that 
the nonproliferation regime is only what states 
make of it. Speaking of the “nonproliferation 
regime” as a proper noun—as a subject—diverts 
us from the reality that the regime truly is only 
what states make of it. The United States, Russia, 
China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Paki-
stan, Israel, Germany, Japan, and other vital ac-
tors are the subjects who determine the strength 
and durability of this regime. Once the responsi-
bilities of these states are recognized and ac-
cepted, it will become possible to demand more 
from them and to specify actions that they must 
take if the threats of nuclear terrorism, prolifera-
tion, and use are to be eliminated or greatly re-
duced. Thus, the first-order challenge for 
concerned actors is to design and pursue strate-
gies for persuading leading states to act more 
decisively, creatively, and constructively on this 
problem. 
One way to persuade key states to act is to 
offer them plausible processes and policy ap-
proaches that would enable them to make pro-
gress. It is much easier for governments to take 
                                                 
1 This text was written in late November 2001, 
before the December 13 attack on the Indian 
parliament and the ensuing mobilization of mili-
tary forces. 
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on a challenge if they have a sense whether and 
how success might be achieved. 
Space and competence do not allow me to 
present an off-the-shelf approach to any or all of 
the challenges identified above. Here I simply 
summarize some of the more obvious require-
ments to address the challenges in South Asia, 
Iraq, and Iran. Then I suggest that a new interna-
tional process should be undertaken to address 
these particular dangers and the overall need to 
strengthen the regime. I propose that countries 
that possess nuclear weapons and fissile materi-
als should acknowledge that they face a global 
proliferation crisis and should immediately form 
a “contact group” to address it. The contact 
group should be charged with taking actions 
necessary to reassure the international commu-
nity that every possible measure is being taken to 
preclude the proliferation and use of nuclear 
weapons by terrorists or states. 
SOUTH ASIA 
The challenge now is not to roll back India 
and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities. That 
will not happen under currently foreseeable cir-
cumstances. Rather, the current challenge is to 
prevent further proliferation, especially from 
Pakistan, and to prevent use of nuclear weapons 
by India or Pakistan. Optimally, these objectives 
should be pursued without saying or doing 
things that increase appearances that either 
country is gaining political standing and other 
benefits from possessing nuclear weapons. 
To stem further proliferation, especially 
from Pakistan, the United States, perhaps in con-
junction with other nuclear-weapon states, 
should engage with Pakistani authorities to de-
sign a range of cooperative steps to strengthen 
the security of Pakistan’s weapons, fissile materi-
als, and other critical components from theft. 
The most likely risk is from insiders, and security 
measures should be designed accordingly. Such 
measures should focus on securing sensitive ma-
terials in storage and transit, but should not as-
sist Pakistan in deploying assembled weapons. 
The latter would violate both the spirit and the 
letter of the NPT and the fundamental underly-
ing objective of preventing the use of nuclear 
weapons. 
Current and former government experts 
know well the range of procedures and tech-
nologies that can serve this task. However, U.S. 
interaction with Pakistan in this area quickly 
bumps up against national and NPT-legal con-
straints. Know-how in the form of manuals, dis-
cussions of best practices, and other types of 
advice in designing physical and procedural sys-
tems to protect nuclear assets from diversion can 
be most readily proffered. Provision of equip-
ment such as vault locks, closed-circuit video 
cameras, and other items would require export 
licenses from the U.S. government. Lawyers 
should explore which types of equipment, if any, 
would and should be permissible under the 
NPT. But even if strong cases can be made for 
tolerance under the NPT, national legislation and 
executive policies likely would have to be ad-
justed. Consultants can fairly readily schematize 
the exact legal and policy decisions that would 
have to be made for each envisioned technology. 
Developing and providing this schematization to 
qualified NGO leaders would be extremely use-
ful as a means for developing a comprehensive, 
government-quality briefing that would give 
opinion shapers and policy makers a detailed 
road map of the steps that would have to be 
taken and the decisions made to work with Paki-
stan on this vital matter. A detailed road map of 
how to do heighten the security of Pakistan’s 
nuclear “assets” would enable proponents then 
to build a more persuasive case why to do it. Re-
sistance to assisting Pakistan secure its nuclear 
assets against diversion would come from several 
identifiable quarters inside and outside the gov-
ernment. If a solid core of the NGO community 
were mobilized in favor of the proposition, it is 
possible that congressional opposition could be 
diminished and the executive could proceed. 
For several reasons, provision of assistance 
in securing Pakistan’s nuclear assets should be as 
secretive as possible. Public discussion of such 
cooperation would provide ammunition to anti-
American elements in Pakistan and weaken the 
current government. Public discussion also 
would increase the sense that the United States 
(or others) is “rewarding” or at least legitimating 
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. To the 
extent that public mention of these issues is un-
avoidable, the discussion should focus on the 
solemn burdens and onerous responsibilities 
attendant to possessing nuclear weapons. That is, 
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nuclear weapons are dangerous; the risks of pro-
liferation are grievous; Pakistan is now experi-
encing some of the dangers and uncertainties 
that led many to urge the country not to acquire 
nuclear weapons; but now that Pakistan has 
done so, Pakistanis must face up to their enor-
mous responsibilities. The United States should 
help because Americans, too, recognize that the 
world would be safer without any nuclear weap-
ons, but as long as they exist, we cannot avoid 
the responsibility to protect others and ourselves 
from the dangers inherent in their existence. 
India, too, is not above concern regarding 
the safety and security of its nuclear materials 
and plants. One focus of the broader contact 
group recommended below would be to elabo-
rate international best practices in materials pro-
tection, control, and accounting, and in warhead 
security, and then press all relevant states to 
adopt such measures. 
Going beyond the risks of proliferation, the 
danger of an Indo-Pak crisis analogous to the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis must be addressed. 
The United States, and perhaps Russia and/or 
China, could help. First, India and Pakistan have 
come very close to agreeing on nuclear confi-
dence-building and risk reduction measures. If 
the Lahore process had been continued, rather 
than interrupted by the Kargil war, the two states 
likely would have formalized agreements on 
these matters. The task now should be to find 
ways for Pakistan and India to specify and affirm 
their agreement on such measures. Political diffi-
culties in their relationship preclude formalizing 
such an agreement at high levels bilaterally. 
However, U.S. officials should explore whether 
the United States could be a transmission belt to 
clarify each state’s understanding and commit-
ments regarding risk reduction. This would be 
done quietly, but the result could be a shared 
understanding between India and Pakistan on 
acceptable procedures for testing missiles, notify-
ing each other of relevant movements and exer-
cises, clarifying ambiguous events, and so forth. 
China could contribute here by encouraging 
Pakistan to cooperate in this exercise, and Russia 
could do the same with India. 
In the event that India and Pakistan escalate 
their conflict over Kashmir, the United States 
should deploy monitoring and other warning 
resources to South Asia. The increased U.S. 
presence in the region offers a potential benefit 
insofar as the United States is more likely to de-
tect a brewing nuclear crisis. The intensity of 
U.S. communications with Indian and Pakistani 
leaders affords opportunities to urge caution on 
both parties and to reassure each that the United 
States will do everything it can to prevent either 
India or Pakistan from taking military action in 
and around Kashmir. In simplest terms, the 
United States must impress upon Pakistan that 
militant-created violence in Kashmir will prevent 
development of the positive U.S.-Pakistani rela-
tionship desired by both sides. Washington must 
reassure New Delhi of its vigilance on this issue, 
and obtain in return Indian commitments not to 
cross the Line of Control in Kashmir. India’s 
forbearance during the Kargil war yielded a ma-
jor political and diplomatic gain in the form of 
clear statements by Washington that the Line of 
Control is the de facto border in Kashmir. India 
should be persuaded that this gain would be re-
versed if New Delhi projected forces across the 
line. 
The current crisis environment in South 
Asia also should strengthen the case by NGOs 
and officials that deployment of nuclear arsenals 
by India and Pakistan would significantly in-
crease the risks of war, including nuclear war. 
Given the acute uncertainties and tensions in the 
region, the imperative should be to heighten sta-
bility and national protection by dispersing and 
securing nuclear assets rather than by mobilizing 
them toward launch-readiness. In a foggy strate-
gic environment, deployed nuclear forces would 
put both India’s and Pakistan’s policy makers in 
unnecessarily precarious positions, fearing immi-
nent nuclear crisis and possible use. Neither side 
possesses a clear enough view of the nuclear 
“battlefield” to know what the other is preparing 
to do. Given this dangerous blindness, it would 
be better to focus on dispersal and security of 
components to ensure the survivability of nu-
clear assets against attack, and to forestall the 
possibility of their acquisition by sub-national 
actors. 
In sum, the actions sketched incompletely 
here would attend to the most immediate nuclear 
dangers in South Asia. By highlighting the dan-
gerous and sober responsibilities required to 
prevent proliferation and possible use of nuclear 
weapons, this approach would not heighten the 
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perceived benefits of nuclear weapons. Rather 
than “giving India and Pakistan a pass” on nu-
clear weapons, the United States would be de-
manding more from them. The message would 
be that India and Pakistan—and other posses-
sors of nuclear weapons—must take decisive 
measures to reassure the rest of the world that 
these weapons will not be used and that further 
proliferation will not occur. American NGOs 
and officials should network with opinion shap-
ers and leaders in Europe, Japan, Argentina, Bra-
zil, South Africa, and other influential states to 
develop and promote this message. 
IRAQ 
Iraq’s challenge to international security and 
the nonproliferation regime is relatively well un-
derstood. Saddam Hussein symbolizes it. Yet, 
even when Saddam passes from the scene, the 
proliferation challenge will remain. 
Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center, in col-
laboration with others in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France, has begun to de-
velop a project that identifies the probable pro-
liferation challenges following a regime change in 
Iraq. The project recognizes that much of the 
international community would respond to re-
gime change in Iraq by seeking to rehabilitate it 
diplomatically, politically, and economically. 
While understandable and in many ways desir-
able, moves to rehabilitate Iraq may outpace 
comprehension that a post-Saddam government 
would likely retain interests in possessing WMD. 
No matter who is in charge of Iraq, the state will 
have ambitions and face security problems that 
may call forth reliance on WMD. More compli-
cated still, other Arab societies and states may 
welcome a rehabilitated Iraq’s possession of stra-
tegic weapons that could equalize Israel’s and 
perhaps Iran’s capabilities. 
Kemp has outlined factors that must be ana-
lyzed and addressed to help policymakers chart a 
course for dealing with these possibilities. He has 
proposed formation of a multilateral, high-level 
series of workshops with U.S., European and 
Middle Eastern experts and officials to refine the 
policy agenda and begin developing recommen-
dations for government action. This project out-
line does not need to be reviewed in detail; 
rather, the Iraqi challenge and this particular ap-
proach to addressing it should be integrated into 
the wider set of activities sketched here. 
IRAN 
The post-September 11 environment also 
poses opportunities to take more constructive 
measures to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. On the supply side, fears of instability 
and proliferation emanating from Pakistan 
should make Russia, China, and other potential 
contributors to Iran’s nuclear capabilities wary of 
the risks inherent in Iran’s possession of fissile 
materials or nuclear weapons. Iran’s political 
future is unknowable; does anyone want to risk a 
future where dangerous nuclear assets in Iran 
could be implicated in a civil war or other crisis? 
Do we want a repeat in Iran of the alarm many 
now feel toward Pakistan? This inherent danger 
of proliferation should be more recognizable in 
Moscow at a time when cooperation is tenta-
tively growing between the United States and 
Russia. Russian commitments to foreclose assis-
tance to Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon 
option should be more obtainable in a climate of 
increasing cooperation. Indeed, this should be 
among the conditions of cooperation.  
The United States must do its part to make 
cooperation attractive to Moscow. Here again 
the heightened concerns over the risks of prolif-
eration should help motivate Washington to nar-
row its visions and plans for ballistic missile 
defenses. The case for missile defenses as a last 
line of defense against proliferators may be 
strengthened since September 11, but the pri-
macy of that mission over more ambitious archi-
tectures that allow strategic domination and 
negation of the Russian and Chinese deterrents 
is also clearer. That is, the United States clearly 
has greater interests in winning Russian and Chi-
nese cooperation in nonproliferation than it does 
in being able to negate the deterrents of these 
two states. This realization could be formalized 
in agreements limiting the prospective architec-
ture of missile defenses and manifesting a will-
ingness to cooperate with Russia and China on 
nonproliferation while reassuring them on mis-
sile defenses. Iran is a prime case for demon-
strating nonproliferation cooperation in the form 
of Russian and Chinese vigilance in preventing 
exports of sensitive equipment, material, and 
know-how to Iran. 
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The Atlantic Council, among others, has 
sketched criteria that could inform definitions of 
acceptable versus unacceptable nuclear and/or 
non-nuclear energy cooperation with Iran. This 
is a subject on which reasonable people can and 
should debate. NGOs should encourage this 
discussion within the United States, and between 
Americans, Iranians, Russians, and others. 
On the demand side, the need for interna-
tional attention is even greater. Any objective 
observer must acknowledge that Iran finds itself 
in a precarious security and political environ-
ment. Iraq remains an adversary and has used 
weapons of mass destruction against Iran. Paki-
stan is an unstable possessor of nuclear weapons, 
and Sunni Islamist extremists in Pakistan have 
demonstrated willingness to kill Shiites. Iranians 
generally are unwilling to acknowledge that their 
state would not be threatened by Israel if Iran 
stopped supporting violent militancy against Is-
rael and did not develop WMD and missiles with 
ranges that go beyond Iraq to Israel. That said, 
Tel Aviv’s possession of nuclear weapons does 
encourage political demands for an Iranian 
equalizer. The United States also remains a per-
ceived military threat to Iran, as does Turkey, as 
was Afghanistan under the Taliban. In any case, 
Iraq alone would be sufficient to stimulate Ira-
nian interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. In-
deed, descriptions of the Iraqi threat by 
American officials such as U.S. Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz could be adopted by 
Iranians as justification for acquiring nuclear 
weapons. 
In order to persuade Iranians that nuclear 
weapons are not in their interests, Americans 
and others must show Iranians how they will be 
more secure without these weapons. Why are 
nuclear weapons not in Iran’s interests? How will 
Iran protect itself against an Iraq that, with or 
without Saddam Hussein, is likely to possess or 
seek WMD? What role would the United States 
and the UNSC be willing to play in protecting 
Iran against Iraq? What security system in the 
region could reassure the smaller Gulf states that 
neither Iraq nor Iran will threaten their security? 
What commitments, deployments and opera-
tional practices on the part of Iran would satisfy 
its defensive needs while not projecting offensive 
threats? What role would U.S. military forces 
play in this reassurance without at the same time 
posing threats to Iran? 
I am not aware of any governmental or non-
governmental study that seeks to answer these 
questions. Yet, these are questions that any 
American strategist or official would want an-
swered if he or she were in the shoes of Iranian 
leaders. Clearly these questions cannot be an-
swered by American strategists alone, but if we 
are serious about the nonproliferation challenge 
in the Gulf, we must develop answers to them. 
Iranians, too, must do much more to answer 
these questions. Then dialogues must be estab-
lished between Iranians and Americans on their 
various perspectives on these questions. This 
should occur first at the track II level, with the 
aim ultimately of advancing the discussion to the 
official level. 
CONTACT GROUP 
The challenges sketched above signify a real 
crisis in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The 
regime’s remarkable effectiveness must not be 
overlooked—as the most extreme proponents of 
ballistic missile defense tend to do. It is precisely 
because the regime is worth saving that leader-
ship must be mobilized to strengthen it. 
The contact group model developed around 
the Bosnia conflict fits the current situation be-
cause it represents the mobilization of key par-
ties determined to solve a problem that more 
formal, established diplomatic forums are not 
suited to solve. Today, it is imperative to reas-
sure the international community that every fea-
sible action is being taken to ensure that 
terrorists do not acquire nuclear materials or 
weapons. The world must be reassured that the 
horrors visited on New York City will not be 
experienced in magnified form through the 
detonation of nuclear weapons, either at the 
hand of terrorists or states, whether by purpose-
ful action or accident or inadvertent escalation. 
An informal contact group would address these 
imperatives. 
A contact group would invite participation 
from the states that have the weapons, materials 
and facilities whose mere existence pose threats 
to international security. Participants would be 
acting on the exceptional responsibilities they 
have as custodians of these enormously danger-
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ous materials, weapons, and facilities. Participa-
tion would be invited from the following states: 
the United States, Russia, China, the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, Japan, 
South Africa, North Korea, India, Israel, and 
Pakistan. These are the states that possess nu-
clear weapons, or significant quantities of sepa-
rated plutonium and/or highly enriched 
uranium. Those that chose not to participate 
would highlight for the international community 
their unwillingness to take constructive action 
against the threat of nuclear terrorism, prolifera-
tion, and use at a time when greater responsibil-
ity is expected.2 
The innovation here is the process. Experts 
would outline the contact group’s functional 
goals in advance. The following would be high 
on the list of topics and objectives: 
• Dissemination and adoption of best prac-
tices in fissile materials protection, control, 
and accounting. 
• Improved measures to protect against in-
sider threats of theft or diversion of fissile 
materials. 
• Cessation of further production of fissile 
materials outside of safeguards.  
• Cooperative measures to block supplies of 
sensitive technology and know-how to Iran, 
Iraq, and/or other states seeking WMD. 
• Measures to decrease risks of escalation to 
nuclear threats and/or use in crises, due to 
asymmetries in warning capabilities, alert 
rates, or capacities to analyze events like nu-
clear accidents or detonations from unde-
clared sources. 
• Initiatives to strengthen adherence to and 
enforcement of the NPT. 
The actual work plan of the group would be de-
veloped in the process of its generation and ini-
tial meetings.  
                                                 
2 If there are additional states that possess very 
small quantities of HEU or plutonium for use in 
experimental/research reactor programs, per-
haps they should also be invited to join the con-
tact group. In general, its membership should 
include the highest possible number of states 
that are part of the “problem” that also are will-
ing to work harder for “solutions.” 
The immediate requirement is to begin quiet, infor-
mal consultations with potential contact group members to 
make the case for the basic process and to refine a work 
plan based on these consultations. This initial exploration 
could best be undertaken by respected former officials and 
independent experts. 
At the outset, we must acknowledge and ad-
dress several important reservations that would 
greet the basic concept. Most likely a contact 
group would be seen to undermine the estab-
lished processes of the NPT and the U.N. Con-
ference on Disarmament (CD). Moreover, 
skeptics would argue that a group that included 
India, Israel and Pakistan would give these states 
“nuclear legitimacy” and status purposefully de-
nied them in the NPT. It also would be argued 
that a contact group would devalue the estab-
lished NPT process of review conferences. 
While important, these criticisms fail to ad-
dress two vital material realities. First, whether 
we like it or not, India, Israel, and Pakistan pos-
sess nuclear weapons and they are extremely 
unlikely to abandon these capabilities in the fore-
seeable future. Meanwhile, the NPT’s underlying 
purpose of preventing the further proliferation 
and possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be 
satisfied without cooperation from these three 
states. They must act to adopt the most stringent 
practices for securing vital “assets,” safeguarding 
against exports, and preventing use. Adoption of 
these practices to the satisfaction of the interna-
tional community will not occur without direct 
inclusion of these states in a cooperative dia-
logue and program of action with the other 
states that affect their security calculations, as 
well as their sense of standards and equity. This 
reality is “uncomfortable” for the NPT, but it 
cannot be wished away. 
Second, as valuable as the NPT review proc-
ess is, it is not likely to meet the immediate re-
quirements posed by the current situation. A 
contact group would not replace the NPT proc-
ess, but rather would complement and 
strengthen it by providing a venue for key states 
actually to make the sort of progress demanded 
by NPT parties in 2000. Indeed, a contact group 
should be seen as a means by which states are 
acting on their responsibilities under the NPT 
and the broader nonproliferation regime. A con-
tact group would do what the NPT process has 
not: put international nonproliferation issues on 
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the agenda of the highest levels of government 
in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, Paris, 
New Delhi, Islamabad, Tel Aviv and other par-
ticipating states. 
A contact group would also minimize the 
“risk” of creating a new, high-status club of the 
“nuclear eight,” while at the same time avoiding 
the ineffectiveness of the too-diffuse CD. Par-
ticipants such as Belgium, Germany, Japan, and 
South Africa would dilute the symbolic “clubbi-
ness” of the nuclear eight and would represent 
some of the important perspectives of non-
nuclear-weapon states in the CD. Some non-
nuclear-weapon states would still object, but, 
again, these objections over form do not address 
the substantive imperative to make progress, 
which for various reasons the CD has been un-
able to do. Moreover, if a contact group actually 
made substantive progress, the critics would be 
silenced, or their criticisms would seem petty. If 
a contact group failed to make progress, then 
criticism would be deserved and could help to 
increase pressure on recalcitrant actors through 
the CD, the NPT review process, and the United 
Nations. 
Another possible criticism or reservation 
would focus on Israel. Tel Aviv, perhaps with 
sympathy from Washington, would resist any 
initiative that would hold Israel to greater ac-
count under the nonproliferation regime. Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, and others might cynically seize on 
such a group as evidence that Israel is being le-
gitimated as a nuclear-weapon state. But neither 
Israel’s stonewalling nor Egypt and others’ rhe-
torical posturing will stem dangerously rising 
levels of water against the dam. To Israel and its 
diplomatic protectors, the argument would be 
that Tel Aviv must be seen to act more positively 
to shore up a nonproliferation regime whose 
failure, ultimately, could have the most negative 
consequences for Israel. Pretending there is not a 
problem will not be a durable strategy. To Egypt 
and others, the argument would be that a contact 
group is not giving Israel (or India and Pakistan) 
a “pass” on nonproliferation, but rather is in-
creasing the international community’s demands 
that these states address the insecurities posed by 
nuclear arsenals and ongoing production of fis-
sile materials. 
An informal contact group would accom-
plish the important task of bringing India, Israel, 
and Pakistan into account for their responsibili-
ties as nuclear-weapon possessors without for-
mally undermining the NPT. Rather than a 
“reward” for proliferation, it would represent a 
demand for international reassurance. More 
broadly, a contact group of this composition 
would provide the first-ever venue for the five 
recognized nuclear-weapon states to engage on 
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Each 
of these states affects the nuclear policies, strate-
gies, and proliferation/nonproliferation concerns 
of the others, either directly or indirectly through 
the proliferation chain. A contact group would 
recognize the interaction (in two directions) 
along the U.S.-Russian-Chinese-Pakistani-Indian 
chain, as well as the U.S.-Russia-China-Iran-Iraq 
chain. The web of interactivity amongst these 
countries simply cannot be disentangled through 
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Before the World Trade Center and Penta-
gon attacks on September 11, 2001, many in-
ternational security specialists claimed that 
terrorists were simply not interested in creating 
mass fatalities. Before the October 2001 an-
thrax attacks in Florida, Washington, and New 
York, many specialists also insisted that public 
fears that terrorists would use weapons of mass 
destruction were unwarranted. Brian Jenkins’ 
1975 aphorism—“Terrorists want a lot of peo-
ple watching and a lot of people listening, but 
not a lot of people dead”—was perhaps the 
most widely quoted statement in the scholarly 
literature on terrorism. This view of terrorists’ 
motives, Jenkins argued, helped explain why 
“terrorists have not done some of the terribly 
damaging and terrifying things they could do, 
such as poisoning a city’s water supply, spread-
ing chemical or biological agents, or other 
things that could produce mass casualties.”1 
Despite growing concerns after the 1995 Aum 
Shinrikyu gas attacks in the Tokyo subway, 
many specialists continued to be skeptical about 
whether a new paradigm was necessary. For 
example, in 1998, Ehud Spinzak insisted that 
“the chances of a successful superterrorism 
attack are minimal,” arguing that public and 
governmental “obsession” with superterrorism 
was due to “sloppy thinking,” government 
agencies’ “vested interests” in increasing their 
budgets, and the “morbid fascination” of “sus-
pense writers, publishers, television networks, 
and sensationalist journalists.”2 
                                                 
1 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A 
New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton and 
Carlo Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and 
World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 
15. Also see Brian M. Jenkins, “Will Terrorists 
Go Nuclear?,” Orbis, 29, (Fall 1985), pp. 507-15. 
2 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism 
Scare,” Foreign Policy, 112, (Fall 1998), pp. 116-
18. For other optimistic assessments see Bruce 
Hoffman, “The American Perspective,” Survival, 
42, (Summer 2000), pp. 161-66; and Paul R. 
After September 11, 2001, no one doubts 
that terrorists might be interested in killing a lot 
of people. But three kinds of questions remain 
worth discussing in our effort to understand 
how serious is the risk of nuclear terrorism in 
the future. First, why might bin Laden and his 
potential successors be interested in nuclear 
weapons? What might be terrorists’ strategic 
purpose for acquiring and using nuclear weap-
ons? Second, how serious is the risk of terrorist 
theft or seizure of nuclear material or nuclear 
weapons from Pakistan today? Third, what can 
the U.S. government and nongovernmental 
organizations do about the problem? 
TERRORISTS’ INTERESTS 
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Usama 
bin Laden was quite open in stating his desire 
for nuclear weapons, indeed claiming that “to 
possess the weapons that could counter those 
of the infidels is a religious duty.”3 Although 
bin Laden later emphasized, after the U.S. 
strikes in Afghanistan began, that he needed 
(and supposedly possessed) nuclear weapons to 
deter U.S. nuclear attacks, his earlier comments 
expressed his desire to punish American citi-
zens and soldiers for what he sees as an evil 
U.S. foreign policy. “We do not differentiate 
between those dressed in military uniforms and 
civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa,” he 
stated in a May 1998 interview: 
We must use such punishment to keep 
your evil away from Muslims, Muslim 
children, and women. American history 
does not distinguish between civilians 
and military, and not even women and 
                                                                      
Pillar, Terrorism and American Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 
pp. 21-23. 
3 Rahimullah Yousafsai, “Interview with Usama 
bin Laden,” ABC News, December 22, 1998, 
<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Dail
yNews/transcript_binladen1_981228.html>. 




children. They are the ones who used 
the bombs against Nagasaki. Can these 
bombs distinguish between infants and 
military?…We believe that the biggest 
thieves in the world and the terrorists 
are the Americans. The only way for us 
to fend off these assaults is to use simi-
lar means.4 
Hatred and shame lurk behind such views. 
But I also fear that there is considerable method 
in bin Laden’s madness. Immediately after the 
September 11 attacks, many people wondered 
how bin Laden could think that he could get 
away with killing thousands of American citi-
zens. In October 2001, for example, Gary 
Anderson, a Red Team leader in terrorist war 
game simulations at the Center for Emerging 
Threats and Opportunities, said that he had 
considered mass casualty attacks before Sep-
tember 11, but did not think they were serious 
threats because they would not serve terrorists’ 
interests. After all, Anderson argued, killing lots 
of Americans would simply enrage the U.S. 
public and galvanize the U.S. and allied gov-
ernments for a protracted war.5 How could such 
an attack serve bin Laden’s political purpose of 
overthrowing conservative Muslim regimes in 
the Middle East and destroying Israel, given 
that a massive U.S. military response was inevi-
table?  
The answer is that there is a kind of a stra-
tegic logic behind his use of mass murder, a 
logic that he also outlined in interviews. Two 
factors appear to be important. First, there was 
belief that the U.S. public lacked the will to 
support a long war. Second, bin Laden hoped 
that large-scale U.S. intervention in the Middle 
East would destabilize the regimes that he seeks 
to overthrow. In May 1998, bin Laden ex-
pressed his views about the lack of U.S. willing-
ness to fight quite clearly:  
                                                 
4 John Miller, “Interview with Usama bin 
Laden,” ABC News, May 28, 1998, <http:// 
abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/ 
miller_binladen_980609.html>. 
5 Greg Jaffe and Chip Cummins, “War Game 
Helps Army’s Mock ‘Red Team’ to Simulate 
Tactics of Low-Tech Fighters,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, October 2, 2001. 
We have seen in the last decade the de-
cline of the American government and 
the weakness of the American soldier 
who is ready to wage Cold Wars and 
unprepared to fight long wars. This was 
proven in Beirut when the Marines fled 
after two explosions. It also proves they 
can run in less than 24 hours, and this 
was also repeated in Somalia. We are 
ready for all occasions. We rely on Al-
lah.6  
In addition, he argued that the Saudi gov-
ernment would eventually fall because of its 
support for the United States, just as the Shah’s 
government fell in the Iranian revolution. U.S. 
military activities in the region could increase 
the likelihood of an uprising from the streets 
and mosques. “We predict that the Riyadh 
leader and those with him that stood with the 
Jews and the Christians…will disintegrate. They 
have left the Muslim nation.” Bin Laden con-
cluded: “The Muslims are moving toward liber-
ating the Muslim worlds. Allah willing, we will 
win.”7  
Any terrorist leader with this strategic vi-
sion, whether it is bin Laden or a successor in 
al-Qa’ida or a similar terrorist network, is not 
likely be deterred from using nuclear weapons 
or radiological weapons against the United 
States. U.S. threats to use conventional military 
forces to kill or capture such a terrorist over the 
long term may not be believed. Not only might 
the American public’s willingness to engage in a 
long campaign be underestimated, but it is also 
possible that nuclear weapons could be deliv-
ered in a covert manner (by a commercial air-
liner, ship, or truck, or by a cruise missile). In 
such cases, there would not be a “return ad-
dress” against which to retaliate. Finally, even if 
the perpetrator of such an attack were discov-
ered (through intelligence sources or the “nu-
clear forensics” programs started at the U.S. 
national laboratories), U.S. threats to retaliate in 
kind might be welcomed, since the U.S. use of 
nuclear weapons could hasten the downfall of 
allied regimes in the Muslim world through pro-
tests in the mosques and riots in the streets. 
                                                 
6 Miller, “Interview with Usama bin Laden.” 
7 Ibid. 
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I conclude that the best way, by far, to pre-
vent Islamic fundamentalist terrorists from ever 
using nuclear weapons is to prevent them from 
ever possessing such weapons. This anti-
terrorist imperative adds yet one more compel-
ling reason to believe that the spread of nuclear 
weapons to potential proliferant states is 
unlikely to produce even the kind of moderately 
stable balance of terror that eventually emerged, 
through trial-and-terror learning, during the 
Cold War.8 The best way, by far, to prevent 
Islamic or other terrorists from possessing nu-
clear weapons is to prevent unstable states from 
possessing nuclear weapons. 
PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Of course, one Islamic state—Pakistan—
already has nuclear materials and weapons. 
How concerned should we be about the danger 
of insider or terrorist theft of Pakistani nuclear 
materials or nuclear weapons? In early Novem-
ber, when asked to rate the security of Pakistani 
nuclear weapons sites on a scale from 1-100 
scale, President Pervez Musharraf declared: “I 
would certainly give it over 90.”9 How confi-
dent should this make us feel?  
Good news and bad news can be glimpsed 
through the veil of secrecy that covers the Paki-
stani nuclear program. The good news is impor-
tant to recognize: the Pakistani arsenal is small 
(an estimated 25-50 nuclear weapons), with 
weapons apparently normally maintained in an 
unassembled state (with nuclear cores kept 
apart from the other weapons components) and 
not mated to delivery vehicles. That low level of 
operational readiness makes the weapons 
harder to use in a crisis or war, but far more 
secure from theft. 
There are, however, many more pieces of 
bad news. First, it is believed that Pakistani 
weapons (probably because of both technical 
design and because they are kept in an unas-
                                                 
8 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 2nd ed., 
(New York: W.W. Norton, forthcoming 2002).  
9 “Pak Nukes Not Ready to be Fired,” The 
News, November 11, 2001, <http://www. 
jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2001-daily/11-11-
2001/main/main6.htm>. 
sembled state) lack the advanced permissive 
action link (PAL) locks and environmental 
sensing devices (ESDs) that make it difficult for 
a terrorist or other unauthorized individual to 
use an assembled nuclear weapon if assembly 
occurs in a crisis alert and the weapon is then 
stolen. This possibility is worrisome, since there 
is some evidence that Pakistan did begin to alert 
its nuclear forces during the 1999 Kargil crisis.10 
Moreover, it has been reported that Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons were moved to new secret 
locations in an emergency operation within days 
after the September 11 attack.11 Although de-
tails are not available, the operation was proba-
bly due to the Pakistani government’s fear that 
India and the United States might attack its nu-
clear storage sites.12 If that is the case, it is likely 
that the operation decreased the risk of a suc-
cessful surprise attack on the arsenal, but also 
increased the risk of theft of a nuclear weapon. 
Second, according to officers in Pakistan’s 
Strategic Plans Division, as reported at a Center 
for International Security and Cooperation 
(CISAC) workshop in March 2001, there is no 
dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) in 
place for the officers and guards of Pakistan’s 
nuclear forces. The only such system currently 
                                                 
10 Raj Chengappa, “Pakistan Tried Nuclear 
Blackmail,” The Newspaper Today, January 12, 
2000, <http://www.thenewspapertoday. 
com/>. 
11 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan 
Moves Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, 
November 11, 2001, p. A1, <http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9038-
2001Nov10.html>. 
12 Other explanations include Pakistani con-
cerns that the storage sites were on the flight 
paths of U.S. attacking aircraft and the need to 
move weapons to even more secure locations 
than their normal peacetime storage sites. 
Musharraf, however, did stress the danger of an 
Indian attack in his September 18th speech, 
stating that “our forces are on full alert and 
ready for a do or die situation.” See “Highlights 
of General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the 
Nation,” Dawn, 19 September 2001, <http:// 
www.dawn.com/events/speech/20010919/ind
ex.htm>. 




in place is a physical examination given to offi-
cers when they receive their initial commission 
into the armed forces and a series of counteres-
pionage background investigations, given by the 
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) when officers 
and soldiers are being considered for nuclear 
weapons duty. Unfortunately, the ISI is the 
military institution in Pakistan most closely tied 
to the Taliban and this procedure is vulnerable 
to insider/outsider collusion. Third, no special-
ized teams have been trained inside the Pakistan 
Army on how to seize or dismantle a nuclear 
weapon if one was stolen from the arsenal. In 
June 2001, Foreign Minister Sattar formally an-
nounced that the Pakistani government recog-
nized these problems and was studying how to 
implement programs based on the U.S. PRP 
and NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Team) 
programs.13 Unfortunately, these studies had 
just started when the September 11 attacks oc-
curred.  
Finally, it is only partially reassuring that 
President Musharraf forced a number of senior 
and mid-level officers of the ISI to leave office 
in mid-September because of their ties to the 
Taliban (and according to some reports, also to 
al-Qa’ida).14 This is mixed news, because we 
should be pleased that Musharraf purged the 
ISI of at least some pro-Taliban officers, but we 
should be worried that terrorist sympathizers 
will come out from the shadows in the future. 
Neither we, nor Musharraf, can know how 
close those shadows will fall to nuclear storage 
sites. Guarding the guardians has never been a 
more vexing problem. 
                                                 
13 “Honorable Abdul Sattar,” June 18, 2001, 
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation 
Conference, Washington, DC, <http://www. 
ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Confere
nce%202001/sattar.htm>. 
14 Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “Leader 
Purges Top Ranks of Military, Spy Service,” 
Washington Post, October 8, 2001, p. 1; Sanjay 
Singh, ““Indian Intelligence Inputs Behind ISI 
Chiefs Exit,” Statesmen, October 9, 2001; John 
F. Burns, “Pakistan Atom Experts Held Amid 
Fear of Leaked Secrets,” New York Times, No-
vember 1, 2001, p. 1. 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
What role can and should the U.S. govern-
ment and nongovernmental organizations play 
in improving security at Pakistani nuclear 
weapons and storage sites? The Bush admini-
stration was contemplating making a nuclear 
security assistance offer to Pakistan prior to 
September 11. The terrorist attack forced a 
high-level decision, which was taken quickly. 
When Secretary of State Powell went to Islama-
bad, he therefore took with him an offer to as-
sist in providing increased security for Pakistani 
nuclear weapons and nuclear materials storage 
sites.15 Despite public assurances by the Paki-
stani Foreign Ministry that “Pakistan’s strategic 
assets are under foolproof custodial controls,” 
President Musharraf and Foreign Minister Sat-
tar eventually accepted at least the principle of 
U.S. technical assistance in early November 
2001.16 
What kinds of assistance should be given 
and by whom? Four different kinds of concerns 
have been expressed about nuclear security as-
sistance. First, many nonproliferation specialists 
have argued that U.S. assistance could provide 
“legitimacy” to the Indian and Pakistani deci-
sions to test nuclear weapons in 1998, and 
would therefore lead other potential nuclear 
states to believe that the United States is no 
longer serious about global nonproliferation. 
The Bush administration has not placed much 
weight on these concerns, however, and the 
nonproliferation impact of any assistance pro-
gram would in any case be minor compared to 
the broader policy change of lifting U.S. gov-
ernment sanctions on India and Pakistan. Sec-
ond, officials in the State Department have 
argued that other nuclear states may use U.S. 
government assistance to Pakistan as an excuse 
to justify their nuclear-related exports to Iraq 
and Iran. Any such excuses, however, are sim-
ply unpersuasive and should be condemned as 
such. There is a world of difference between 
                                                 
15 Douglas Frantz, “US and Pakistan Discuss 
Nuclear Security,” New York Times, October 1, 
2001, p. A3; Greg Myre, “US Wants to Advise 
Pakistan on Nukes,” AP, November 3, 2001. 
16 Ibid. The quote is from Abdul Sattar, Pakistan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2001. 
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providing nuclear security assistance to an exist-
ing non-NPT sanctioned nuclear state and as-
sisting a non-nuclear state to develop its own 
arsenal. 
Third, it is possible that sharing specific 
technological devices and information would be 
counterproductive if it encourages Pakistan to 
mate warheads and bombs to delivery vehicles 
and to deploy weapons into the field, in the 
belief that these operations would now be safe. 
In my view, this is the most legitimate concern 
about U.S. nuclear assistance. I therefore rec-
ommend that assistance programs focus on 
encouraging safe-and-secure storage, transport, 
and maintenance of nuclear materials, compo-
nents, and warheads. It should not include 
technical assistance or studies of organizational 
best practices regarding nuclear alert operations 
such as mating warheads to missiles or trans-
porting fully assembled weapons. There will 
inevitably be some ambiguity about this line, 
since many steps (such as improved personnel 
reliability programs) presumably improve secu-
rity of nuclear weapons both in storage and in 
the field. Still, the principle behind U.S. nuclear 
assistance should to focus on organizational 
practices and technologies that would encour-
age Pakistan to maintain its current policy of 
keeping components stored separately and not 
mated to delivery vehicles. This principle would 
exclude sharing PALs and ESD technology, but 
in any case it is unlikely that Pakistan would 
accept U.S. assistance in any such steps that 
require getting secret details about their weap-
ons designs, or worse yet from their perspec-
tive, letting Americans place devices on their 
crucial strategic assets. The UNSCOM record in 
Iraq is not forgotten. 
Fourth, many have expressed concerns that 
U.S. nuclear security assistance would be in vio-
lation of U.S. export control laws and would cut 
against its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) commitments. The Bush administration 
is currently revising the export laws, however, 
and has argued that most forms of nuclear se-
curity assistance do not violate the NPT. This is 
clearly a contentious issue and will be the sub-
ject of much debate in the coming year. 
Finally, it is not yet clear what role NGOs 
can best play, now that the U.S. government 
has taken on this important issue. Let me con-
clude with four observations. First, NGOs have 
already played an important role in paving the 
way for current assistance efforts by exposing 
influential Pakistanis to the complexity of the 
problems and persuading them of the need for 
improved nuclear security efforts. Second, 
NGOs can play a valuable role in both critiqu-
ing U.S. nuclear security programs—the United 
States may also need to rethink some of its own 
practices after September 11—and in turning 
“U.S. assistance” efforts into more acceptable 
joint efforts to “share best practices.” Third, 
many thorny nuclear problems will still remain 
in South Asia, even if nuclear security is im-
proved in Pakistan. Efforts to identify and im-
plement solutions to problems of false 
warnings, crisis instability, the potential role of 
defenses, and the modalities of arms control 
agreements remain vital to the future of the 
region. Finally, improving nuclear security in 
Pakistan should be seen as the first step, not the 
last. India faces different, but not dissimilar, 
challenges and it would be wise to help reduce 
the nuclear security problems there, before a 
future crisis turns wisdom into necessity.
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THREE CHALLENGES 
At the dawn of the 21st Century, the major 
powers face three challenges. First, on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, a non-state actor demonstrated that 
it could have a strategic impact on world affairs. 
The regional and global implications of the 
events of that day are so numerous and diverse 
that the list of impacted areas is almost endless: 
the Middle East, the Muslim world in general, 
the reshaping of Central Asia, the U.S.-Russia 
relationship, global financial system, immigration 
policies, the safety of hazardous materials, and so 
on.  
For the major powers, the most important 
consequence undoubtedly has been the demon-
stration of the potential rivalry they might face in 
coming decades from non-state actors able to 
inflict on them a level of destruction that previ-
ously has been unthinkable in peacetime. Al-
Qa’ida may be particularly well organized and 
may have exceptional global reach, but its exis-
tence at the present time is far from accidental. 
Rather, it reflects a permanent trend: as a result 
of the globalization of the economy, trade, and 
knowledge, more and more destructive power is 
falling into the hands of more and more people. 
The significance of this new reality was immedi-
ately understood by the international commu-
nity, as shown in U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1368, which was adopted by consen-
sus just one day after the attacks in New York 
and Washington, DC. No country can afford a 
U.S. failure in the campaign against global terror-
ism, and this common interest is probably the 
main asset available to the United States. 
Second, regional wars do not always remain 
minor wars. By the 1980s, it was already clear 
that the major powers were no longer able to 
exercise full control over regional rivalries. The 
Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years and in-
flicted massive casualties, was foreign to the 
U.S.-Soviet confrontation and neither super-
power was able to prevent or channel the con-
flict. That war had considerable consequences in 
the region: it encouraged Iraq to continue fight-
ing its neighbors, played a significant role in 
Iran’s decision to embark on WMD programs, 
and showed that chemical weapons could be 
used not only against soldiers but also against 
civilians without prompting reactions from the 
rest of the world.  
In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the coa-
lition gathered to fight the intruder was the larg-
est since the 1950-53 Korean War. Although the 
actual hostilities were limited in duration and 
casualties, the lack of a formal settlement in 1991 
and the permanent fear that Saddam Hussein 
continues to inspire in the region and beyond, 
have in effect made that apparently month-long 
clash a continuing ten-year conflict. Today, after 
more than three years without international in-
spectors in Iraq, new hostilities may start at any 
time. In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union 
Address, President Bush made clear that the 
United States was again considering military ac-
tion against Iraq. The potential global signifi-
cance of regional wars is an increasingly 
worrisome phenomenon, particularly if one takes 
into account the presence of WMD in regions of 
major tension, i.e., the Middle East, South Asia, 
and East Asia. 
Third, new powers are aspiring to become 
part of the major-power “club.” Twelve years 
after the end of the Cold War, power has shifted 
dramatically. Russia has declined to become a 
regional power It still retains huge WMD arse-
nals but lacks major economic, diplomatic, or 
conventional military power. Unified Germany is 
the most important European power, and will 
continue to grow as it “normalizes” its foreign 
and defense policies. But only the European Un-
ion, with a potential membership of 23 nations, 
is itself is a possible major power in the Euro-
pean region. India increasingly resents the un-
equal role it plays on the world stage in 
comparison to China.  
Thus the U.S. Security Council’s five perma-
nent members no longer represent the current 
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status of world affairs, and as a result the body is 
perceived as lacking legitimacy. The inability to 
find a solution to this situation that would be 
agreeable to all has prevented implementation of 
necessary reform. One result is the absence of 
serious multilateral handling of security issues, at 
a time when the United States shows a clear 
preference for a solitary path. 
NEW STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 
Three different views of the new strategic 
landscape are emerging. First is the view that the 
new age is no longer a world of major powers—
or indeed even of nation-states—but rather of 
large regional agreements, economic and/or po-
litical (the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.) and of 
transnational networks. The symbol of the 
postmodern world is the EU: an interdependent 
entity composed of states that have agreed to 
relinquish a substantial degree of their sover-
eignty to common institutions. It represents a 
breaking down of the distinction between do-
mestic and foreign affairs, and the growing ir-
relevance of national borders. Robert Cooper, 
for example, expresses this view.1 A different 
approach, though one equally dismissive of tradi-
tional “major powers,” sees network forms of 
organization attuned to the information age as 
the real winners in the new era. This hypothesis 
is made in a recent RAND study that has re-
ceived public attention since September 11:  
The fight for the future makes daily 
headlines. Its battles are not between the 
armies of leading states, nor are its 
weapons the large, expensive tanks, 
planes, and fleets of regular armed 
forces. Rather, the combatants come 
from bomb-making terrorist groups like 
Usama bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, drug 
smuggling cartels like those in Colombia 
and Mexico, and militant anarchists like 
the Black Bloc that ran amok during the 
Battle of Seattle…What all have in 
common is that they operate in small, 
dispersed units that can deploy nimbly—
anywhere, anytime.2 
                                                 
1 Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the 
World Order (London: Demos, 1999). 
2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Net-
This development has numerous strategic impli-
cations, particularly when amorphous “free-
floating” terrorist groups and criminal networks 
may possess WMD. 
Second, a sharply different perspective em-
phasizes the continuity of the traditional power 
game. According to this view, far from witness-
ing the end of the major powers and their rivalry, 
international relations now involve dealing with 
new forms of nationalism. This is true in the 
United States after September 11, where “the 
application of power has returned to the fore-
front of American foreign policy,” as the New 
York Times underlined after Bush’s State of the 
Union Address.3 For different reasons (i.e., re-
cent decolonization), the nationalist trend is also 
very prominent in Asia, particularly in countries 
like India and China. Under this reading, the 
European Union represents a unique experience 
that cannot serve as a model for other parts of 
the world. And indeed, although international 
networks will expand, the fight against their 
darkest forms (e.g., catastrophic terrorism) will 
require increasing power on the part of central 
authorities and committed governments. There-
fore, after an eclipse of ten years following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the “come-back of 
politics” is also impressive, and particularly re-
markable in the United States where the Repub-
licans were elected to implement a totally 
different agenda.  
This opposing view interprets the current 
events not only in terms of the increasing power 
of central authorities, but also in terms of a re-
turn to tough geopolitics and power relations 
among countries. It does not necessarily entail 
confrontations or conflicts between states, how-
ever, since cooperation could alternate with ten-
sion. But in essence, according to this view, each 
country essentially continues to pursue its own 
national interest. 
A third view underlines the new impetus for 
cooperation among states, and expands it to a 
number of significant issues that require collec-
tive action. According to this view, divisive is-
                                                                       
works and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 
3 “The Limits of Power,” New York Times, Janu-
ary 31, 2002. 
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sues will recede because of increasing pressures 
to solve common security and economic issues. 
And the trend towards collective endeavors will 
eventually prevail as a consequence of recogni-
tion of interests that are broader and higher than 
national ones. In particular, worldwide agree-
ment on the fight against terrorism will open an 
area of increased cooperation among states, 
which face common problems and challenges 
that they are unable to address alone (e.g., re-
garding the environment, health, drugs, weapons 
proliferation, international crime, etc.). This view 
holds that the impetus for cooperation will 
overwhelm differences over traditional national 
interests, and that September 11 offers an his-
toric opportunity to make the world safer, not 
only from terrorists with global reach, but from 
rivalry between the world’s major powers. This 
new international environment would also be 
conducive to development of multilateral 
cooperation and a sustained collective battle 
against WMD proliferation. 
MAJOR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES 
If the common aim of all the major powers 
is to maintain a relatively stable world in the 21st 
Century, then they must accept significant 
changes. In particular, they must assume major 
responsibilities commensurate with their major 
roles in world affairs. 
As the world’s leading power, the United 
States has some significant responsibilities to 
fulfill.  
• If the United States needs the rest of the 
world, then it should listen to it—something 
the current U.S. administration often ap-
pears unwilling to do. The legitimate U.S. vi-
sion of a new world order that is rules- and 
values-based would have greater worldwide 
appeal if it were not so often perceived as 
the solitary pursuit of U.S. self-interest. 
• Formal agreements may limit U.S. freedom 
of action, but they are essential for interna-
tional security and stability. At a time when 
strategic surprises are so frequent that they 
almost define the strategic scene, such 
agreements tend to reduce unpredictability. 
Since predictability is such an essential part 
of stability, it appears particularly important 
for a major power like the United States 
with numerous security commitments in re-
gions of tension. 
• Far from being a bad word, nation-building 
is a necessity when dealing with failed states, 
which now present a clear strategic challenge 
because of their potential as breeding 
grounds for terrorists. 
• Review of U.S. policy in the Middle East—
where it is increasingly obvious that left to 
themselves the Israelis and the Palestinians 
will only prepare for war—has become ur-
gent. In no other part of the world is WMD 
use more likely in the near future. The 
components of Middle East peace are 
already available in the Taba negotiations of 
January 2001. 
According to President Putin, Russia has 
chosen integration with the West. Several conse-
quences flow from this decision. 
• In the absence of independent information 
in Russia, it will be increasingly difficult to 
exercise any form of control over regional 
and central power in that country, including 
on security and nonproliferation issues. 
• If Russia wants to avoid a U.S. military op-
eration in Iraq, then it should make unambi-
guously clear to Iraq that UNSC Resolution 
1284 must be implemented and that Iraq 
must accept unconditionally the return of in-
ternational inspectors. 
• Suspicions concerning ongoing offensive 
CBW activities in Russia should be allevi-
ated. 
• Russian export controls should be enforced 
more decisively. 
China should revise its tendency to remain a 
self-obsessed country. 
• Antagonistic patriotism arising from the 
government’s “patriotic education” cam-
paigns may be the only new ideology avail-
able in China after the collapse of 
communism, but manipulating jingoistic 
public opinion is increasingly absurd in a 
globalized world, where China’s future and 
success will be related to its degree of open-
ness. 
• Threats to use force against Taiwan—seen 
by many observers as incompatible with 
UNSC permanent membership—should 
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give way in Beijing to commitments to re-
solve the issue peacefully. 
• China still does not have a responsible non-
proliferation policy, and in 2001 Chinese 
companies reportedly again have been 
caught selling hazardous materials (i.e., 
chemical and biological weapon agents) to 
Iran. 
• More generally, China is expected to become 
an international player, committed to inter-
national security even when there are no di-
rect consequences for China at stake. 
Europe should become a more serious se-
curity contributor in world affairs. 
• The enlargement of the European Union is 
widely perceived as a contribution to stabil-
ity in the Eastern part of Europe, but it 
should also contribute to enlarge the Euro-
pean strategic vision, now still limited to its 
immediate geographic periphery. 
• Fears that a war against Iraq might destabi-
lize the whole Middle East should be ac-
companied by more effective containment 
of the Iraqi threat, and a smarter combina-
tion of sanctions and inspections. 
• A European cooperative threat reduction 
program—similar to the Nunn-Lugar efforts 
in the United States—should be put in 
place, with priority given to the safety and 
security of chemical and biological weapon 
agents. Within Europe, there is significant 
agreement on the threatening nature of the 
remaining gigantic Soviet WMD complex. 
Of particular concern are theater nuclear 
weapons, offensive BW capabilities, and 
Russian difficulties in disposing of the So-
viet CW stockpile. 
• It is time for Europe to take more seriously 
its own pledge to “play its full role on the in-
ternational stage.” It should acknowledge 
that it has more security responsibilities, be-
ginning with the Balkans, Eastern Europe, 
and Africa. The process of European unifi-
cation must be accompanied by a more co-
herent and significant contribution to 
regional and international security. 
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OPPORTUNITY LOST 
In the aftermath of the U.S.-Russian sum-
mit meeting at Crawford, Texas, in November 
2001, bilateral relations are in danger of enter-
ing into a period of drift. Despite the burst of 
energy that ensued after President Vladimir 
Putin decided that Russia would join the U.S.-
led fight against terrorism, the summit pro-
duced little in the way of concrete agenda items 
for the two countries to pursue. New activities, 
especially intelligence sharing and military co-
operation, continue to develop at the tactical 
level in the anti-terrorism campaign. However, 
these were already in train prior to the summit. 
Progress on the big strategic issues, and espe-
cially on the development of a new framework 
for strategic cooperation as called for at earlier 
meetings between Putin and Bush, appears to 
have stalled. 
The reasons why Crawford was so unpro-
ductive seem rooted in President Bush’s politi-
cal preferences. His warm relationship with 
Putin, established in the three meetings that 
preceded Crawford, did not counterbalance his 
need to mollify powerful forces on Capitol Hill. 
Just prior to the summit, nine strongly anti-
ABM Treaty senators wrote Bush with the clear 
message that he would undertake amendments 
to the treaty, even time-limited ones, at his 
peril.1 Bush evidently heard that message loud 
and clear, and backed away from any effort to 
craft a compromise that would leave the ABM 
Treaty intact for a transitional period while test-
ing of U.S. missile defenses went forward. 
Putin had clearly signaled that such a com-
promise would be acceptable to him, but when 
Bush drew back Putin did as well, returning to a 
harder position on sustaining verifiable arms 
control treaties. As a result, Putin returned to 
Moscow with only half of what he needed—a 
                                                 
1 Reference to the letter appears in Stephen 
Fidler, “Summit Agrees Cuts in Nuclear 
Forces,” Financial Times, November 14, 2001. 
promise of further offensive strategic force re-
ductions by the U.S. side, but no progress on 
the defensive aspect of the strategic partnership. 
Moreover, Putin’s insistence on legally binding 
instruments received only a whiff of acquies-
cence from Bush, when he stated offhandedly 
in a November 13, 2001, White House press 
conference that if he had to write something 
down, he would. 
More startling than the arms control 
agenda, however, was the fact that no progress 
was recorded on other major cooperative activi-
ties in the economic, security, and foreign pol-
icy arenas. In the security sphere, the lost 
opportunity to accelerate progress on nonpro-
liferation and threat reduction projects was es-
pecially notable. Even if no new money were to 
be made available, the summit could have pub-
licly launched new approaches to financing such 
as debt swaps. It could also have launched ef-
forts to accelerate the programs, for example 
through the new access agreements that have 
recently been concluded and could have been 
signed with some fanfare in the summit con-
text. Finally, the summit could have launched 
new processes, such as an effort to resolve 
long-standing differences over Russian nuclear 
and missile technology cooperation with Iran. 
In the end, the two presidents were left to con-
tinue developing their personal relationship 
while foregoing other summit accomplish-
ments. 
In addition to the president’s political pref-
erence noted above, it is worth considering 
other factors that may have contributed to the 
unproductive nature of this meeting. One factor 
may be the reaction to the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission that was so evident during Bush’s 
electoral campaign. The Bush team reacted 
strongly against the notion of regular high-level 
meetings in that model, complaining that the 
Commission ground along as a government-to-
government bureaucratic exercise that did not 
answer to needs in the business community and 
other nongovernmental sectors. They therefore 
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may have felt that progress on government-to-
government priorities was not especially impor-
tant to the political health of their president. 
Evidently, the president himself felt no need to 
bring “deliverables” out of Crawford. 
If this factor reigned, then a related factor 
was also at work—lack of a bureaucratic proc-
ess that would drive toward results. Normally, a 
president wants a summit to be judged a suc-
cess, as measured in the problems solved, new 
initiatives launched, and agreements signed. 
Normally, in fact, tangible progress on issues is 
the only reason that presidents get together in 
summit meetings—the opportunity to knock 
heads in their respective governments and 
achieve results that no one else can achieve is 
the raison d’être for meeting. This urge from 
the president in turn puts the “fear of God” 
into bureaucratic players, leading to compro-
mises and solutions that would otherwise have 
been impossible. 
To ensure that the president gets what he 
wants out of a summit, one or two bureaucratic 
players—in the U.S. context often in the Na-
tional Security Council but sometimes in the 
State or Defense departments—will drive the 
process. Such “bit between the teeth” individu-
als were notably absent in the Crawford case. 
Indeed, according to some accounts, key bu-
reaucratic players applied force in the other di-
rection, to prevent tangible progress. As long as 
Bush was indifferent to summit results, their 
actions were acceptable. However, as a result, 
Crawford was a wasted opportunity. 
A PATH TO FUTURE PROGRESS 
The lack of a bureaucracy empowered and 
willing to come to grips with a new relationship 
with Russia will contribute most to drift in the 
wake of the Crawford meeting. The president 
may continue to articulate the new relationship 
as a goal, but if key bureaucratic players are 
pushing in the other direction, then few among 
the career ranks will risk sticking their necks out 
with new ideas. This effect will also be evident 
on the Russian side, where bureaucratic risk-
taking is not normal, and long-standing anti-
U.S. feeling is still strong in many quarters. 
A further trend away from cooperation is 
likely to grow in the geostrategic arena, as the 
United States and Russian Federation pursue 
quite different goals in further stages of the 
fight against terrorism. Already, Secretary of 
State Powell has had to telephone Russian For-
eign Minister Ivanov to object to the sudden 
arrival in Kabul of a large contingent of Russian 
military and diplomats. Ostensibly arriving to 
launch humanitarian programs, these individu-
als re-opened the old Soviet embassy at the in-
vitation of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Soviet 
Union’s former client in Afghanistan but no 
one else’s choice for leader of the re-emergent 
Afghan government.2 Continued problems of 
this kind are likely to further sour new efforts at 
partnership. 
This environment is quite different from 
the mood set by earlier Bush-Putin meetings as 
well as by Putin’s decision in September 2001 to 
join the anti-terrorism campaign. The question 
is, can progress nevertheless be made toward a 
more positive U.S.-Russian relationship and, 
eventually, a new framework for strategic coop-
eration? I would suggest that progress can be 
made, as long as it is built on three principles: 
existing precedent, dispersed action, and low 
profile.  
Existing precedent is not the detritus of the 
Cold War relationship, but the advances that 
have been made in U.S.-Russian interactions 
over the past decade. In the security arena, for 
example, cooperative threat reduction, nuclear 
risk reduction, laboratory-to-laboratory pro-
jects, and Y2K mitigation are a few of the initia-
tives that have created new areas of cooperation 
that can continue to be developed as U.S. and 
Russian experts confront new problems. CTR 
programs are very well known in this regard, 
but other arrangements such as the Warhead 
Safety and Security Exchange Agreement 
(WSSX) give quite broad scope for new activity 
in the counterterrorism arena, and specifically in 
responding to the WMD terrorism threat. 
Dispersed actions can be carried out in several 
venues: at cabinet and lower levels in the U.S. 
and Russian governments, in the Congress and 
Duma, and among nongovernmental organiza-
                                                 
2 Steve Mufson, “U.S. Talks to Moscow about 
Force in Kabul,” Washington Post, November 29, 
2001, p. 25. 
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tions. For example, immediately following the 
Crawford summit, U.S. Secretary of Energy 
Spencer Abraham traveled to Russia with Am-
bassador Linton Brooks, the newly confirmed 
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation. They conferred with the Rus-
sian Navy and with the Russian Ministry of 
Atomic Energy about accelerating material pro-
tection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) pro-
grams, and also took proactive steps with the 
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to re-
new dialogue on nuclear technology sales to 
Iran. They also launched several new access 
agreements with their Russian counterparts. All 
of these activities could properly have been part 
of Crawford summit “deliverables,” but since 
President Bush was not pressing for them, they 
can also be effectively deployed in this way at a 
sub-cabinet level. The important step, in this 
case, is high-level, intensive, and consistent in-
teraction with Russian interlocutors. 
Action by congressional players and non-
governmental actors can also be productive, 
although it is trickier to coordinate with gov-
ernmental priorities. At times, of course, one 
must go beyond what the President wants to do 
to make progress, just as Congress and the 
NGO community pushed for and achieved 
higher FY 02 budgets for nonproliferation and 
threat reduction programs than the Bush ad-
ministration had requested. This outcome was, 
we might say, a beneficial result of our checks-
and-balances system of government. 
In a more cooperative sense, however, 
Congress and the NGO community can par-
ticipate in developing new policies and concepts 
to advance cooperation between the two coun-
tries. A prime example of this is the work that 
has been done on Capitol Hill and among non-
government actors to develop the concept of 
“debt-for-nonproliferation swaps.” Under this 
concept, the United States and its allies would 
forgive Soviet and other debt held by the Rus-
sian government, in return for which the Rus-
sian government would pump rubles into 
previously agreed nonproliferation projects. 
While interagency work proceeds inside the 
government to examine the feasibility of the 
concept and plan the diplomacy that will be 
required to bring it into implementation, Con-
gress has embarked on developing a legislative 
package to underpin such a program. At the 
same time, the NGO community has continued 
to flesh out the concept. Such a division of la-
bor can be effective in developing new or 
unique forms of cooperation, but the actors 
involved have to remain in close communica-
tion while the process unfolds. 
Given the ambivalence that has been dis-
played within the Bush administration about a 
new partnership with Russia, keeping a low profile 
in the policy development process is probably a 
basic requirement. This approach is eased by 
the fact that the administration is finishing its 
early period, when a number of highly charged 
reviews were carried out regarding Russia pol-
icy, threat reduction and nonproliferation pro-
grams, and strategic nuclear weapons. Although 
these reviews have slowed various programs—
most prominently the plutonium disposition 
program—in the end they have not produced 
enormous upheaval in the overall Russia and 
nonproliferation portfolio. 
AIMING AT QUIET PROGRESS 
Thus, in the wake of the Crawford summit, 
it will be possible to develop new and innova-
tive policy toward Russia, but not with the burst 
of high-level support and enthusiasm that the 
early Bush-Putin meetings seemed to herald. 
Rather, government actors, along with Congress 
and the nongovernmental community, should 
be able to make considerable progress on new 
concepts and ideas for cooperation under the 
generalized presidential enthusiasm in both the 
White House and Kremlin for a “new strategic 
relationship.” In the near term, however, this 
enthusiasm does not seem like it will translate 
into significant challenges, particularly by Bush, 
to key political actors in his own party. 
For this reason, quiet progress toward the 
new relationship is probably the best course to 
pursue over the next six months, progress that 
will also be an antidote to drift. By the time the 
two presidents meet again in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, however, both will have to decide 
whether domestic political accord or the U.S.-
Russia relationship is the more important. Putin 
has already decided that he is capable of con-
fronting some of his key political interlocutors; 
Bush will have to decide whether he can do the 
same.
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Relations among the major powers appear 
to have been greatly influenced by the attacks 
of September 11 and the unfolding U.S.-led war 
on international terrorism. In the short term, 
the implications for their willingness to cooper-
ate to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical weapons appear quite 
positive. The longer-term implications are much 
less clear.1 
The positive short-term prognosis has its 
roots in the common interest created by the 
September 11 attacks. None of the other major 
powers can afford to see America lose this war. 
For them, a U.S. loss would mean the release of 
al-Qa’ida to pursue a broader agenda (not just 
against the United States), the erosion of the 
stabilizing role of the United States in regions 
of interest to the other major powers, economic 
costs including a weakening of the global trad-
ing regime, and potentially the legitimization of 
WMD, including for terrorist political purposes. 
But if they cannot afford to see they United 
States lose, neither can the other major powers 
afford to see a U.S. victory without them. They 
must be seen in Washington’s eyes to count, 
not least in order to be able to shape outcomes 
to the conflict in ways that suit their interests. 
Greater concert among the major powers 
bodes well for the nonproliferation effort. Mos-
cow may be more inclined than ever before to 
close the door on its leaky WMD programs 
(especially BW), and Washington more willing 
to spend funds toward that end. Beijing may be 
more inclined to lend its firm support to non-
proliferation, as it comes to terms with the fact 
that the interests put at risk by further prolifera-
tion are not merely the hegemonic interests of a 
                                                 
1 The views expressed here are the author’s per-
sonal views and should not be attributed to 
IDA or any of its sponsors. 
dominant power but the stability interests of 
the international community more generally. 
Greater concert may also pay dividends in 
terms of managing instabilities in the trilateral 
offense/defense relationship. Chinese strategic 
modernization, the U.S. move to deploy ballis-
tic missile defenses, and Russia’s own evolving 
offense/defense posture hold the possibility of 
new arms races and regional repercussions in 
Asia—all of which could significantly under-
mine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
But the challenges of staying the course of 
major-power concert in the period ahead may 
be considerable. If and as the hot war expands 
to include U.S. attacks on other states support-
ing international terrorism, Russia, China, or 
perhaps both may oppose U.S. actions. And as 
the war becomes a long-term campaign, all of 
the major powers will need to change in order 
for that campaign to succeed. Russia will have 
to account more seriously for the security di-
mension of international relations (and clean up 
its export act). China will have to shift from its 
preoccupation with its own problems (and the 
U.S. relationship) to more fully embrace its re-
sponsibilities as a guarantor of international 
stability. Europe will have to begin to “punch at 
its own weight.” The United States will have to 
take meaningful (and consistent) steps to foster 
and lead “the community of nations”—a role 
and community seemingly oft forgotten in the 
United States. Policymakers in Washington will 
have to stop using “multilateralism” as a dirty 
word and instead see multilateral institutions as 
a tool for “burden sharing.” 
In weighing these prospects, the record of 
the last decade is hardly reassuring. In the pe-
riod since the end of the bipolar Cold War con-
frontation, two key themes have emerged in 
relations among the major powers. 
The first: opportunity lost. The end of the 
Cold War might have been expected to bring 
with it a new era of cooperation and concert 
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among the major powers in the realm of peace 
and security—a promise that was evident in the 
context of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. But 
that promise was squandered. Increasingly, it 
seems that others expect the major powers to 
fall out among themselves in the search for 
short-term gains, rather than to cooperate for 
longer-term benefits. The implication for the 
nonproliferation project is simply that the guar-
antors (in their role as the five permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil) might have so squandered their credibility 
and authority as to ruin any future efforts to act 
to protect the regimes—even if they were to act 
in concert. 
The second theme: wariness of Washington. 
Despite the best efforts of Beijing, Moscow, 
and others to sell the notion of an emerging 
multipolarity in the international system, the 
singular place of the United States has grown 
only more pronounced in the decade since the 
end of bipolar confrontation. Accordingly, both 
Beijing and Moscow have grown increasingly 
cynical regarding Washington’s intentions. Bei-
jing especially worries that Washington aspires 
to escape from the balance of power in the dec-
ades before China’s emergence as a peer com-
petitor. This worry is magnified by China’s fear 
of what some there see America’s pursuit of its 
own “Brezhnev Doctrine”—export of Ameri-
can ideology (i.e., democracy and human rights 
for all), backed by the iron fist of American 
military supremacy. The implication for the 
nonproliferation project would be that suspi-
cion will attach to any U.S. action, however di-
rectly related to the war on terrorism. 
With these themes as context, how confi-
dent can we be that the major powers will man-
age to find concert and cooperation in their 
best interest in the period ahead? The “oppor-
tunity lost” theme points to one alternative pos-
sibility—that the U.N. Security Council system 
might somehow be swept aside as a meaning-
less vestige of a war now more than a half-
century past. In this circumstance, it seems pos-
sible that the nonproliferation project would 
also be set aside by many states, as another ves-
tige of a world order now past. The “wariness 
of Washington” theme points to another possi-
bility—that Moscow and Beijing will limit their 
cooperation with Washington in anticipation of 
a coming move by Washington to consolidate 
its gains. In Russia, Putin’s critics worry about 
this possibility in the wake of the Crawford 
summit, as they question whether America will 
pay the price Moscow may ask for sustained 
cooperation. China’s leaders too have worried 
on this score, as they fear an American attempt 
to consolidate a long-term military position in 
Asia in service of encirclement and containment 
of China (and they look at the 2001 Quadren-
nial Defense Review, with its emphasis on new 
threats in Asia, as confirmation of their fear). 
In sum, the attacks of September 11 appear 
to have laid some new foundations for a greater 
concert among the major powers, a concert that 
can be expected to pay positive dividends for 
the nonproliferation project. But that concert 
may prove short-lived. Or it may prove long-
lived but irrelevant to the nonproliferation pro-
ject, given past underperformance. 
UNFOLDING UNCERTAINTIES 
Given the profound uncertainties associ-
ated with the war on international terrorism, we 
are compelled also to consider how much this 
landscape might be changed by what has yet to 
happen. 
• What if al-Qa’ida resorts to the use of bio-
logical weapons to kill millions? What if bin 
Laden attempts the collapse of Western so-
ciety and economy through BW attack on 
food stocks or introduces contagion in 
ways targeted to make containment impos-
sible (with the ensuing political firestorm)? 
What reactions would seem necessary and 
appropriate? What lesson would be impor-
tant to “teach” in responding to such 
provocation? 
• What if an unfolding “hot war” between a 
U.S.-led coalition and an anti-U.S. coalition 
somehow sees the use of chemical and bio-
logical weapons “conventionalized?” 
• What if growing concern about the terrorist 
use of biological weapons leads states—
both minor powers and major ones—to 
develop deeper interest in such weapons? 
• What if the conflict as it unfolds somehow 
raises basic political questions about the 
cast of major powers—whether because 
some have “proven” themselves not up to 
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the label, or other states demonstrate that 
they are somehow essential and demand a 
seat with the P-5? 
The list of “what-ifs” may be long indeed, 
unless the United States is successful in termi-
nating war soon on its terms. The so-far suc-
cessful war against the Taliban suggests that this 
outcome may well be achieved. The entirely 
unanticipated character and massively destruc-
tive intent of the September 11 attacks suggests 
that this result may yet prove elusive. 
WINNING THE WAR 
—AND THE PEACE 
This exercise in “what ifs” helps to make 
three further points. First, there is an important 
distinction between winning the war on interna-
tional terrorism and winning the peace to fol-
low. Alas, international society is notorious for 
winning the war only to lose the peace that fol-
lows, though perhaps this is especially a U.S. 
dilemma. To win the peace at the major-power 
level—i.e., to facilitate major-power concert on 
peace and security issues post-war—
undoubtedly has implications for how the war 
is prosecuted. For Washington this implies a 
double-sided challenge—acting in ways that 
sustain the coalition, while ensuring that re-
straints imposed by the coalition do not prevent 
achievement of core objectives. 
Second, we cannot gauge the challenges of 
winning the peace until we know how hard-
won it proves to be. A war that stops in the 
next few weeks will present one set of essen-
tially familiar challenges. A war that rages on 
will present less familiar ones. Such a war can 
be expected to create interests that divide the 
major powers—but it can also be expected to 
create interests that bring them together. This is 
especially so if it touches on questions associ-
ated with nuclear use and the reputation of bio-
logical weapons. 
Third, if past wars are any guide, arms con-
trol will be seen as a useful tool for winning the 
peace to follow. Arms control played an impor-
tant role in the effort to consolidate the peace 
after World War I, to consolidate the post-
WWII order in both Europe and Asia, in cool-
ing down and ultimately transforming the Cold 
War, and in the post-Gulf War effort. But it is 
also the case that each conflict made new things 
seem necessary in arms control—especially in 
the chemical and biological domains, from the 
Geneva Protocol through the BWC to the 
CWC and special UNSC implementation meas-
ures in Iraq. Whether the current arms control 
agenda will look like the right agenda post-war 
will be determined by the lessons that are drawn 
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MAKING SENSE OF DISASTER 
The terrorists who murdered thousands of 
people on September 11, 2001, succeeded in 
their attempt to wreak destruction in New York 
and Washington, DC, and arouse horror across 
the United States and around the world. They 
will not, however, determine the meaning of 
that terrible day, because its ultimate impact will 
be decided by how the world responds to their 
provocation. The calamity they inflicted on 
9/11 immediately brought out the best in many 
people, from the brave self-sacrifice of police 
officers and firefighters lost at the World Trade 
Center, to the expressions by people in nearly 
every country of mourning for the victims and 
their families. The September 11 attacks also 
awakened widespread conviction that officials 
in the United States and elsewhere must devote 
urgent attention to addressing threats posed by 
terrorism and mass-destruction weapons. This 
determination—if oriented by an accurate 
assessment of new and longstanding risks of 
mass destruction, and focused through policy 
measures that can effectively address these 
risks—can help to make this a safer world in 
spite of al-Qa’ida. 
The authors in this collection bring consid-
erable expertise and dedication to the tasks of 
appraising such risks and fashioning effective 
responses.1 When we planned this effort in 
early October 2001, we did not yet know that 
                                                 
1 This essay is based on the deliberations of the 
Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group in 
its December 3-4, 2001, meeting, which consid-
ered draft versions of papers in this collection. 
In developing this paper, I sought to draw upon 
the sense of the members’ deliberations, but am 
alone responsible for their specific expression 
here. A list of the participants—who engaged in 
not-for-attribution discussions as individuals 
rather than as institutional or national represen-
tatives—concludes this publication. 
the civilian population of the United States was 
again under terrorist attack. An anonymous 
person or group had filled ordinary letters with 
weapons-grade anthrax spores and begun mail-
ing them through the U.S. Postal Service. Al-
though the first victims had already been 
infected, physicians had not yet identified the 
cause of their sickness.2 What this attack sought 
to accomplish remains a mystery, but we soon 
learned of its lethal consequences and frighten-
ing potential. The perpetrator(s) killed five peo-
ple, sickened many others, and put thousands at 
risk. We witnessed how a faceless assailant can 
pervert modern science to disseminate unseen 
pathogens to disrupt everyday life and spread 
fear. We recognize—as, unfortunately, so must 
other would-be bioterrorists—that the assail-
ant(s) benefited from the incubation period of 
the disease, and the time required for doctors to 
diagnose it as anthrax, to thus far escape detec-
tion and arrest. Though doubts remain, it ap-
pears that the culprit(s) employed several ruses 
to try to divert blame for the attack, perhaps to 
help evade capture, but possibly in a calculated 
scheme to provoke a hasty military reprisal by 
the United States against a foreign adversary. 
This essay derives preliminary lessons from 
these painful experiences and the still-unfolding 
responses to them, and reviews options for 
averting such attacks in the future. It is pre-
sented in two parts. The first offers a reassess-
ment of threats posed by mass-destruction 
terrorism and weapons proliferation after 9/11 
and the anthrax attacks. It emphasizes lamenta-
ble evidence of continuing prospects for nu-
clear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons 
proliferation, as well as increased risks posed by 
non-state actors and biological weapons. 
                                                 
2 See Eric Lipton and Kirk Johnson, “Tracking 
Bioterror's Tangled Course,” New York Times, 
December 26, 2001, p. 1. 
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Informed by these assessments, the second 
part considers a range of feasible responses, 
which include specific policy instruments as 
well as domestic and international processes 
that can generate new policy options. Some are 
“traditional” tools that need strengthening or 
updating; others are innovative ideas to address 
emerging vulnerabilities or make use of new 
political opportunities for effectively countering 
terrorist and proliferation threats. Driving many 
of these proposals is the evident necessity to 
curb unauthorized access to dangerous materi-
als within countries, and to forestall further 
NBC proliferation to more states. This review 
highlights the grave risks incurred by states that 
acquire and refuse to relinquish nuclear weap-
ons, and their urgent responsibilities to their 
own people and the international community to 
ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into 
unauthorized hands and are never again used in 
war. 
Enduring Risks 
What has really changed since 9/11? The 
events of that day called into question basic 
assumptions that many people understandably 
took for granted: that political extremists would 
not be willing to commit suicide en masse; that 
air travel is a mode of mass transportation, not 
mass destruction; that skyscrapers in New York 
would not be blown out from under office 
workers. Since then, the anthrax attacks jarred 
public confidence that little could be more safe 
or innocuous than the daily mail. Yet despite 
declarations that everything changed in Sep-
tember 2001, looking closely we see much con-
tinuity in international affairs—in fact, far too 
much constancy, if we consider enduring prolif-
eration threats and regional insecurities. 
While U.S. military responses to 9/11 may 
make many contributions to U.S. and interna-
tional security, it is hard to see how these ef-
forts can resolve some of the most serious and 
intractable NBC weapons proliferation and ter-
rorism problems. Notably, the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process will not be revived by 
the U.S. “war on terrorism” and could possibly 
be undermined by it. Ethnic and sectarian reli-
gious conflicts and terrorism have afflicted the 
Middle East for decades, and no prospects for 
their elimination are in sight today. Without 
comprehensive and credible peace, most NBC 
and ballistic missile programs in the region will 
likely continue apace. The lone but crucial ex-
ception might be that of Iraq, in the event of 
either decisive U.S. military action, or of Sad-
dam Hussein’s acceptance of the UNMOVIC 
inspection and monitoring system to verify 
Iraq’s elimination of proscribed NBC weapons 
and ballistic missiles. 
In South Asia, military responses to Sep-
tember 11 offer no hope for “rolling back” nu-
clear proliferation. At minimum, Indian and 
Pakistani officials and the international com-
munity must avert the accidental or deliberate 
use of nuclear weapons. At best, we can hope 
to forestall or at least delay deployment of nu-
clear weapons, especially on ballistic missiles, 
and avert further proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, especially to non-state actors. Given past 
wars, current tensions, geographic proximity, 
and limited early-warning capabilities, we must 
fear in particular that the unstable process of 
deploying nuclear-armed missiles in the subcon-
tinent could beget a situation as acute as the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Stepping back to consider nonproliferation 
affairs from a global perspective, some observ-
ers warn that the five nuclear-weapons-state 
(NWS) members of the NPT have made little 
progress toward fulfilling the commitments that 
they made at the 2000 Review Conference. This 
lack of momentum toward disarmament may 
pose indirect, long-term incentives for some 
non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) to recon-
sider their nonproliferation commitments, and 
may undercut international comity essential for 
effective cooperation on export controls, nu-
clear safeguards, and other measures. Nonpro-
liferation collaboration in general and the NPT 
bargain between NWS and NNWS in particular 
may also suffer if efforts to lessen the risks of 
nuclear proliferation and terrorism result in 
constricted technology transfers for legitimate, 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The September 11 and anthrax attacks 
demonstrated, moreover, deficiencies in extant 
nonproliferation regimes, notably with respect 
to non-state threats and biological weapons. 
These must be taken more seriously than in the 
past, and so are given detailed attention here. 
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Non-State Actors and Bioweapon Threats 
As Thérèse Delpech observes, 9/11 exem-
plified an ongoing trend in which “more and 
more destructive power is falling into the hands 
of more and more people.” Concern that non-
state actors might acquire capabilities sufficient 
to carry out mass-destruction or mass-
disruption assaults, however, is not new. Many 
nongovernmental specialists and government 
officials had long warned of this possibility. 
This risk was among those motivating Coopera-
tive Threat Reduction (CTR) programs to pre-
vent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons 
and fissile material in the former Soviet Union. 
Still, following the sarin gas attacks conducted 
by Aum Shinrikyu in the Tokyo subway in 
1995, the 9/11 and anthrax attacks inflicted this 
past year have made addressing such threats a 
higher priority. 
Indeed, as articulated by Usama bin Laden 
and implemented by a series of terrorist attacks 
that include the bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the USS Cole in 
2000, and most recently the 9/11 attacks, al-
Qa’ida poses a threat of unprecedented propor-
tions for a transnational actor. Bin Laden 
openly seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, and 
refuses to distinguish between civilians and 
military targets. Moreover, the perpetrators of 
the 1998 embassy bombings and 9/11 did not 
distinguish between citizens of the United 
States and those of other countries, or between 
Christians and Jews and those of the Islamic 
faith. Many Muslims and citizens from coun-
tries other than the United States were killed or 
injured in the 1998 and September 11, 2001, 
attacks; while few of the casualties in the em-
bassy bombings were Americans. We cannot 
expect discriminate targeting from al-Qa’ida; 
mass murder is not incidental but fundamental 
to the group’s operations. 
The threat its members pose is made more 
serious by the fact that at least some of the 
9/11 hijackers were willing to commit suicide. 
It may be difficult or impossible to deter attacks 
by subnational or transnational actors whose 
members are unconcerned with either their own 
personal safety or that of their putative con-
stituents—the peoples, groups, or classes they 
ostensibly claim to defend. Worse, some actors 
may deliberately seek to provoke retaliation in 
service of their political or strategic ambitions. 
During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Sad-
dam Hussein launched Scud missiles at Tel 
Aviv in an effort to provoke Israel into entering 
the war, a gambit that sought to cleave Arab 
states apart from the coalition arrayed against 
Iraq. Similarly, al-Qa’ida may have sought 
though the 9/11 attacks to provoke a U.S. mili-
tary response that would foment popular upris-
ings and regime changes in Saudi Arabia and 
other countries. 
Some transnational organizations, especially 
al-Qa’ida, have demonstrated a sophisticated 
capacity for tactical adaptation and innovation 
in their terrorist operations. Although the full 
extent of the threat cannot be assessed with 
confidence, such actors clearly pose some de-
gree of increased risk to civilian infrastructure, 
transportation and communication systems, 
chemical and nuclear plants, and to radioactive 
sources used in medicine and industry. Unfor-
tunately, mass media reports and “expert” 
commentary since 9/11 have publicized a range 
of specific possibilities that terrorists might ex-
ploit for targeting purposes or to develop new 
modes of attack. In addition, al-Qa’ida’s cell-
based organizational structure may encourage 
intra-group competition to develop ever more 
deadly tactics, while aiding members in evading 
identification and arrest by law enforcement 
officials. The threat, however, may now extend 
far beyond that organization. Worldwide, every 
individual or group disposed toward violent 
action in pursuit of their objectives may now 
draw “inspiration,” if it can be called that, from 
the tactical cunning and awful impact of the 
9/11 attacks.  
The disruptive effects of the anthrax letters, 
especially coupled with the lengthy failure to 
apprehend whoever was responsible for them, 
may provide a comparable demonstration for 
other terrorists or for states considering use of 
bioweapons. Specialists have long recognized 
that given incubation periods and the “back-
ground noise” of naturally occurring diseases, it 
might be difficult to attribute responsibility for 
bioweapons attacks or even recognize that a 
BW attack had taken place, and hypothesized 
that perpetrators might deliberately leave a false 
train of evidence to cast blame on others. Now 
each element of this scenario has been illus-
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trated for a global audience, which likely in-
cludes some terrorist organizations that previ-
ously had not considered or seriously pursued 
bioweapons. 
In particular, two types of NBC hazards are 
now of greater significance. The first is that of 
insider threats within states that possess NBC 
capabilities. Pakistan exemplifies this risk, as 
members of the nuclear weapons establishment, 
the armed forces, and the intelligence services 
had ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-
legedly to al-Qa’ida and other jihadi groups in 
the region. The danger is that those entrusted 
with the nation’s most destructive instru-
ments—nuclear weapons—may have alle-
giances other than to their national authorities. 
By no means, however, is this risk singular to 
Pakistan; indeed, the available evidence suggests 
that the anthrax assailant was probably involved 
in biodefense activities conducted under U.S. 
government auspices. But given the immense 
scope and uncertain status of NBC weapons 
programs and facilities in the former Soviet Un-
ion, it is these Cold War legacies that pose the 
most troubling potential source for insider 
threats. While diversion of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons production would require a 
sizable team or organization to constitute an 
effective threat, small groups or even lone indi-
viduals may pose serious risks if they can ac-
quire bioweapon capabilities from within a 
national biodefense or BW program.  
The second type of increased danger may 
be posed by actors that do not discriminate 
among people in carrying out terror attacks and 
who are unconcerned with the well-being of 
their professed constituents. We now face a 
much greater risk that if such actors were able 
to gain access to contagious lethal pathogens, either 
from laboratories or from natural sources, they 
may be more likely to use them than any state 
or terrorist organization had ever been before. 
In an era of intercontinental air travel, no na-
tion or population group might remain entirely 
secure if contagious agents were unleashed in 
any populated region of the world. The intrinsic 
difficulty of controlling the scope of a conta-
gion had served as an inherent deterrent in the 
past, but this prospect may not deter some pre-
sent or future terrorist organizations that are 
willing to kill thousands of people, including 
themselves and their supporters. 
The year 2001 marked a major expansion in 
the geographic scope and substantive dimen-
sions of the threat environment that policymak-
ers must consider in making security policy. 
There are, however, encouraging indications 
that decisionmakers have begun to take BW 
threats more seriously than they did in the past, 
and more importantly, have started to look 
more comprehensively—if not yet systemati-
cally—at the full range of potential threats 
posed by mass-destruction terrorism and weap-
ons proliferation. 
EFFECTIVE RESPONSES 
The continuing and emerging threats out-
lined above can only be addressed effectively 
with a multifaceted set of policy measures im-
plemented both within national boundaries and 
at the international level. This review considers 
in turn basic guiding principles; bureaucratic, 
institutional, and international processes; and 
selected policy measures that together with ex-
isting efforts can generate an adequate program 
of action to diminish risks of mass-destruction 
terrorism and weapons proliferation. In ad-
dressing some problems, fortunately, construc-
tive synergies will facilitate efforts to deny NBC 
weapons both to state and non-state actors. For 
instance, more effective implementation of 
IAEA safeguards on civilian nuclear fuel-cycle 
facilities would serve both counterterrorism and 
nonproliferation objectives.  
Nevertheless, crafting policy responses will 
require balancing priorities and making a num-
ber of difficult tradeoffs on other issues, be-
tween the relative risks posed by state and non-
state actors; between preventing NBC war and 
averting NBC terrorism; and between unilateral 
decisiveness and multilateral deliberation. Such 
trade-offs are exemplified by the urgent need to 
secure the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals, 
but to do so without legitimizing these states’ 
blatant violation of international nonprolifera-
tion norms. Among the most important and 
perhaps the most contradictory responses to 
the 9/11 and anthrax attacks are U.S. defense 
efforts. For example, the dramatic boost in 
funding for U.S. biodefense activities undoubt-
edly will make vital contributions to addressing 
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BW threats. However, if internal security in 
these programs is as lax as it reportedly has 
been in the past, by increasing the number of 
individuals working with lethal pathogens and 
relevant processing technologies, this expanded 
effort will increase insider risks of bioterrorist 
actions against the United States. 
Guiding Principles 
Effective responses to 9/11 and the an-
thrax attacks should be informed by several 
principles. The most basic principle, of course, 
is to aim for the outcome that prevents NBC-
related security threats from ever materializing: 
nonproliferation. Obviously, nuclear weapons and 
fissile materials that are never produced cannot 
be employed by states or stolen by terrorist or-
ganizations. In general terms, the nonprolifera-
tion of NBC weapons offers the soundest basis 
for preserving both international security and 
U.S. national security. This principle has ori-
ented the most effective campaign in history to 
curb the spread of advanced strategic technol-
ogy, effectively limiting the spread of the most 
destructive military instrument ever invented—
nuclear weapons. Over the past five decades 
more and more countries have developed ad-
vanced technological and industrial infrastruc-
tures, but fewer and fewer of them have chosen 
to apply their capabilities to producing nuclear 
weapons. Over time, acquisition, testing, and 
threats to use nuclear weapons have become 
increasingly infrequent, to such an extent that in 
literal terms these have become deviant behav-
iors for the international community of nations. 
However, chemical and especially biological 
weapons-relevant materials and technologies 
differ because of their diverse, important, and 
legitimate civilian purposes. Given their societal 
contributions, it is impractical to deny access to 
such dual-use items. Five other principles, how-
ever, can orient effective responses to terrorism 
and proliferation. 
The first is that of preventing unauthorized ac-
cess to NBC weapons and other capabilities that 
can be employed for mass-destruction strikes. 
This principle is most obviously involved in 
efforts to increase physical protection of fissile 
materials, deny outsiders access to nuclear 
power plants, and prevent suspected terrorists 
from boarding aircraft. Such activities enable 
states to gain effective control over actors and 
activities within their national territory, prevent-
ing non-state actors from acquiring, shipping, 
storing, or launching NBC weapons from 
within national borders. Where functioning 
states do not exist or where they lack control 
over some regions, as in present-day Afghani-
stan, state-building or capacity-strengthening 
efforts may be necessary to create the institu-
tional foundations for denying access to non-
state actors.  
A second principle is that of crafting mutu-
ally reinforcing domestic and international measures, in 
order to leverage scarce financial, human, and 
political resources; avoid creating loopholes or 
vulnerabilities that terrorists or states seeking 
NBC capabilities can exploit; and to create mul-
tiple layers of prevention, deterrence, and de-
fense against mass-destruction threats. Stated 
conversely, focusing too narrowly on one type 
or arena of possible risk, or relying too heavily 
on one type of policy response, invites failure. 
For example, denying terrorists access to fissile 
material will require effective implementation of 
both national and international safeguards, and 
no world region or country can be ignored in 
safeguarding fissile materials as the least-secure 
area would then become the target of illicit pro-
curement activities.  
A third principle is to craft dual-purpose re-
sponses. For example, disease surveillance and 
public health capabilities offer societal benefits 
even in the absence of deliberate BW attack. 
Research investments, training exercises, and 
communications systems can aid in the fight 
against emerging infectious diseases and other 
health risks, whether or not specific BW threats 
ever materialize. In prioritizing expenditures, 
efforts should be weighted to address the broad 
range of BW threats that overlap with natural 
sources of infection. This principle also applies 
to efforts to secure transportation, communica-
tion, and energy facilities, which should be pri-
oritized so as to also help prepare for natural 
disasters.  
A fourth principle applies to efforts to 
thwart terrorism. Forceful interdiction to identify, 
disrupt, and if possible destroy terrorist organi-
zations is imperative to prevent transnational 
groups from again turning prosaic tools of 
modern life into terror weapons. Hopefully, 
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disrupting al-Qa’ida and toppling the Taleban 
will create a deterrent effect that will discourage 
state sponsorship of non-state actors that en-
gage in terrorism, and will also reduce interna-
tional toleration for actors that use terror in 
ostensible pursuit of such legitimate goals as 
national self-determination. However, conven-
tional military force may be useful in only a 
relatively small portion of counterterrorist ac-
tivities. Such measures as inter-state intelligence 
sharing, domestic law enforcement, and disrupt-
ing terrorist financial networks are apt to be of 
greater utility for interdiction tasks in most 
places and times. 
A fifth principle that will shape prospects 
for stemming terrorist and NBC proliferation 
threats to international security is that of justice. 
Real and perceived violations of human rights, 
economic justice, political freedom, national 
sovereignty, and other normative values have 
no automatic, direct consequences for interna-
tional security. However, as in the present Is-
raeli-Palestinian and Indo-Pakistani conflicts 
over disputed territories demonstrates, histori-
cal and present-day grievances provide underly-
ing motivations that can be mobilized by 
societal activists and government officials, with 
consequences that unfortunately often fall most 
heavily on noncombatants. In this regard, eco-
nomic development assistance may serve non-
proliferation insofar as aid creates societal 
benefits that reduce the motivations of subna-
tional and transnational actors to engage in ter-
rorism or acquire mass-destruction weapons. 
Innovative Processes 
Among the most promising developments 
since 9/11 are new approaches and processes 
that have emerged or been proposed for gener-
ating new policy options. In this regard, the 
U.S. “war on terrorism” is a process of a magni-
tude and significance all its own, and hence it is 
examined below in detail. But one aspect of this 
U.S. campaign has broad potential application. 
That is for the United States or other interna-
tional or regional leaders to work with “coali-
tions of the willing:” informal, ad-hoc, 
problem-oriented groupings of two or more 
states, whose national interests are at risk and 
that have the resources to confront a specific 
terrorist or NBC proliferation threat. Such an 
approach has many advantages, not least the 
decisiveness possible when the number of ac-
tors is reduced to the absolute minimum neces-
sary for success in resolving a specific problem. 
Possible risks of this approach, however, in-
clude lack of continuity over time, inconsistency 
with efforts in other regions, and undermining 
support for multilateral approaches to security 
affairs and fostering disregard for international 
institutions. One way to avoid this would be to 
employ ad-hoc coalitions and perhaps formal 
military alliances (e.g., NATO) to build political 
consensus and implement concrete measures 
within a sub-set of countries. These could serve 
as building blocks to prepare for subsequent 
efforts in additional regions or at the multilat-
eral level. 
One process of potentially broad relevance 
is that of self-governance by scientific commu-
nities to avoid creating unintended biological, 
chemical, or other mass-destruction risks. Such 
efforts may generate a wide range of policy op-
tions that could effectively stem NBC weapons 
proliferation and terrorism at the individual, lab, 
and scientific society levels. Potentially even 
surpassing nuclear physics and modern chemis-
try, biotechnology development and the biosci-
ences offer tremendous opportunities for 
bettering the human condition, but as always, 
powerful knowledge can be misused. Govern-
ment regulations and law enforcement can only 
go so far in preventing the misuse of scientific 
and commercial advances, and for the sake of 
efficiency alone it would be best if scientific 
communities carried out as much of the gov-
ernance responsibilities as is feasible. 
 Another potentially useful process applies 
to the U.S. political system, in which the execu-
tive branch would pursue an expedited ap-
proach to winning approval for new arms 
control and nonproliferation accords from the 
legislature. Taking a “fast-track” approach with 
the Senate could avoid many of the negative 
outcomes of the past decade, from partisan po-
litical opposition to the CTBT to loopholes 
created in gaining ratification of the CWC. In 
the United States as elsewhere, a broad, nonpar-
tisan, executive-legislative consensus would 
provide the firmest basis for advancing nonpro-
liferation and counterterrorism measures that 
involve formal international accords. 
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Finally, an innovative process worth con-
sideration is George Perkovich’s proposal for 
the creation of a nuclear “contact group.” Such 
a group could resemble in shared purpose that 
formed by Britain, France, Germany, Russia, 
and the United States to address the Bosnia 
conflict. But this nuclear contact group would 
include the dozen-odd states whose nuclear 
armaments and fissile material stocks inherently 
pose potential threats to international security. 
At least indirectly, the nuclear weapons, atomic 
energy, and national security policies of these 
states are interconnected, but at present this 
otherwise heterogeneous group has no dedi-
cated venue in which to examine and address 
their policy interdependence. There are risks 
that such a process could legitimate nuclear 
weapons proliferation by India, Israel, and Paki-
stan, but there are also considerable benefits 
that might be gained. Not least of these would 
be to create a forum for promoting greater rec-
ognition of what Perkovich underscores are the 
“solemn burdens and onerous responsibilities 
attendant to possessing nuclear weapons.” 
Specific Measures 
As the papers in this collection outline, 
policymakers can help curb terrorism and pro-
liferation threats to some degree by updating 
and strengthening existing policy measures, but 
they should also consider designing new meas-
ures. In preventing states or non-state actors 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, fissile materi-
als, or radioactive sources, further efforts are 
necessary to enhance and gain the full security 
benefits of existing procedures. Former Soviet 
stockpiles continue to represent the greatest 
risks, and increased budgetary commitments 
indicate that the Bush administration has come 
to recognize the vital contributions that CTR 
programs make to reducing potential terrorist 
threats to U.S. national security. Even if major 
new U.S.-Russian efforts on nonproliferation 
cooperation are not in the offing, low-key but 
still significant cooperative activities can and 
should continue to advance at the bureaucratic 
level and in the efforts of nongovernmental 
actors. European states could make important 
contributions by establishing and funding com-
parable CTR efforts, although given current 
CTR emphasis on nuclear warheads and fissile 
materials, a complementary European campaign 
might be most helpful if it were focused on 
safely disposing of CW munitions and reori-
enting former CBW facilities toward civilian 
enterprises. 
To date, few IAEA members have brought 
into legal force the 1997 Additional Protocol on 
expanded IAEA safeguards. This is unfortu-
nate, because widespread implementation of 
expanded safeguards would help prevent unau-
thorized access and illicit trafficking, and thus 
contribute to denying terrorists and proliferant 
states access to materials necessary to fabricate 
nuclear weapons. IAEA members should also 
build on the 1987 Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, to update the 
accord, expand its scope, and fully implement 
the convention in domestic law and institutions. 
At present, the IAEA is seriously under-
resourced to effectively ameliorate radiological 
attacks and sabotage of nuclear power plants 
and fuel-cycle facilities. IAEA supporters—and 
indeed, every state with an interest in avoiding 
radioactive contamination of the environment 
and consequent international threats to public 
health—should dramatically increase their fi-
nancial, political, and human-resource support 
for the agency’s efforts to ensure that nuclear 
energy is employed only for peaceful purposes. 
Much new work needs to be done to mini-
mize the bioweapon threats inherently involved 
in human and veterinary medicine, bioscience, 
and biotechnology development. As suggested 
above, the international scientific community 
should work to develop a regulation system and 
new norms for practitioners in the biological 
sciences. This could be usefully augmented by 
governmental measures, including criminaliza-
tion of illicit BW-related activity. The United 
States government should undertake an exhaus-
tive national inventory of the most dangerous 
pathogens held by U.S. laboratories, and review 
its national legislation with an eye to developing 
effective accounting and control over disease 
cultures and dual-use processing and dissemina-
tion technologies. These U.S. measures could 
serve as the basis for expanding protections 
overseas, by opening negotiations on a multilat-
eral Biosecurity Convention that would employ 
a safety-and-security approach to preventing 
bioterrorism. 
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Some biological weapon scenarios may 
have widespread and destabilizing conse-
quences for international affairs. Unless clearly 
punished, any BW use by a state in war could 
encourage further BW proliferation and use in 
other conflicts. Leading members of the inter-
national community should commence informal 
discussions—perhaps in the G-8 but certainly 
in the U.N. Security Council—to outline in ad-
vance a range of appropriate responses in the 
event of a breach in the international norm 
against the use of bioweapons. Preparing a co-
ordinated response may be invaluable if the 
international community is forced to confront 
such an event, but publicizing such advance 
preparations could also serve as a useful deter-
rent that might avert BW attacks from ever be-
ing inflicted. 
THE U.S. “WAR ON TERRORISM” 
As noted above, perhaps the important 
process set in motion by 9/11 is that of the 
ongoing U.S. campaign to identify, locate, and 
kill or capture al-Qa’ida leaders, members, and 
supporters in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Al-
though military combat in Central Asia has 
drawn the greatest attention, the ultimate suc-
cess of this effort will depend on a range of 
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement 
activities around the world and in the United 
States. Beyond its direct contributions to pre-
venting al-Qa’ida from acquiring NBC weapons 
and conducting mass-destruction attacks, this 
“war on terrorism” also aims to deter states 
from aiding transnational actors that engage in 
terrorism against the United States, its civilian 
population at home, and its military forces, al-
lies, and friends abroad. The most important 
consequences of this campaign, however, may 
be its indirect benefits in terms of reshaping the 
global security agenda, forging new alliances 
and ameliorating old enmities, and generating 
new political, institutional, and technical op-
tions for addressing terrorism and proliferation 
threats. At present, this globe-spanning process 
is still in motion, and its ultimate trajectory and 
cumulative accomplishments remain uncertain.  
One point, however, has never been in 
doubt. If grounded in an accurate assessment of 
both proliferation threats and nonproliferation 
opportunities, and focused through effective 
policy instruments that can avert terrorism and 
stem proliferation, U.S. leadership can make 
unparalleled contributions to international as 
well as U.S. national security. Toward these 
ends, this essay concludes by analyzing contra-
dictory impacts of the U.S. campaign, question-
ing the dominant U.S. overall threat assessment, 
and stressing the importance of winning not 
just the current war but the ensuing peace. 
Problematic Contradictions 
Addressing security threats typically in-
volves making compromises between pursuing 
the ideal and achieving the feasible; coping with 
near-term crises and reducing longer-term risks; 
and resolving distinct types of security threats. 
In this regard, despite its extraordinary urgency 
the U.S. response to 9/11 has been quite typi-
cal. Many aspects of the U.S. response show 
great promise for ameliorating mass-destruction 
terrorism and proliferation threats. The United 
States has forcefully unseated the Taleban and 
denied al-Qa’ida the use of training camps in 
Afghanistan; effectively pressed Pakistan’s lead-
ers to end the “jihadization” of the Pakistani 
state and society; and won concessions from 
Saudi Arabia to curb terrorist financing and 
recruitment activities in that country. Moreover, 
the United States has never been more seriously 
engaged in promoting constructive security ar-
rangements in South Asia than it has become in 
the wake of 9/11. The U.S. presence and com-
mitments in this theater may entail a sustained 
combination of pressure and assistance for In-
dia and Pakistan to address their bilateral con-
flicts, and eventually yield arrangements to build 
confidence and reduce misinformation during 
crises, or result in other improvements to re-
gional security.  
Furthermore, President Bush has bluntly 
threatened that if necessary the United States 
may preempt Iranian, Iraqi, and North Korean 
programs that could pose NBC and missile 
threats to the United States or its interests. De-
terring or preventing nuclear proliferation by 
Iraq and North Korea in particular—both of 
which have unequivocally violated their non-
proliferation commitments under the NPT—
would be a major contribution to regional and 
international security. Deterring and/or punish-
ing such “rogue” behavior as sponsoring terror-
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ism or acquiring NBC weapons by these or 
other states would certainly help to make this a 
safer world. 
But the military campaign against terrorism 
and Bush’s warnings to states comprising what 
he terms an “axis of evil” are not the only pol-
icy innovations that the United States has un-
dertaken since 9/11. Lamentably, even if the 
aforementioned contributions are achieved, 
they may prove in time to be overshadowed by 
the tacit, simultaneous U.S. accommodation of 
nuclear proliferants in South Asia. Most impor-
tantly, the U.S. posture toward Pakistan has 
undergone a radical transformation. Before Sep-
tember 11, U.S. officials denounced what they 
viewed as the country’s illegitimate military 
leadership; condemned Pakistan’s open and 
extensive support for the Taleban; threatened 
to classify Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror-
ism; and imposed sanctions to punish its viola-
tion of nonproliferation norms in developing 
nuclear weapons and testing them in May 1998. 
Since 9/11, however, Pakistan has become a 
close U.S. ally, one openly rewarded for its as-
sistance in the war in Afghanistan. What en-
abled an erstwhile “rogue” state to befriend the 
world’s sole superpower? Geographic contiguity 
to Afghanistan was obviously important, as was 
Pakistan’s willingness to turn against the 
Taleban, but international observers can hardly 
fail to infer that Pakistan’s arsenal of nuclear 
weapons played a decisive role in U.S. calcula-
tions. To judge from this Pakistani experience, 
nuclear proliferation can pay big dividends in 
terms of gaining international influence.  
This example may provide an additional ra-
tionale for nuclear weapons beyond the view 
previously expressed by Indian officials that the 
United States only respects countries that pos-
sess nuclear weapons, and that acquiring the 
bomb effectively forestalls the possibility of 
U.S. military intervention. As Amin Tarzi ob-
serves, U.S. acquiescence to Pakistani prolifera-
tion is undoubtedly a matter of close attention 
in Tehran, and may lead the current Iranian 
regime—and governments or political cliques in 
other countries—to conclude that possession of 
nuclear weapons can serve as an insurance pol-
icy to secure a given regime, however undemo-
cratic or otherwise illegitimate.  
This “lesson” is surely not one that the 
Bush administration sought to convey, and 
given the immediate exigencies after 9/11 of 
assembling and deploying military forces against 
al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, it is not clear whether 
the United States could have avoided conveying 
this regrettable impression. There are certainly 
valid strategic and economic reasons for U.S. 
decisions to waive or eliminate sanctions against 
India and Pakistan, but over the long term, 
these considerations may pale in contrast to the 
importance of stemming the pace and extent of 
nuclear proliferation. 
The medium- to long-term risk is that such 
countries as Egypt, Japan, South Africa, 
Ukraine, and the many other countries that 
have abjured nuclear weapon ambitions could 
eventually conclude that if current nuclear pro-
liferation is acceptable and future proliferation 
inevitable, then their national security interests 
may require that they too acquire strategic de-
terrents offering regional and international in-
fluence. It would be unfortunate to allow the 
demands of a few proliferant states to over-
shadow the legitimate security needs of the 
many nonproliferants—the majority of states 
that are, after all, the “good citizens” of the in-
ternational community. 
Narrow Threat Assessment 
Senior officials in the Bush administration 
are rightly preoccupied with mass-destruction 
and terrorism threats posed by al-Qa’ida and by 
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. These risks cannot 
be trivialized or ignored, but there are grounds 
for concern that if U.S. officials lose sight of the 
broader potential and actual threat environ-
ment, myopic focus on these risks could drive 
policy responses that may inadvertently under-
cut U.S. national security, unsettle international 
stability, and undermine U.S. influence in shap-
ing world affairs. Considering its statements, 
decisions, and actions, on balance it appears 
that in assessing threats this administration dis-
tinguishes reflexively between types of actors 
rather than between categories of weapons. 
From this vantage, “rogue” state acquisition of 
mass-destruction weapons is the core security 
problem before the United States, not the 
spread of NBC weapons per se. While in the 
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short term this view is understandable, over the 
longer term it is apt to prove misguided. 
Consider that in just the few decades since 
the beginning of the nuclear era, at different 
points in time the United States has had both 
cooperative and adversarial relationships with 
such important countries as China, Iran, Iraq, 
Japan, Germany, and Russia. In the absence of 
radical transformations in international affairs, 
the nuclear weapons and fissile material stocks 
produced to date will continue to pose latent 
threats to U.S. national security for the foresee-
able future (while some radioactive wastes may 
remain potential instruments of terrorism for a 
time span on the order of human civilization). 
Given historical reversals in inter-state relations, 
it is not prudent for the United States to pre-
sume that its allies today will always be its 
friends tomorrow. Likewise, even longstanding 
and bitter enmities may give way to improved 
relations, and so old foes may one day be new 
partners. For this reason, the fundamental prin-
ciple of nonproliferation—regardless of 
whether it is friends or foes that seek or acquire 
NBC weapons—provides the most reliable ba-
sis for preserving U.S. (and international) secu-
rity over time. 
In advocating development of U.S. de-
fenses against the possibility of a surprise ballis-
tic missile attack, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld has recounted the many stra-
tegic surprises that have confronted the United 
States during his lifetime.3 Incongruously, how-
ever, his “worst case” threat assessment does 
not appear to anticipate the possibility that the 
nuclear and missile capabilities of current U.S. 
allies might one day be turned against the 
United States or its interests. Moreover, his 
analysis fails to consider the importance of ex-
ploiting unexpected but positive developments, 
a number of which have also occurred during 
the same time period. Most notably, the Cold 
War ended swiftly not in hot war but through 
the disintegration of what had appeared for 
decades to be a political system with invincible 
totalitarian control over an expansive empire. 
Just as unexpectedly and positively, though less 
                                                 
3 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Toward 21st-Century 
Deterrence,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2001, 
p. A16. 
world-altering, the apartheid regime in South 
Africa came to an end not through violent revo-
lution but by political reform. In crafting poli-
cies to address mass-destruction terrorism and 
proliferation threats, the United States should 
prepare for the worst, but it should also posi-
tion itself to take advantage of “pleasant sur-
prises” that provide opportunities for securing 
progress, which history also shows that we can 
expect to encounter. 
Nevertheless, September 11 certainly made 
plain the devastating potential of some strategic 
surprises. While Rumsfeld and others had 
stressed for years that NBC-armed ballistic mis-
sile proliferation posed the most immediate and 
serious threat to the U.S. homeland, the Sep-
tember 11 and anthrax attacks did not employ 
ballistic missiles or any other type of military 
delivery vehicle, but instead exploited the exist-
ing civilian infrastructure to deadly effect. Con-
trary to the initial expectation of many analysts, 
Rumsfeld and his colleagues appear not to have 
reconsidered their determination to field anti-
missile interceptors. In this regard, the admini-
stration appears to have concluded that it can-
not win China and Russia’s support on 
nonproliferation export controls and that 
“rogue” proliferation programs will continue 
unchecked, so the only remedy is to try to de-
feat missile threats by mounting an anti-missile 
system as soon as possible. 
But 9/11 also catalyzed positive interna-
tional responses, notably the surprising conver-
gence of great-power interests that undercut an 
emerging Chinese-Russian strategic alliance, 
dampened U.S. conflicts with China, and led to 
Putin’s historic decision to unequivocally ally 
Russia with the West. In the U.N. Security 
Council, China and Russia joined in a unani-
mous declaration of support for the United 
States that contrasted vividly with recent dis-
putes over Kosovo, Iraq, and other issues. Both 
countries joined, moreover, in the unanimous 
vote for UNSC 1373, which provides a new 
institutional framework for criminalizing and 
combating international terrorism. In open 
support of U.S. military strikes into neighboring 
Afghanistan, Moscow authorized the use of 
former Soviet airbases by U.S. bombers likewise 
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built during the superpowers’ Cold War. These 
historic shifts constituted a unique and unex-
pected opportunity for major-power collabora-
tion.  
The Bush administration did make tactical 
use of this opportunity, notably by gaining Rus-
sian support for military action in Central Asia. 
But the Bush-Putin summit at Crawford, Texas, 
resulted in no concrete or constructive ad-
vances toward reducing the proliferation and 
terrorism threats posed by Cold War stockpiles 
in Russia. And the Bush administration decided 
to withdraw the United States from the ABM 
Treaty, despite serious Chinese and Russian 
objections that doing so would prejudice their 
security, and in the face of strong reservations 
expressed by NATO allies. 
Thus, the “rogue state” missile threat as-
sessment appears to be a driving force in U.S. 
policy responses that relinquished leverage over 
China and Russia, which could otherwise be 
exploited to press both states to halt missile 
technology transfers that enable Iran, Pakistan, 
and North Korea to pose increasingly sophisti-
cated missile threats. Moreover, the decision to 
abrogate the ABM Treaty, like recent U.S. deci-
sions on the CTBT, BWC, and other coopera-
tive international endeavors, has unsettled many 
U.S. allies in ways that may lead some to con-
sider developing independent strategic capabili-
ties. We may never know whether the United 
States could have taken advantage of allied, Chi-
nese, and Russian concerns regarding the ABM 
Treaty to win support for measures to 
effectively stem the proliferation of NBC tech-
nologies, because thus far the Bush administra-
tion has never even considered—let alone 
seriously tested—this policy alternative. 
Oriented by fatalism regarding the pros-
pects for stemming nuclear and ballistic missile 
proliferation, the administration’s foremost de-
fense priority is to develop and deploy an anti-
missile system. Even if it proves possible to 
overcome sensor, integration, protection, and 
other challenges to develop a functioning anti-
missile defense system, such a measure can at 
best address only one means of delivering NBC 
weapons against the United States. Moreover, 
although missile proliferation does pose a threat 
to U.S. national security, the U.S. intelligence 
community estimates that the U.S. homeland is 
more likely to be attacked with NBC weapons 
by enemies “using nonmissile means.”4 These 
factors alone are insufficient to preclude con-
sideration of missile defenses. The critical point, 
however, is that the dominant U.S. threat as-
sessment does not appear to be grounded in a 
comprehensive and systematic evaluation of 
mass-destruction threats to the United States; 
instead, a narrow assessment is driving empha-
sis on a limited set of policy responses without 
careful evaluation of potential unintended con-
sequences, or exploration of alternative options 
that might avoid negative repercussions. 
Winning the Peace 
Since 1940, military force has been critical 
to stopping dangerous nuclear weapon threats 
posed by Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and 
Ba’athist Iraq. In past months, military meas-
ures were decisive in unseating the Taleban and 
physically dismantling al-Qa’ida facilities and 
operations in Afghanistan. The demonstrated 
readiness of the United States and its allies to 
use force in the past—and credible threats to 
do so in the future—can aid in preventing ter-
rorism and deterring the use of NBC weapons, 
and in some cases may dissuade states or non-
state actors from pursuing acquisition of NBC 
weapons. If other countries are unwilling to 
bear the financial, political, and military burdens 
of enforcing Iraq’s compliance with U.N. Secu-
rity Council-mandated elimination of mass-
destruction weapons, then at some point it may 
fall to the United States to do so on its own. 
But these specific contributions to reducing 
mass-destruction terrorism and proliferation 
risks should not be confused with the entire 
campaign against such threats to international 
peace and security. Military force alone cannot 
prevent al-Qa’ida operatives outside Afghani-
stan from conducting terror attacks, or obviate 
threats posed by most other non-state actors. 
                                                 
4 Director of Central Intelligence, “Foreign 
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile 
Threat though 2015,” (Washington, DC: Na-
tional Intelligence Council, December 2001), 
pp. 7, 15, <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/ 
other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissile 
final.pdf>. 
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Indeed, the utility of force and modalities of 
power are uncertain in this new era; e.g., mega-
tons of nuclear destructive capability offer no 
means to leverage information about terrorist 
intentions and capabilities, yet acquiring such 
information will be imperative to averting fu-
ture attacks. And U.S. preemptive warnings are 
at best credible against only the very narrow set 
of militarily weak countries that are also current 
U.S. adversaries. Military force, whether wielded 
unilaterally or in allied coalitions, likewise offers 
leverage that is in most cases inadequate and 
more often negligible for remedying bioweapon 
hazards. To employ Brad Robert’s suggestive 
phrase, the task before the United States and 
other members of the international community 
is to focus the determination and concern 
aroused by the 9/11 and anthrax attacks on 
developing an integrated program of action that 
can aid in “winning the peace” that will follow 
the present conflict. 
Since 1945, U.S. leaders have sought to 
prevent the spread of dangerous military capa-
bilities, especially to U.S. foes but also to U.S. 
friends. Toward this end, they developed an 
interlocking set of U.S. and international institu-
tions that have had greater success in averting 
nuclear proliferation than anyone imagined pos-
sible in the early years of the nuclear age. These 
institutions differ in type and specific applica-
tion, ranging from the safeguards agreements 
required for export of research reactors to 
mandatory sanctions against countries testing 
nuclear weapons; from security assurances for 
NATO members to NSG controls on sensitive 
nuclear and dual-use exports; from the NPT 
norm against nuclear weapons proliferation to 
counterproliferation preparedness to fight and 
prevail in the event of CBW attack against U.S. 
armed forces. But over time, facing new and 
more diverse proliferation threats and also un-
expected nonproliferation opportunities, U.S. 
leaders have helped to create more and more 
U.S. and international institutions employing 
progressively more sophisticated tools for ad-
dressing mass-destruction threats. 
Increasingly, however, there are grounds 
for concern that in dealing with security chal-
lenges the current U.S. administration may be  
unnecessarily and imprudently relying on a nar-
row set of policy measures—primarily the uni-
lateral exercise of military force and deployment 
of national missile defense—while foregoing 
available institutions and policy alternatives that 
can more effectively address threats to the 
United States and international community. In 
particular, a number of recent decisions have 
undermined the effectiveness of existing non-
proliferation tools. Regrettably, though a unilat-
eral pattern of decision making and selective 
backing for international law, and in particular 
through negative actions regarding the CTBT, 
CWC, BWC draft protocol and Review Confer-
ence, and ABM Treaty, the United States risks 
losing credibility as a good-faith, constructive 
participant in international efforts to address 
NBC weapons threats. 
Worse, by disparaging international institu-
tions in general, some Bush administration offi-
cials may be undermining strategic stability and 
predictability, as well as reducing the perceived 
reliability of the United States as a security 
guarantor. NATO, after all, is a treaty-based 
organization. Coupled with repeated demon-
strations that the United States can exert over-
whelming force at a global scope unparalleled in 
history, and given alleged U.S. intentions to 
militarize space and otherwise increase its mili-
tary preeminence even further, such steps risk 
creating the perception that the United States is 
bent on global military domination. Over the 
long term, such a perception could itself create 
considerable dangers for international stability 
as it might prompt countering responses from 
allies as well as adversaries. But in the short 
term, it could have the adverse effect of dis-
tracting attention from the very real threats 
posed by mass-destruction weapons prolifera-
tion and terrorism. 
That would be tragic. For although the 
United States is a military hegemon possessing 
unrivaled destructive capability, it is also a state 
with basic national interests in preserving inter-
national peace and security, and a country dedi-
cated to promoting such values as democratic 
governance and religious freedom. To a degree 
perhaps also unrivalled in history, the core in-
terests and values of the dominant power of  
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this era coincide with those of the majority of 
countries and peoples around the world. As in 
creating the international order following World 
War II, the United States would do best for 
itself and others by creating and sustaining in-
ternational institutions like NATO and the 
Bretton Woods system that joined military, po-
litical, and economic power with shared, legiti-
mate purposes. 
In at least one momentous sense, the an-
thrax and 9/11 attacks of 2001 did constitute a 
watershed, by triggering newfound recognition 
worldwide that all civilized peoples have a 
shared stake in averting mass-destruction ter-
rorism and weapons proliferation. This offers 
an historic opportunity to meld U.S. power with 
common international purpose to craft durable 
nonproliferation institutions.
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